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Missouri Law Review
Volume 2

NOVEMBER, 1937

Number 4

THE WORK OF THE MISSOURI SUPREME
COURT FOR THE YEAR 1936
This issue of the Missouti Law Review is devoted to a study of the work
of the Missouri Supreme Court for the year 1936. This study is designed to
follow the progress of the law in Missouri as found in the decisions by the
highest appellate tribunal. It is true, however, that the full development of
the law during any period cannot be shown without including the work of the
Missouri Courts of Appeals. Various members of the legal profession have
collaborated in this study. It is hoped that this effort will prove to be of
sufficient value so that this type of study will become an annual part of this
publication. In this manner the progress of the law may be pointed out to
the members of the legal profession of Missouri in a way that the reading of
isolated cases during the year cannot do. It is quite obvious that there are
limitations to a survey of this nature. It is, of course, impossible to cover
every topic in the law, hence certain fields have been selected.
I
STATISTICAL SURVEY
The following statistical tables convey their own significance. Table I
shows the volume of work which has been presented to the court during 1935
and 1936. It shows also the disposition of the cases. It is to be noticed that
there was a considerable reduction in the number of cases filed in 1936, as
compared to 1935. However, the number of cases disposed of by opinions was
greater in 1936 than in 1935.1

1. There is a variance between the total number of cases disposed of by
opinions in Table I and the number in Table II. This may be explained in that
the former was taken from the docket, while the latter was taken from the reports.
Certain opinions have disposed of more than one docketed case. In some instances
a case was decided in 1935 and rehearing denied in 1936. In Table II, the date of
the decision was taken.
(393)
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TABLE

12

SUPREME COURT DOCKET

January 1, 1935, to December 31, 1936
Number of cases on docket January 1, 1937

Writs

Civil

Criminal

Total

270

288

Number of cases filed 1935-1936
Civil
Writs
Criminal
1935 ----------- 473
216
98
1936----------- 342
185
96
815

401

Total
787
623

194

1410

Number of cases disposed of by opinions
Civil
Criminal
1935 ---------------------256
75
1936 ---------------------296
73
552

Total
331
369

148

700

Number of cases disposed of by motions, etc.
Civil
Writs
Criminal
1935 ---------- 302
147
35
1936 ---------- 276
132
20
578

279

55

Total
484
428
912

Number of cases under submission

Civil

Criminal

Total

69

8

77

Number of cases on docket January 1, 1935 ------ 490
Number of cases filed 1935-1936 ---------------- 1410
Number of cases disposed of 1935-1936 -------- 1612

1900
1612
288

2. Table I was prepared by the clerk of the court. Tables II and III were
prepared by Mr. Theodore Beezley, a third year student in the School of Law.
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Table II shows the disposition of the litigation. A comparison of affirmances with reversals carries interesting implications. The number of reversals clearly indicates the need for and value of an appellate tribunal for
the protection of litigants.
TABLE II
DISPOSITION OF LITIGATION

Judgment affirmed ----------------------------------Affirmed on condition (enter remittitur)-------------------Awarding of new trial by trial court affirmed ---------------Affirmed and remanded --------------------------------Reversed and remanded -------------------------------

Judgment reversed

--------------------------------

140
7
2
4
87

14

Modified or corrected and as modified or corrected affirmed --4
Affirmed in part and reversed in part ---------------------5
in
Affirmed part and in part reversed and remanded ----------- 5
Writ granted ----------------------------------------5
Writ denied ----------------------------------------19
Rule absolute ---------------------------------------8
Rule discharged --------------------------------------2
Case transferred to court of appeals ---------------------18
Record quashed -------------------------------------4
Appeal dismissed -------------------------------------7
Table III gives a topical analysis of the decisions for the year 1936. It
is impossible that such a table will more then reflect the opinion of the in-

dividual who has attempted to classify the cases under one topic. Seldom do
cases fall only in one field of the law. In preparing this table each case has
been listed under the principal issue with which it dealt. In many instances
this necessarily had to be arbitrary. However, in spite of the shortcomings
of such an attempted analysis, the table does show the fields of the law to
which the litigation during this period pertained.
TABLE II

4

TOPICAL ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS

Administrative Law ---------------------------------------

6

Agency --------------------------------------------------

1

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
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-----------------------------------Appeal and Error
Bills and Notes --------------------------------------Constitutional Law ----------------------------------Contracts ------------------------------------------Corporations ----------------------------------------Criminal Law
--------------------------------------Creditors Rights -------------------------------------Damages--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Equity
Evidence
------------------------------------------Habes Corpus Proceedings -----------------------------Insurance ------------------------------------------Mandamus Proceedings -------------------------------Master and Servant
---------------------------------Mortgages
-----------------------------------------Municipal Corporations -------------------------------Negligence (Automobiles) ----------------------------------------------------------------Other Negligence
Partnership -----------------------------------------Pleading -------------------------------------------Practice and Procedure -------------------------------Quo Warranto Proceedings -----------------------------Real Property
--------------------------------------Receivership ----------------------------------------Statutory Construction --------------------------------Suretyship and Guaranty ------------------------------Taxation -------------------------------------------Torts (other than negligence) ---------------------------Trusts ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Wills
Prohibition Proceedings --------------------------------

19
2
16
7
2
58
2
6
18
11

7
8
15
6
2
17
24
S
14
2
15
5
1
5
7
9
27
5

The average number of opinions written by members of the Missouri
Supreme Court during this period is eighteen. The average number of opinions written by the Supreme Court Commissioners is thirty-one. The
scarcity of dissents is quite remarkable. During the year under review
there were only four dissents and only two dissenting opinions written.
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II

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
H. L.

LISLE*

In view of the comparatively recent development of this field of law
and the resulting lack of formal organization of the topics involved, the
writer will briefly state the method of dealing with the cases.
Since there is no digest heading which includes all the cases on the
subject, it has been necessary to search all the reported cases to ascertain
when law relating to this new development in the Anglo-American law
system appeared. Because of the specialized nature and diversity of function of the administrative agencies it seems desirable to organize the cases
in respect to agencies with which they deal, rather than to lump together
decisions dealing with a similar function or power being exercised by several
agencies. Finally since this does not purport to be an exhaustive study of
administrative law as applied in Missouri, but rather a review of the court's
work in the field for the year, not all of the Missouri commissions and administrative agencies will be referred to.
Submitting in advance of consideration of the cases a suggested improvement in the field, it would seem that clarity and understanding might be
facilitated by the adoption of a uniform reporter system for the rules and
orders of all such agencies and the frequent reference to such reports by the
courts in their opinions dealing with the functions of the agencies.
I.

(A)

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF MISSOURI

Jurisdictionof tire Supreme Court on Appeal From Orders of the
Public Service Commission

The following two cases have to do with the jurisdiction of the supreme
court on appeal from the circuit courts. In both cases the court denied
jurisdiction to hear such appeals but on different grounds. The cases have
to do with the procedural aspect rather than the substantive law and demonstrate that the court requires adherence to the statutory and constitutional
procedural requirements.
In State ex rel. to Use of Alton R. R. v. Public Service Commission,'
there was an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of Cole county
*Member of the Board of Editors of the
1. 100 S. W. (2d) 474 (Mo. 1936).

MIssouRI LAW REVIEW.
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affirming an order of the Public Service Commission fixing maximum rates
for transportation of coal in car load lots between points in Missouri where
the distance is 95 miles or less. The appellants contend there is a constitutional question properly lodged in the case and thus that this court has
jurisdiction. Section 5233 of Missouri Revised Statutes 1929 provides
that the defeated party before the commission must file with the commission
a motion for rehearing as a prerequisite to the removal of the cause from
the commission to the circuit court by certiorari. This same section provides
that the application for rehearing filed with the commission "shall set forth
specifically the ground or grounds on which the appellant considers said
order or decision to be unlawful, unjust or unreasonable. No corporation or
person or public utility shall in any court urge or rely on any ground not so
set forth in said application." The cause was transferred to the Kansas City
Court of Appeals. Unless there is a constitutional question involved the
supreme court has no jurisdiction to hear this appeal, 2 and since the alleged
constitutional question was not preserved in the application for rehearing
but first appears in the application for certiorari to remove the case to the
circuit court, the appellant has not complied with the statutory requirements
and it cannot be considered by the court.3
State ex rel. Pitcairnv. Public Service Commissio# was an appeal by the
relators from a judgment of the circuit court of Cole county affirming an
order of the Public Service Commission granting a certificate of convenience
and necessity to the operator of a bus line. The relator assigned an error
that the order of the commission was unreasonable, unjust, and unlawful
and that the circuit court erred in affirming it because (1) the applicant was
not required to comply with Section 5268 (as amended by Laws of Missouri
1931, p. 307, Laws of Missouri 1935, p. 323); (2) there was no proof of convenience and necessity; (3) the order enlarged and expanded the scope and
application of the 1931 bus and truck law5 contrary to the intention of
the legislature. This appeal was sent to the supreme court because Section

2. State ex rel. Gehrs v. Public Service Commission, 338 Mo. 177, 90 S. W.
(2d) 390 (1935); State ex rel. Pitcaim v. Public Service Commission, 338 Mo. 180,
90 S. W. (2d) 392 (1935); State ex rel. Gehrs v. Public Service Commission, 90 S.
W. (2d) 394 (Mo. 1935); State ex rel. Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public
Service Commission, 338 Mo. 572, 92 S. W. (2d) 882 (1935).
3. State ex rel. Buffum Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 272 Mo. 627,
199 S. W. 962 (1917); State ex rel. v. Atkinson, 269 Mo. 634, 192 S. W. 86 (1917).
4. 92 S. W. (2d) 881 (Mo. 1936).
5. Laws of Missouri 1931, p. 304.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss4/1
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5237 of Missouri Revised Statutes 1929 undertakes to confer jurisdiction
upon this court in all cases originating before the Public Service Commission.
The cause was ordered transferred to the Kansas City Court of Appeals.

Here the court denied having jurisdiction on the ground that all appeals
within its jurisdiction are designated by the constitution of Missouri, 6 and
that in all other cases jurisdiction of appeals from circuit courts of the state
resides in the several courts of appeals. The legislature cannot by enactment
invade the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals as defined and vested by the
constitution or that of the supreme court to either enlarge or subtract therefrom.7 The alleged error number three presents no constitutional issue
since the relator was only contending that the commission's order is unlawful

in that it went beyond its statutory authorization, and not that the statutory
authorization was unconstitutional."
(B) Rate Fixing in Relation To Prior Existing Contracts
9
In Kansas City Light and Power Co. v. Midland Realty Co., the plaintiff contracted to supply the defendant with steam heating service for a
certain period at specified rates. This contract was entered into before the
Public Service Commission Law was enacted. Under the contract the defendant had an option of renewal which was exercised shortly after the
Public Service Law was enacted and became effective. The plaintiff filed
with the Public Service Commission a schedule of rates effective August 1,
1917. This schedule was higher than the defendant's contract rate. The commission never ruled upon the reasonableness of such schedule. In September,
1917, other of the plaintiff's users of steam filed a complaint against such
schedule and the commission determined that such schedule was unreasonably high and ordered it lowered, such order to be effective March 1, 1918.
This new schedule was still higher than the defendant's rate. On June 11,
1918, the plaintiff entered a complaint before the commission charging that
the rates were confiscatory. The commission found for the plaintiff that the
rates on steam were confiscatory and had been placing the burden of
operating the business upon the electrical division of the plaintiff
company and ordered such rates raised, such order to become effective

6. Mo. CONsT. art. 6, § 12, and Section 5 of Amendment of 1884 to article 6.
7. State ex rel. Pitcairn v. Public Service Commission, 338 Mo. 180, 90 S.
W. (2d) 392 (1935); State ex rel. Gehrs v. Public Service Commission, 338 Mo.
177, 90 S. W. (2d) 390 (1935).
8. See Moyer v. Orek Coal Co., 78 S. W. (2d) 107 (Mo. 1934).
9. 338 Mo. 1141, 93 S. W. (2d) 954 (1936).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1937
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December, 1919. After August 1, 1917, the plaintiff billed the defendant for
its steam heating service under the schedule effective on that date until
March, 1918, and thereafter under the schedule of the latter date until
August 31, 1918, which was the date that the defendant claimed its contract
expired. The defendant refused to pay as billed and made payments in accordance with the contract rate claiming that rate to be still effective. The
plaintiff claims that the contract rate was void and seeks to recover the difference between the amount already paid by the defendant and the scheduled
rates. The circuit court held for the defendant as to the difference between
the rates for the period August 31, 1917, to March 1, 1918; and for the plaintiff as to the difference in rates between March 1, 1918, and August 31, 1918.
The court reversed the finding for the defendant, and affirmed the finding for
the plaintiff.
The defendant contended that the schedule filed and effective August 1,
1917, was not a lawful rate as to contract customers until ruled upon as
being just and reasonable by the commission, in other words that filing with
the commission did not make the rate so filed prima facie legal as to contract
customers. However, approving the construction placed upon the rating
statutes 0 by a prior case," the court held that the rates filed by the plaintiff effective August 1, 1917, primarily fixed by the plaintiff's schedule,
were under the circumstances the effective rates pro tempore, though their
reasonableness was not thereby finally determined and that maintenance
of a lower rate (the contract rate) than the August 1, 1917 rate was against
2
public welfare.'
The defendant next contended that paragraph 4 of Section 5208 of Missouri Revised Statutes 1929 expressly preserves heating contracts existing at
the time the act was passed. However, the court points out that it has been
settled by the Missouri decisions that the commission has the power to fix
by order reasonable telephone, light, power, and heating charges at rates
exceeding the maximum prescribed by ordinance, franchise, or individual

10. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 5228. The statute gives Commission power to
fix heating rates. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 5247. The statute places burden upon
party adverse to commission to show that commission's order was unreasonable or
unlawful.
11. Marty v. Kansas City Light & Power Co., 303 Mo. 233, 259 S. W. 793
(1923).
12. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 5189, expressly prohibits discrimination by a
utility as to rates charged between localities or persons.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss4/1
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contracts; that such order does not in the constitutional sense impair the
obligations of such contracts; and that such rates automatically supersede
all rates coming into conflict therewith.' 3 The former decisions referred to in
footnote thirteen are based upon the theory that, since the constitution of
Missouri's declares that "the exercise of police power of the State shall never
be abridged," it cannot be contracted away. The Public Service Commission
is not a court and cannot enforce contracts, but instead deals with public
utilities upon the theory of public service without regard to any contracts.
It is a fact finding body whose findings and orders are prima facie reasonable
and lawful, and are subject to judicial review in that respect only. Therefore, the court in the principal case holds that the statute does not operate
to exempt the contracts from the scope of exercise of police power.
Finally the defendant contends that it is a violation of the contracts
clause5 and of the due process clauseo of the United States Constitution to
abrogate their contract rate unless in due course of its procedure the commission finds the contract rate to be reasonable. The court held that the construction the Missouri courts have placed upon the statute17 authorizing
substituted rates for existing rates"' does not require any finding of facts or
making of any order as a condition precedent to validity of the schedule filed
in 1917 and effective August 31, 1917. Therefore, since the defendant did
not afford himself of the usual remedy of protesting the reasonableness of
the rates, and adding the fact that the federal courts follow the construction placed on state statutes by state courts,19 no question of due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution could arise.
(C)

Public Service Commission Ordersin Relation to Interstate Commerce
The following two cases involve orders of the commission coming in
conflict with federal power over interstate commerce resulting in a setting
aside of the commission's order by the court. In State ex rel. to Use of Pan-

13. Kansas City Bolt and Nut Co. v. Kansas City Light and Power Co., 275
Mo. 529, 204 S. W. 1074 (1918), aff'd 252 U. S. 571 (1920), upon authority of
Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp., 248 U. S. 372 (1919); State
ex rel. Washington Univ. v. Public Service Commission, 308 Mo. 328, 272 S. W. 971
(1925).
14. Art 12, § 5.
15. U. S. CONST., ART. 1, § 10.
16.

U. S. CoNsT., AMEND. XIV.

17. Marty v. Kansas City Light & Power Co., 303 Mo. 233, 259 S. W. 793
(1923).
18. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 5228.
19. Georgia Ry. &Power Co. v. Decatur, 262 U. S. 432 (1923).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1937
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handle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission,2" the relator
prosecuted this review before the court of an order of the Public Service Commission requiring the relator "to furnish natural gas to the city of Fulton at
reasonable rates." The relator was an interstate pipe line company engaged
in transporting natural gas from Texas and Kansas through the states of
Oklahoma, Missouri, and Illinois for the purpose of sale in large quantities
to local gas distributing utilities at wholesale and industrial plants. Among
the distributing utilities purchasing gas from the relator in Missouri is the
Central States Gas Utilities Company, a subsidiary corporation owning and
operating several local distribution systems in cities in Missouri. The delivery
of natural gas by the relator to local distributing systems is accomplished by
means of laterals off the main line which connect with pressure measuring
stations where the local utility takes delivery and reduces the pressure. Service from the relator's main line is rendered under contract and the relator
owned none of the facilities beyond the outlet of the reduction and measuring
stations. A Fulton industrial plant had contracted to buy gas from the relator
and in consequence of such transaction the relator built a lateral and delivered gas to the plant outside the city limits. The relator refused to sell gas to
the city's municipal utility and as a result the city applied to the commission for the order here complained of. The commission's opinion stated that
such order was not an interference with the relator's interstate commerce
because the relator and its subsidiary in Missouri constituted in reality one
common enterprise engaging in intrastate business in Missouri. The circuit
court upheld the order. The cause was reversed and remanded with directions
to annul the order of the commission.
The court states that the case of State ex rel. Cities Service Gas Co. z.
Public Service Commission21 is controlling. In that case it was held that
where the interstate pipe line company had contracted with subsidiary companies to furnish gas to the subsidiary for distribution to consumers in
municipalities it did not subject the main line company to regulation by this
commission, since the company was not engaged in intrastate commerce and
such regulation would constitute a direct burden upon the interstate commerce of the main line company. The work of the main line company in preparing for delivery to local distributors was an incident of its interstate

20. 93 S. W. (2d) 675 (Mo. 1936).
21. 337 Mo.809, 85 S.W. (2d) 890, 891 (1935).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss4/1
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business in contrast to the pressure reduction and distribution by the subsidiary. This view expressed by the court is in line with decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States on this point.22
State ex rel. and to Use of Baldwin v. Public Service Commission3 was
an appeal from the judgment of the circuit court approving an order of the
commission. The order of the Public Service Commission requiring the Missouri Pacific Railway to restore certain inequalities between the interstate
and the intrastate coal rates to Jefferson City, either by the elimination of
a forty-five cent per ton allowance to consignees of interstate shipments, or
by establishing a similar allowance with respect to intrastate shipments was
held to be beyond the proper power of the commission as an interference with
rates in interstate commerce.
Since the intrastate rate was not an issue in the case the court assumes
that it was a reasonable one as fixed by the commission. The effect then of
the commission's order was to say to the Missouri Pacific that if it did not
raise its interstate rate, at the expense of losing business to other competing
lines, it would have to haul coal for less than the reasonable rate fixed by
the commission for interstate shipping. Such effect seems to be a direct
burden upon interstate commerce and to fall within the prohibition placed
upon such direct burdens by the Supreme Court of the United States.24
The commission contended that since Congress had never attempted to
regulate a situation causing undue prejudice against intrastate commerce
and an undue preference to interstate commerce, until Congress occupies
that field, the states are free to regulate as in this case. However, the court
points out that the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the
commerce clause prevents states imposing direct burdens upon interstate
25
commerce whether Congress has acted or not.
(D)

Public Service Commission Orders in Relation To Railroad Building
and Improvement

The following two cases deal with orders of the commission which required railroads to expend money on building and improvements where

22. State Tax Commission v. Interstate Natural Gas Co. Inc., 284 U. S. 41
(1931); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923); People's Natural Gas
Co. v. Public Service Commission, 270 U. S. 550 (1926).
23. 339 Mo. 814, 99 S. W. (2d) 90 (1936).
24. Louisville and Nashville Ry. v. Eubank, 184 U. S. 27 (1902).
25. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 396 (1913); Missouri ex rel. Barrett
v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298, 307, 308 (1924).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1937
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public safety was to be benefited thereby. The findings of the commission
in both cases required the presentation of much expert evidence and a great
amount of technical detail which, in absence of such commissions, would place
a great burden upon the courts of law.
State ex rel. Wabash Ry. v. Public Service Commission, State ex rel.
Franklin v. Public Service Commission and State ex rel. City of St. Louis
v. PublicService Commission-6 were three separate appeals (but because they
presented but one case were treated as one by the court) from the judgment
of the circuit court of Cole county upholding the order of the Public Service
Commission, which allocated the cost of abolishing grade crossings of the
Wabash and certain streets of St. Louis at 60% of the cost against the city
and 40% against the Wabash. Both the city and the Wabash contend that
the other should bear the total expense, but the court pointing out the careful consideration of the commission in making its determination of all the
facts and circumstances involved, upheld the commission's finding as to
allocation.
In answering the railroads contention that it had been denied due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, the court points out that the commission permitted all parties
to be heard and an opportunity to present their evidence after which, the
commission giving due consideration to all the evidence, based its conclusion
upon the facts found. The case demonstrates the usefulness of administra2"
7
tive agencies and is in accord with prior Missouri decisions.
In State ex rel. St. Paul and Kansas City Short Line R. R. v. Public
Service Commission,28 the railroad had, in violation of the regulations of
the Public Service Commission, erected a bridge with a fourteen foot horizontal clearance instead of a sixteen foot clearance, without first applying to
the commission for permission to do the same,2 but later applied to the commissi6n to approve the same due to alleged financial inconvenience of repair-

26. 100 S. W. (2d) 522 (Mo. 1936).
27. State ex rel. Wabash Ry. v. Public Service Commission, 306 Mo. 149, 267
S. W. 102 (1924); State ex rel. Alton Ry. v. Public Service Commission, 334 Mo.
985, 70 S. W. (2d) 52 (1934); State ex rel. Alton Ry. v. Public Service Commission, 334 Mo. 995, 70 S. W. (2d) 57 (1934).
28. 339 Mo. 641, 98 S. W. (2d) 699 (1936).
29. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 4657 empowers the Public Service Commission
to promulgate rules concerning track clearances and make it necessary for railroads
wishing to erect structures with clearances less than those provided by commission's
rules to apply to commission for permission to erect the same.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss4/1
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ing the bridge. The court held it was not error for the commission to refuse
such application since, had the railroad previous to erection of the bridge
made application showing mere financial inconvenience, it would not have
authorized the commission granting permission to erect a bridge not complying with requirements; therefore, the applicant could not place itself in a
better position by erecting the bridge without permission and asking for
permission to maintain it later. Economy alone, as a ground for authorizing
the commission to permit construction of a bridge not meeting the statutory
and commission requirements, is not within the term "impracticable" as
contemplated by Section 4657 of Missouri Revised Statutes 1929.
(E)

Public Service Commission Orders Exceeding Statutory Authority of
the Commission

In State ex rel. Empire District.Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission,"" in reversing the judgment of the circuit court of Cole county which
affirmed an order of the Public Service Commission, the court held that
Section 5200 of Missouri Revised Statutes 1929 did not authorize the commission to order that the electric company replace in its depreciation reserve
fund amounts which had been charged to such fund and subsequently transferred to the surplus account and thereafter used for paying dividends to
stockholders.
The court bases its decision primarily upon its interpretation of the
statute in question. The statute gives the commission power, after hearing,
to require the company to carry an account for depreciation reserve, subject
to control by the commission. This is construed by the court to mean that
if the commission by order, after hearing, requires that the company set up
such account, then the commission can control the amounts charged to said
account. In the principal case the company had voluntarily set up such an
account and charged amounts to it, which had been shown in its reports
to the commission since 1915. Thus the court arrives at the conclusion that
the commission, not having by its order required the company to set up
the account, had no power over it. The retroactive nature of an order purporting to affect amounts accumulated in years prior to the commission's
order was also pointed out by the court.
Aside from the strictness of such construction and the fact that it requires the commission to order a thing done which the company has already

30. 339 Mo. 1188, 100 S. W. (2d) 509 (1936).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1937
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done to acquire jurisdiction over the fund, the construction seems sound.
It appears, however, that profitable inquiry may be made into the purpose of the commission's hearing in the first instance. The commission had
been attempting to ascertain the fair value of the company's property and in
so doing found some enlightening information as to the rapid accumulation
of what might well be considered, in view of the advanced state of engineering science in computation of the life of physical property, excessive accruals
in the depreciation reserve account. From 1915 to 1923 the account grew
to approximately $1,000,000, at which time the directors of the company set
aside $400,000 to be charged to the "surplus" account, in 1926 another $400,000 was set aside in the same fashion, and again in 1929 $800,000 was transferred to an account called "Special Surplus Reserve," and this fund was
disbursed by paying dividends to stockholders before this proceeding was
brought. These transfers were shown on the company's annual report
to the commission.
Realizing the position of the court in face of the statement by the commission that it could not ascertain whether such accruals were excessive or
not, yet it seems that the statement of the court to the effect that the only
interest of the public in such a reserve is that the company's property be kept
in repair, is hardly justified. If the company had been charging excessive
amounts to the depreciation reserve account, such procedure might well result
in higher rates to the consumer, since this amount would be deducted from
earnings on the books of the company but by their accounting methods
eventually paid to stockholders as profits. Surely the public has an interest
in the rates it pays for service.
As to the purpose of the commission's order concerning the last $800,000
transferred to "surplus," little can be ascertained since the court does not
cite the report of the commission nor are portions bearing on this point
quoted.
II.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION

(A)

Procedureand Evidence

Wills v. Berberick's Delivery Co.31 demonstrates the principle that while
procedure and admission of evidence before administrative tribunals is not
as formal and strict as in courts of law, reasonable assurance of finding based
upon evidence is requisite.

31.

339 Mo. 856, 98 S. W. (2d) 569 (1936).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss4/1
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The appellants filed a claim with the Workmen's Compensation Commission seeking compensation for the death of Arthur N. Wills. The deceased,
employed as a chauffeur for the respondent company, fell while repairing the
roof of one of the respondent's trucks and sustained severe and painful injuries to his left elbow and shoulder. At the time of the accident the deceased
had a small boil on the left side of his face. The infection which had been
confined in the boil, began to spread, finally resulting in septicemia from
which he died a week after his fall. The appellant claimed that the injuries
resulting from the fall caused the infection to spread. The respondent contended that the injuries sustained did not have any connection with the
spreading of the infection. To sustain their contention the respondents
offered to introduce in evidence a written statement, made and signed by the
deceased, wherein he stated he had not sustained any injuries to his face by
the fall, and also the testimony of a physician that the deceased had made
statements to the physician to the same effect. This evidence was excluded
on the theory that the deceased was not there to refute such evidence. On
appeal to the circuit court the evidence was held material, and the commission's order reversed. The circuit court was upheld on the ground that the
evidence was properly admissable as part of the res gestae.
The appellant, citing the case of Jackson v. Curtiss-Wright Airplane
Co.32 quotes the following from that case:
"The proceedings before the compensation commission are
prescribed by statute, section 3349, R. S. Mo. 1929 ... to be informal and without regard to the technical rules of evidence. While
incompetent evidence will not support an award38 . . . its admission is substantial, competent evidence to support it."
The court answers this contention by pointing out that the admission of
incompetent evidence, where there is sufficient competent evidence to justify
the award, and excluding competent evidence are two entirely different
things; therefore, the commission erred in so excluding the respondent's
evidence.
(B)

Finality of Findings of Workmen's Compensation Commission

The following two cases are in accord with prior Missouri decisions in
holding that the findings of the commission have the force and effect of a

32. 334 Mo. 805, 68 S. W. (2d) 715 (1934).
33. Woods v. American Coal and Ice Co., 25 S. W. (2d) 144, 146 (Mo. App.
1930).
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jury verdict 34 and will not be disturbed if supported by sufficient evidence.-"5
Section 3349 Missouri Revised Statutes 1929 does not mean that that finding can be based upon testimony that falls short of proof of fact. 36
In Adams v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 37 the deceased, an employee of
the defendant life insurance company, was killed while working in South
Dakota. There was conflicting evidence as to whether the deceased was still
working under a contract made in South Dakota or whether a new contract
had been entered into when the deceased had been transferred to Missouri
to work in the home office for some time before he returned to South Dakota
where he was killed. The commission upon application made to it by the
widow for compensation found that there was insufficient evidence to sustain
a finding that there was a new contract entered into in Missouri and hence
the commission did not have jurisdiction. The circuit court reversed the
finding of the commission and remanded the cause to the commission with
directions to find that the claimant was entitled to compensation. The
supreme court reversed the ruling of the circuit court. Findings of fact by
the commission, if sustained by sufficient competent evidence, are, absent
fraud, conclusive on appeal, and, in determining the sufficienecy of the
evidence upon which the commission based its finding, the court considers
the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and disregards evidence which might support a different finding than made.38
The court held that as a matter of law upon the record it could not say
that a new contract was made when the deceased was called to Missouri, or
in other words there was substantial evidence to support the finding of the
commission that a new contract was not made in Missouri.
On the other hand, the findings of fact by the commission are not con39
clusive on appeal if not supported by sufficient competent evidence.
In Maddux v. Kansas City Public Service Co.,40 the claimant employee
was injured in the course of his employment and after hearing the evidence as

34. Haeger v. Pulitzer, 17 S. W. (2d) 578 (Mo. 1929).
35. Smith v. Levis-Zukoski Mercantile Co., 14 S. W. (2d) 470 (Mo. 1929).
36. Woods v. American Coal and Ice Co., 25 S. W. (2d) 144 (Mo. App. 1930).
37. 101 S. W. (2d) 75 (Mo. 1936).
38. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 3342; Wadley v. Employer's Liability Assurance
Corp., 225 Mo. App. 631, 37 S. W. (2d) 665 (1931); Lerlich v. Chevrolet Motor Co.,
328 Mo. 112, 40 S. W. (2d) 601 (1931).
39. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 3342; Doughton v. Marland Refining Co., 331
Mo. 280, 53 S. W. (2d) 236 (1932).
40. 100 S. W. (2d) 535 (Mo. 1936).
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to the permanency of the claimant's injury, the commission awarded him
compensation on the basis of "permanent total disability," as set forth in
Section 3316 of Missouri Revised Statutes 1929, instead of on the basis of
"partial permanent disability" as set forth in Section 3315 of Missouri
Revised Statutes 1929. The circuit court affirmed the award, and the affirmance was upheld by the supreme court. The finding of the commission
on questions of fact, if supported by substantial, competent evidence, has the
force and effect of the verdict of a jury and is conclusive upon the courts on
appeal. 4 1 The commission's finding here is supported in the court's estimation
by sufficient evidence.
(C)

Jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission

In determining that the Workmen's Compensation Commission could
not deny jurisdiction in the following case the court found it necessary to
decide a very troublesome conflict of laws problem. Under the facts of the
case either the law of Illinois or the law of Missouri was applicable; therefore,
it became necessary for the court to decide which should apply in determining whether or not the commission could refuse to entertain jurisdiction.
The court in the case adopted the view of the United States Supreme Court
as expressed by the case of Alaska Packer'sAssociation v. IndustrialAccident
Commission of California,41a and rejected the unsatisfactory "contract theory"
sometimes applied to such cases.4 2 Since it is not the purpose of this article
to deal with the conflict problem, it will suffice to say that Missouri is in
accord with the latest United States Supreme Court decision.
In State ex rel. Weaver v. Missouri Workmen's CompensationCommission, James Weaver, a resident of Missouri, was employed by a New York
company under a contract of employment executed in Illinois. Weaver was
killed while in the course of his employment while in the state of Missouri.
He left surviving him his widow and two minor children who were residents
of Missouri. At the time of Weaver's employment and thereafter, there was
in full force and effect in Illinois a workmen's compensation law, which
provided that the Illinois law should apply to any injury received outside the
state of Illinois under contract of employment made within the state of
43

41. Doughton v. Marland Refining Co., 331 Mo. 280, 53 S. W. (2d) 236
(1932).
41a. 294 U.S.532 (1935).
42. See 11 MINN. L. REv. 329 (1927).
43. 339 Mo. 150, 95 S. W. (2d) 641 (1936).
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Illinois. The widow of Weaver applied to the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission for compensation under the Missouri law, which provides that it shall apply "to all injuries received in this state, regardless of
where the contract of employment was made, and also to all injuries received
outside of this state under contract of employment made in this state, unless
the contract of employment in any case shall otherwise provide." 4 The
Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission declined to take jurisdiction
of the application upon the grounds that (1) since the contract of employment was made in Illinois, the Missouri statute did not apply, and (2) that
even if the Missouri statute did apply the commission should decline jurisdiction because the Illinois law also applies and must, under the full faith
and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, be given effect in Missouri. The
court held that the Missouri workmen's compensation law applied, 5 therefore the commission could not deny jurisdiction.
III. MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION
(A)

Powers of the Commission

The following two cases demonstrate the broad scope of administrative
power vested in the Highway Commission by the constitution of Missouri
and by statute. In State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Sevier,4' under
the constitutional provision that money in the state road fund should be
administered for construction and maintenance of such highways and free
interstate bridges as the state highway commission might deem proper, 7 the
commission entered into a joint undertaking with the Kansas state highway
department to construct a free bridge across the Missouri river. A company
owning a bridge across the river sought to enjoin the commission from going
on with the work on the ground that the Kansas highway department may
not perform their part of the undertaking and that it will be a waste of public
funds. The commission brought prohibition. The court held that the commission has sole jurisdiction to determine whether expenditures for building
free interstate bridges and connecting highways would be a waste of public
funds because of inability or unwillingness of other states to perform their
part of such undertaking. The determination of the question by the com-

44. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 3310.
45. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) §§ 3299 et seq.
46. 339 Mo. 479, 97 S. W. (2d) 427 (1936).
47. Mo. CoNsT. art 4, § 44a.
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mission is final. The courts cannot interfere with the ordinary functions of
executive departments. 48 Therefore, prohibition will lie.
In State ex rel. Missouri Power Co. v. Allen,4 9 a statute forbade the
moving of buildings along highways unless application had been made to
the county court and a permit issued authorizing the same. While moving
a tool shed belonging to the commission, a highway commission employee was
killed by a highline of the defendant power company. No permit had been
obtained to move the building. The court held that such failure to obtain
the permit would not bar recovery by the administrator of the deceased, since
the deceased stood in the same relation to the power company as the commission did. The court points out that since the commission is essentially an
agency of the state and as such exercises broad administrative powers in the
interest of the public5" and has jurisdiction and control to maintain highways,
it would be anomalous to require that such commission apply to the county
court to move its tool house, an act which was incident to highway maintenance.
IV.

ST. Louis BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS

State ex rel. Kennedy v. Remmer's v. Board of Police Commissionp'
involves an instance of an administrative agency formulating an order and
acting under it in excess of power conferred on the commission and in an
arbitrary fashion. The constitution of Missouri 52 provides that the general
assembly may enact laws for the removal from office of all public officers,
for cause. Under this constitutional provision the general assembly enacted
statutes "3 creating the Boards of Police Commissioners as administrative
agencies and endowing them with power to appoint the members of metropolitan police forces and with power to discharge members for cause. Section
7547 of Missouri Revised Statutes 1929 delegated additional authority to
make rules and regulations consistent with the section which shall be necessary for discipline, trial, and government of the police. The section further
provides that violations of all such lawful rules shall be punishable by dis-

48. Selecman v. Matthews, 321 Mo. 1047, 15 S. W. (2d) 788 (1929).
49. 100 S. W. (2d) 868 (Mo. 1936).
50. For powers of Highway Commission, see Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 8115,
8134, 8109.
51. 101 S. W. (2d) 70 (Mo. 1936).
52. Art. 14, § 7.
53. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 7540 to 7548.
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missal or such lighter punishment as the boards may direct. Rule 10, Section
178 of the St. Louis Police Manual reads:
"He (referring to every member and employee of the force)
shall not file, nor retain counsel for the defense of, an action at law
without first obtaining permission to do so from the chief of police
with approval of the board."
The charge under which Kennedy, a patrolman, was discharged stated
that, without making application to the board, he had filed an action in court
and retained counsel in a suit to enjoin the board from asking him to give ten
per cent of his salary toward unemployment relief. He brought certiorari
in the circuit court to review the action of the board. The writ was quashed
and Kennedy appeals. The proceedings were reversed and remanded with
direction to quash the record as made by the board. While there is no doubt
but that the board has jurisdiction to entertain and decide upon the infraction
of valid rules adopted by the board, 54 yet such a rule as the one used as the
basis for the dismissal is unreasonable upon its face, arbitrary in its character,
is a denial of reasonable liberty of action, and transcends the due bounds
of legislative power, irrespective of constitutional power, state or national."
Also the rule contravenes article 2, Section 10 of the constitution of
Missouri, which provides that the courts of justice should be open to every
person and a certain remedy afforded for every injury to every person, property, or character; and that right and justice shall be administered without
sale, denial, or delay.
V.

MISSOURI DENTAL BOARD

State ex rel. Inscho v. Missouri Dental Board56 is another case in which
an administrative agency exceeded its statutory authorization. Here the
Dental Board made an order revoking a dentist's certificate of registration,
charging that the dentist had published misleading statements as to his
skill and method of practice of dentistry, and that, through advertising in
newspapers and statements to patients, he tended to deceive and
defraud the public. The statute 57 among other things authorizes the
board to revoke a certificate of registration if the dentist advertises in any

54. State ex inf. Barrett ex rel. Bradshaw v. Hedrick, 294 Mo. 21, 241 S. W.
402 (1922).
55. Hannibal v. Missouri and Kansas Tel. Co., 31 Mo. App. 23, 33 (1888).
56. 339 Mo. 547, 98 S. W. (2d) 606 (1936).
57. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 13566.
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manner with a view of deceiving or defrauding the public. The evidence
presented proved that the dentist had advertised, but there was no showing
that the statements in the advertisements had been false nor that anyone
had relied upon them to their substantial damage. The dentist petitioned
the circuit court for an alternative writ of mandamus directing the Dental
Board to rescind its order. The circuit court issued the writ upon the ground
that the complaint did not charge nor the evidence show any offense under
the statute. This was affirmed. The Dental Board is vested, by statute, with
administrative and ministerial powers and duties, and so long as its actions
are within the scope of its powers and it exercises a reasonable discretion, the
courts will not interfere therewith; but if, perchance, through some misunderstanding or misconstruction of the statute, the board exceeds its power or
acts beyond the scope of its authority, or in the exercise of the powers given,
it acts arbitrarily and against the great weight of the evidence before it
upon a given question, the aggrieved party may resort to an action of this
58

kind.
The charge went to fraudulent misleading and deceptive advertising, but
no attempt was made to show that any false statements were made in the
advertisements. Mere advertising, while it may be disapproved by the profession, does not constitute a ground under the statute for revocation of
licenses.
III
APPELLATE PRACTICE
THOMAS

E.

ATKINsoN*

Considerably more than one half of the opinions decided by the Supreme
Court of Missouri in 1936 have one, or more, digest paragraphs upon matters
concerning appellate practice. Furthermore, as the cases have been digested
in the unofficial reporter, fully twenty per cent of all syllabus paragraphs deal
with matters of the jurisdiction of the supreme court, the procedural side of
extraordinary legal actions commenced there, and the field known as appeal
and error. While it is true that many of these paragraphs refer merely to
points casually mentioned by the court and do not represent difficult or time58. State ex rel. McCleary v. Adcock, 206 Mo. 550, 105 S. W. 270 (1907).
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B. University of North Dakota,
1925; LL.B. University of Michigan, 1917; J.S.D. Yale, 1926.
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consuming deliberations, the same can be said of many of the points of substantive law or trial procedure. It would not seem unreasonable to assume
that somewhere in the vicinity of one fifth of the court's time and energy is
consumed in passing upon questions of its own jurisdiction and procedure.
Most thinking people will share the writer's regret of this conclusion.
Even the most friendly and sympathetic critic must feel that an undue amount
of energy is being expended on the machinery of presenting cases before our
highest tribunal. Obviously the blame must be shared, in some fashion, by
the courts, the bar and the legislature. Very likely a broad-minded person
engaged in any one of these three fields would be willing-though perhaps reluctant-to admit that some of the responsibility should be assumed by his
particular branch. Possibly the court's derelictions may be due in part to
lack of clarity and consistency of its prior pronouncements, and in part to the
subconscious professional attitude which runs through all professions of
placing undue emphasis upon form and technique at the expense of the larger
functions which the particular profession is designed to fulfill. On the part of
the bar there is undoubtedly considerable carelessness, and occasionally,
unforgiveable ignorance. More serious is counsel's frequent insistence upon
unmeritorious technical points. Finally the legislature's fault may be its
neglect to pass amendments to procedural statutes in keeping with modern
demands, or its failure to turn the entire matter over to the court or some
other body better qualified to make the necessary revisions.
It seems apparent that if the situation is to be materially bettered, this
is not likely to come as the result of isolated movements among the three
responsible bodies. Probably the best solution would be a new set of rules
promulgated by the court and framed with the assistance of the Judicial
Council and the bar.1 Of course new rules alone can only make improvements

1. In the interest of harmony, legislative sanction should be obtained, if
possible, for the judicial pronouncement of procedural rules. Current history of

rule-making for actions at law in the Federal courts is a case in point. If such
sanction is not forth-coming, may the court, in the exercise of its judicial powers,
proceed to set up a set of rules of appellate and trial procedure displacing existing
statutes? In a scholarly and lawyer-like article, Professor Tyrrell Williams concludes that, while the legislature may delegate to the courts the power to displace
statutory procedure by rules of court, without such authority, judicial rules are
subject to the statute laws. Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court
Affecting Procedure (1937) 22 Wash. U. L. Q. 459. Of course this conclusion is
inevitable under the English parliamentary system. American authorities have also
refused to supersede statutory procedural provisions by court rules. In this connection, see the opinion of Ellison, C. J., in Clark v. Austin, 101 S. W. (2d) 977,
985-996 (Mo. 1937). Still it may be asked whether under American constitutional
system, the judicial nullification of procedural rules would not be a much milder
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possible. The immediate propelling force must be a change of attitude in the
judiciary and in the profession generally. In this, the bench must lead the
way, for only through its firm determination can the sloth, the carelessness
and unwarranted contentiousness, of the stragglers at the bar be dispelled.
In this connection there is room for optimism concerning some of the decisions
mentioned below. Some of them clarify doubtful points. Others insure future
observation of rules designed to promote procedural efficiency by the very
rigor with which breaches of those rules are met. Still, in the main, the cumbersome appellate machinery continues as before. It cannot do otherwise
until the present statutory structure is overhauled by some group or body
which is given carte blanche.

It would be impossible within reasonable compass, as well as generally
unprofitable, to set forth herein all propositions of appellate procedure decided
by the court in 1936. On the other hand no attempt will be made to restrict
treatment to cases deciding new points. Rather an endeavor will be made to
steer a middle course and mention all cases which may be regarded important
as precedents. Possibly the presentation of a fair picture of the year's work
in the field may be one method of raising the general inquiry of the need for
reform.
JURISDICTION OI" THE SUPREME COURT

The supreme court has jurisdiction to entertain appeals from circuit
courts by Section 12 of article VI of the constitution (as amended) in causes
where the amount in dispute exceeds the sum of $7,5002 and "in cases involv-

assertion of authority than the established power to declare unconstitutional a law
dealing with substantive provisions. It is true that if the judicial power to displace
procedural statutes exists, it has long been dormant. This is not remarkable in view
of the fact that until comparatively recently the legislatures rather than the courts
led the way in freeing us from archaic procedural shackles. As a purely practical
matter, it was reasonable that the courts should have recognized the legislatures'
forward steps of an earlier day. The question now is: should the courts be hampered by present legislative inactivity, due perhaps more to pressure of time than
to absence of interest on the part of the latter? A constitutional amendment permitting court rules to supersede procedural statutes would of course be a happy
solution of the whole matter.
See also Howard, Control of Unauthorized PracticeBefore Administrative Tribunals in Missouri (1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 313. Hudson, The Proposed Regulation of
Missouri Procedure by Rules of Court (1916) 13 U. oF Mo. BULL. LAw SER. 3;
Hyde, From Common Law Rules to Rules of Court (1937) 22 WASH. U. L. Q. 187;
Hyde, Origin and Development of Missouri Appellate Procedure (1937) 2 Mo. L.
REv. 281; Wheaton, Courts and the Rule-Making Powers (1936) 1 Mo. L. REv. 261.
2. See Section 3 of amendment of 1884 to article VI of the constitution and
Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 1914.
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ing the construction of the Constitution of the United States or of this
state; in cases where the validity of a treaty or statute of or authority exercised under the United States is drawn in question; in cases involving the
construction of the revenue laws of the state, or the title to any office under
this state; in cases involving title to real estate; in cases where a county or
other political subdivision of the state or any state officer is a party, and in all
cases of felony."
That these are the only cases in which an appeal from the circuit court
court may be entertained by the supreme court was reaffirmed in State ex rel.
Gehrs v. PublicService Commission of Missouri,' holding that a statute authorizing appeals generally from judgments of the circuit court affirming orders of
the commission was invalid.
In Bolin v. Sovereign Camp, Wf. 0. W., 4 it was claimed by the appellant
that the insurance agreement in question was a Nebraska contract and that
under the laws of that state was ultra vires and that "full faith and credit"
was involved. The appellee claimed that the agreement was a Missouri contract and the trial court so found. The supreme court held that the only question involved in the appeal was whether the trial court was right in so finding
and that this question could be decided without passing upon the constitutional question and accordingly transferred the appeal to the appropriate
court of appeals.
In an appeal from the circuit court from a judgment upholding an order
of the Public Service Commission, it was held in State ex rel. to the Use of A/ton
R. R. v. Public Service Commission5 that the court would not take cognizance
of the proceeding upon the basis of constitutionality of the order unless that
question was preserved in the application for rehearing filed with the commission. Furthermore, in State ex rel. Missouri Electric Power Co. v. Allen, s it
was held that the supreme court had no jurisdiction of an appeal upon the
basis of a constitutional question when the latter was not the sole issue in the
court below and the appellant did not in any manner insist upon constitutional protection on the trial.
3. 338 Mo. 177, 90 S. W. (2d) 394 (1936), noted in (1936) 21 ST. Louis L.
REv. 332. This case relies on several cases decided late in 1935. See also State
ex tel. Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 92 S.W. (2d)
882 (Mo. 1935); State ex rel. to the Use of Alton R. R. v. Public Service Commission, 100 S.W. (2d) 474 (Mo. 1936).
4. 339 Mo. 618, 98 S.W. (2d) 681 (1936).
5. 100 S.W. (2d) 474 (Mo. 1936).
6. 100 S.W. (2d) 868 (Mo. 1936).
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A number of cases involved the question as to whether the amount in dispute exceeded the sum of $7,500 so as to allow appeal from the circuit to the
supreme court. In a collision accident case where plaintiff's petition alleged
personal injuries to the extent of $10,000 and also property damages, and the
verdict was for $500, it was held in Ashbrook v. WilliS7 that the court had no
jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's appeal though his motion for new trial
claimed inadequacy of the amount of the verdict. The court asserted its
power to pierce the record to see whether jurisdiction was being foisted on the
court. As the point of inadequacy of the verdict was neither briefed nor argued,
the claim of damages in excess of $7,500 was deemed colorable. In Johnston
v. Ramming,8 it was held that where the petition alleged $15,000 damages and
the verdict was for the defendant and plaintiff obtained an order for a new
trial from which defendant appealed, the supreme court had jurisdiction of
the appeal. Where weekly payments for life were claimed under the workmen's compensation law, it was held proper for the court to make use of
mortality tables in order to determine whether the amount in dispute exceeded
the jurisdictional figure.' A fair measure existed for the measurement of the
amount in dispute in this case. 10
In a suit in the nature of a creditors' bill, the amount in dispute is the
total of claims represented and not the value of property of which the receiver
would go into possession, according to Matz v. Miami Club Restaurant."
Where a permanent injunction was granted by the court below but the question of $10,000 damages was reserved, it was held inGodefroy Mfg. Co. v. Lady
Lennox Co.' 2 that the supreme court had no jurisdiction on account of the
amount. The finality of this judgment for purposes of appeal was left to the
court of appeals. In Stine v. Southwest Bank of St. Louis, 3 suit was brought to
enjoin the foreclosure of a trust deed for $20,000 on the ground of an agreement
to extend. Plaintiff lost below and costs in the sum of $2,653.60 were assessed

1936).

7. 338 Mo. 226, 89 S. W. (2d) 659 (1936).
8. 100 S. W. (2d) 466 (Mo. 1936).
9. Maddux v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 100 S. W. (2d) 535 (Mo.

10. Cf. State ex rel. Pitcaim .v. Public Service Commission, 338 Mo. 180, 90
S. W. (2d) 392 (1935), where appellant sought merely the privilege to operate a
motor carrier for hire. As no money judgment was sought the privilege was deemed
to involve no measureable pecuniary right so as to give the court jurisdiction on
appeal.
11. 339 Mo. 1133, 100 S. W. (2d) 476 (1936). See infra note 14.
12. 339 Mo. 1107, 100 S. W. (2d) 271 (1936).
13. 98 S. W. (2d) 539 (Mo. 1936).
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against him and his surety upon motion of defendant. Plaintiff's appeal from
this order was held not to be within the jurisdiction of the supreme court
because: (1) there was nothing to show the amount involved on the injunction
issue, and (2) even if an appeal were made upon the injunction matter, the
present appeal was separate, being neither a cross-appeal nor an appeal upon
the matter of fixing costs in the action.
Several cases reiterate the rule that controversies concerning a claimant's
interest in a decedent's estate is determined by the net value of the claimant's
interest after payment of debts and not by the gross estate, nor the claimant's
14
proportionate share thereof.
A number of cases pass upon the question as to whether title to real
estate is involved. This seems to be a never ending problem in Missouri.
That issues concerning the priority of certain liens on land do not give the court
jurisdiction on appeal was held in Breit v. Bowland.6 According to State ex
rel. Ross v. Martin,'6 an appeal from an order granting a motion to set aside
a sale of lands under execution for delinquent drainage taxes was held not to
involve title to realty, as the validity of the sale and not title was in issue.
In City of St. Louis v. Franklin Bank, 17 it was decided that the supreme court
had no jurisdiction of an appeal by the condemnor from an award of damages
to owners when the right to condemn was conceded, as no title to realty was
involved. A suit to cancel a trust deed and to enjoin sale thereunder was
deemed to involve title to real estate for purposes of appellate jurisdiction in
Meredith v. Pound.8
Ballenger v. Windes 9 is an important decision. It was held that an action
of ejectment in which defendant claimed title and in which judgment was given
in favor of plaintiff for possession and one dollar per month rents and profits
until possession was given, did not involve title to real estate as title was not
specificially adjudged in the action though it might have been if prayed.
Justice Hays dissented reviewing the historical nature of ejectment and the

14. Peer v. Ashauer, 92 S. W. (2d) 154 (Mo. 1936); Fleischaker v. Fleischaker,
338 Mo. 797, 92 S. W. (2d) 169 (1936); In re Flynn Estate, 338 Mo. 522, 92 S.
W. (2d) 671 (1936); Whitworth v. Monahan's Estate, 339 Mo. 1123, 100 S. W.
(2d) 460 (1936).
15. 92 S. W. (2d) 110 (Mo. 1936).
16. 338 Mo. 1067, 93 S. W. (2d) 911 (1936).
17. 98 S. W. (2d) 534 (Mo. 1936).
18. 92 S. W. (2d) 698 (Mo. 1936). See also Hendrix v. Goldman, 92 S. W.
(2d) 733 (Mo. 1936).
19. 338 Mo. 1039, 93 S. W. (2d) 882 (1936).
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defenses thereto. In the later case of Welsh v. Brown,2" it was held that in a
similar case where defendant asked to have title adjudged, the supreme court
had jurisdiction of the appeal. In this opinion, Ballenger v. Windes is discussed and possibly a little doubt is cast upon that decision. Of course where
in an ejectment action defendant does not claim title nor the right to possession, the supreme court has no jurisdiction of the appeal as one involving title
to realty. This was decided in Haynes v. Dunstan.21
Peer v. Zshauer22 holds that there is no issue involving title to real estate
in a suit for the construction of a will, wherein the petition alleged that plaintiff and defendant were each seized of a one half interest in the land and defendant demurred. In re Flynn Estate23 is a case in which a widower, after
renouncing his wife's will, petitioned for $500 as part of his distributive share
of the estate. The circuit court denied the petition and the supreme court
upon appeal denied its own jurisdiction though the estate consisted in part
of realty. When the circuit court upon a creditor's appeal set aside the probate
court's sale of decedent's realty and the purchaser attempted to appeal to
the supreme court, it was held in Bank of ForestCity v. Pettijohn2 4 that title to
real estate was not involved so as to permit the review.
EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES

Actions of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari are, strictly speaking,
original rather than appellate proceedings when the writs are issued by the
supreme court. However, in so far at least as these writs review the action of
the court below, they fall fairly in the field of appellate practice.
State ex rel. Dilliner v. CumminS2 5 decided two points of procedure with
reference to the court's original proceedings in mandamus. It was first decided that while the alternative writ should be abstracted as the first or basic
pleading in the action, still if the respondent in his abstract furnishes all the
information which a proper abstract of the writ would give, the proceedings
should not be dismissed. The further holding of the court was to the effect
that when the relator asked for proper relief in his application for the alternative writ, but the writ as issued did not comply with this application, the
alternative writ might be amended. This amendment was considered necessary so that peremptory writ could follow the alternative writ.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

339 Mo. 235, 96 S. W. (2d) 345
98 S.W. (2d) 539 (Mo. 1936).
92 S. W. (2d) 154 (Mo. 1936).
338 Mo. 522, 92 S. W. (2d) 671
338 Mo. 506, 92 S. W. (2d) 189
338 Mo. 609, 92 S. W. (2d) 605

(1936).
(1936).
(1936).
(1936).
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In State ex rel. Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission,26 the employer filed a writ of mandamus to compel the commission to assume jurisdiction over a claim which it had dismissed as being
within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. It appeared that subsequent to this dismissal, the employee started his action in the federal court.
It was held that writ should be denied as nugatory because the federal court's
determination of its jurisdiction would be controlling and also for the reason
that claimant could not be compelled to prosecute his claim before the commission.
That a writ of certiorari does not review the action of an inferior tribunal
upon its merits but goes only to matters of jurisdiction or power to proceed
was held in State ex rel. Kennedy v. Remmers. 27 Accordingly the court declared that a bill of exceptions or transcript of the evidence would be disregarded as the review is on the record proper. State ex rel. Hoyt v. Shain deals
with certiorari to review an opinion of the court of appeals upon the ground
that it was conflicting with supreme court decisions. It was held that the
supreme court was bound by the conclusions of fact made by the court of
appeals and that the action of the supreme court would be confined to quashing the part of the opinion found to be conflicting. It is clearly stated that the
supreme court does not tell the court of appeals what to do when the latter
undertakes to make a new record in the case.
State ex rel. Cowden v. Knight 9 and State ex rel. Johnson v. Sevier"o are
cases in which it was deemed proper, upon the facts shown, to make absolute
a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from proceeding with certain
mandamus actions. Particularly in the later case it appears that prohibition
may have a somewhat broader scope than that of forbiding the court below
from exceeding its jurisdiction.3
In State ex rel. McGrew Coal Co. v. Ragland,32 the plaintiff had obtained
judgment for damages below, which judgment had been reversed by the
Supreme Court of Missouri and review by certiorari denied by the United
States Supreme Court. After mandate of reversal had been forwarded to the
26. 92 S. W. (2d) 624 (Mo. 1936).
27. 101 S. W. (2d) 70 (Mo. 1936).
28. 338 Mo. 1208, 93 S. W. (2d) 992 (1936).
29. 338 Mo. 584, 92 S. W. (2d) 610 (1936).
30. 339 Mo. 483, 98 S.W. (2d) 677 (1936).
31. See generally McBaine, The ExtraordinaryWrit of Prohibitionin Missouri
(1924) 30 U. OF Mo. BULL. LAw SER. 3; (1924) 31 id. at 3; (1925) 32 id. at
3. In particular see (1924) 31 id. at 27-30.
32. 339 Mo. 452, 97 S. W. (2d) 113 (1936).
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trial court, an original suit of mandamus was commenced in the Supreme
Court of Missouri to compel the clerk of the trial court to issue execution
upon the original judgment. Relator justified this astounding procedure upon
the ground that the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court altered the preexisting law and violated provisions of the Federal and Missouri Constitutions. The court holds very properly that its judgments cannot be collaterally
attacked through such mandamus proceedings.
LAYING FOUNDATION FOR APPEAL-APPEALABLE ORDERS

3
In State v. Herring,1
it was held that the admission of certain testimony
could not be reviewed though an objection was made and exception was taken
to its admission, when there was no motion to strike the answer nor request
that the jury be instructed to disregard it. Overruling an earlier case, it was
announced in Clay v. Owen 4 that where defendant demurred to plaintiff's
evidence at the close of the latter's proofs, which demurrer was overruled and
defendant then offered testimony and without renewing the demurrer requested certain charges to the jury, he had waived his demurrer to the
evidence.
Magee v. Mercantile-CommerceBank and Trust Co.3" announced the rule
that a "judgment" which disposed of only one of several counts of the
petition was interlocutory and hence did not permit an appeal. In Lucitt v.
Toohey's Estate,36 it was held that neither the order of the probate court setting aside the admission of the will, nor the order rejecting the will, nor the
orders setting aside the appointment of the executor and appointing an
administrator were appealable to the circuit court, not coming within the
statutory enumeration of appealable orders. It was pointed out that the
remedy of proponent must be found in a separate action in the circuit court
for the establishment of the will.

Four cases involved procedure concerning the involuntary nonsuit taken
by a plaintiff. When the plaintiff submitted to an involuntary nonsuit with
leave to move to set it aside and the trial court gave a purported "judgment"
for costs in favor of the plaintiff and discharging the jury, it was held in
Harrimanv. Stix, Baer & Fuller Co.,37 that this was not a final order which
33.
95 S. W.
34.
35.
36.
37.

92 S. W. (2d) 132 (Mo. 1936). See also State v. Powell, 339 Mo. 80,
(2d) 1186 (1936); (1936) 1 Mo. L. REv. 365.
338 Mo. 1061, 93 S. W. (2d) 914 (1936).
339 Mo. 559, 98 S. W. (2d) 614 (1936).
89 S. W. (2d) 662 (Mo. 1936).
92 S. W. (2d) 593 (Mo. 1936).
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would support an appeal by plaintiff. Boonville Nat. Bank v. Thompson
and Atrp v. Rogers 9 settle, for both departments, the rule that where the trial
court marks the defendant's peremptory instruction as "given" though it is
not actually read to the jury, plaintiff may then take a nonsuit with leave to
move to set it aside and then appeal. Such nonsuits are deemed involuntary
and outside the class of cases where plaintiff is precluded from appealing after
taking a voluntary nonsuit. Prior to these cases there was some doubt as to
whether or not the peremptory instruction had to be actually read to the jury
before taking the nonsuit in order to have the latter considered involuntary
for the purpose of appeal. In W~allace v. Woods, 40 the court was confronted
with whether the announcement of the taking of the nonsuit before the giving
of the peremptory instruction appeared from the record on appeal. The court
points out that this should appear from the bill of exceptions but while no
specific mention in the bill was found as to when the announcement of the
nonsuit was made, it appeared from the other parts of the record in the proceedings that the nonsuit must have been taken by the plaintiff at the proper
time to permit an appeal. The case also makes clear that it is the judgment of
dismissal, entered after an involuntary nonsuit, from which the appeal should
be taken.
It is certainly open to serious question whether the taking of an involuntary nonsuit at this stage and in this manner should be permitted. The practice is more or less anomolous in Missouri procedure. First, it can be questioned whether the plaintiff should be entitled to carry on an appeal for the
purpose of establishing that he is entitled to go to the jury and at the same
time reserve the right to try his case anew if the upper court's decision is
adverse. Second, it is doubtful if many plaintiffs take advantage of a second
action after being beaten in the appellate court. Finally even if the procedure
does foster some measure of justice and utility, the pitfalls of the practice are
so great as to render it a doubtful procedural device. For example, the plaintiff may take his nonsuit at the wrong time or in an unproper manner, thereby
precluding himself from appeal because the nonsuit is voluntary. Inexpert
attempts to preserve the privilege of a second suit, which is of secondary importance, have frequently prevented plaintiff from obtaining his right of
appeal, which is primary.
38. 339 Mo. 1049, 99 S. W. (2d) 93 (1936), noted in (1937) 2 Mo. L.
253; (1937) 22 WASH. U. L. Q. 565.
39. 99 S. W. (2d) 103 (Mo. 1936).
40. 102 S. W. (2d) 91 (Mo. 1936).
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A motion to modify a divorce decree was considered, in North V. North,41
to be in the nature of a separate action, and it was therefore unnecessary for
the purpose of review to save an exception to the resultant order or judgment.
Where the record does not show that the motion for new trial was made within
four days after verdict and no extensions of time appear, State v. Brown 42
decides that the alleged errors cannot be considered even with consent of
counsel for the state. In State ex rel. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Shain,43 it was
held that the statement in the bill of exceptions to the effect that the evidence
had been introduced in support of the petition and answer did not permit the
review of instructions for the reason that it could not be told whether the instructions, though technically erroneous, were sufficient to cause reversal of
the case.
While the parties may agree upon a statement of facts for the case, still
according to Bakersfield News v. Ozark County, 44 there can be no review except
as to matters appearing upon the record proper unless the agreed statement
is included in a bill of exceptions. State v. Gautney4 holds that nothing except
the record proper is presented for review when the bill of exceptions is uncertified. A similar case is State v. Hodges, 4 also showing the mischief that
may come from failure of the clerk to certify that the transcript contained a
record of all entries in the case.47 If this had been done in the latter case, the
filing of the information in one county and trial in another county with nothing to show change of venue would have caused reversal of the conviction.
FORM OF BRIEFS AND ABSTR.ACTS

If there is any high point in the year's decisions relating to the appellate
practice, it is that the court has been bearing down upon counsel who fail to
observe the rules relating to the form and contents of briefs. Warnings are
frequently given and there are many examples of the treatment which the
careless briefer may expect. Derelictions in the future are sure to incur the
wrath of the court and are likely to cause dismissal of the appeal. This attitude
does not strike the writer as being one of mere insistence upon technicality.
Rather it is a reasonable attempt to secure compliance with rules which are
designed to lighten the mechanical burdens of the court. It is only that the
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

339 Mo. 1226, 100 S. W. (2d) 582 (1936).
339 Mo. 1014, 98 S. W. (2d) 777 (1936).
338 Mo. 217, 89 S. W. (2d) 654 (1936).
338 Mo.519, 92 S.W. (2d) 603 (1936).
93 S. W. (2d) 668 (Mo. 1936).
93 S. W. (2d) 881 (Mo. 1936).
See also State v. Hanks, 98 S. W. (2d) 541 (Mo. 1936).
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remedy may be more harsh on the client than on the erring lawyer, that the
writer regrets. While precedents are probably lacking, it may be asked why
something in the nature of a fine cannot be placed upon counsel for errors of
this avoidable nature.
According to supreme court rule 15 it is provided that the brief for
appellant (1) shall distinctly allege the errors committed by the trial court
and contain in addition thereto, (2) a fair and concise statement of the facts
of the case without reiteration, statements of law, or argument, (3) a statement, in numerical order of the points relied on, with citation of authorities
thereunder, and, (4) a printed argument if desired.
Such assignments of error as that "the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence" and "the verdict is against the law under the evidence" are insufficient, the former being a matter upon which the appellate courts do not
pass and the latter being too broad and indefinite. This was held in Clay v.
Owen, 48 which also decides that assignments of error which are not mentioned
in the points and authorities or in the printed argument are deemed abandoned.
In criminal cases where the statute, 9 requires motions for new trial to
set forth in detail and with particularity the specific grounds thereof, it is
natural that the court should seize upon absence of the required particularity
in the motion made below without inquiry as to the form of the specifications
of error in the brief. A number of cases have refused to consider alleged errors
for this reason.-' In some of these the court may be speaking of deficiencies
in either the assignments of error in the motion for new trial, or the assignments of error in the appellant's brief. In State v. White, it was held that the
insufficient assignments of error in the motion for new trial could not be
broadened or made specific by the points and authorities in appellant's brief.
48. 338 Mo. 1061, 93 S. W. (2d) 914 (1936). See also Colin v. Moldenhauer, 338 Mo. 827, 92 S. W. (2d) 601 (1936), holding that assignments of error
that "the judgment on the record is erroneous" and "the record will not support
the judgment" were insufficient basis for the argument that the trial court decided
the case without hearing evidence.
49. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 3735.
50. State v. Thompson, 338 Mo. 897, 92 S. W. (2d) 892 (1936); State v.
Arnett, 338 Mo. 907, 92 S. W. (2d) 897 (1936); State v. Bagby, 338 Mo. 951, 93
S. W. (2d) 241 (1936); State v. Kaner, 338 Mo. 972, 93 S. W. (2d) 671 (1936);
State v. Maples, 96 S. W. (2d) 26 (Mo. 1936); State v. Flinn, 96 S. W. (2d) 506
(Mo. 1936); State v. Smith, 339 Mo. 950, 98 S. W. (2d) 657 (1936); State v.
Mansker, 339 Mo. 913, 98 S. W. (2d) 666 (1936); State v. White, 339 Mo. 1019, 99
S. W. (2d) 72 (1936); State v. Arenz, 100 S. W. (2d) 264 (Mo. 1936). See generally Comment (1936) 1 Mo. L. REv. 175.
51. 339 Mo. 1019, 99 S. W. (2d) 72 (1936).
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State v. McKeever6 2 refuses to pass upon errors alleged in the brief, which
were not mentioned in the motion for new trial. State v. Frazier3 makes the
point that it is even more unfair for appellant to bring general assignments of
error to the supreme court than to present these below when there is a chance
for questioning and argument.
In Shaw v. Fulkerson,54 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
because the statement of facts in the brief contained argumentative matter in
violation of statute and court rule. While the court indicated that its action
might be too lenient, it refused to dismiss because, ignoring the argumentative matter, appellant had stated all the facts including those favorable to
respondent.
Where the points and authorities are merely a repetition of the assignments of error followed by a list of citations and without stating the reasons
for the errors complained of, the brief fails to comply with rule 15. For this
reason the appeals were dismissed in Hartkopf v. Elliott," and Majors v.
Malone. 6 Putting it another way, the assignments of error should show in
particular to what ruling of the trial court objection is being taken, while the
points should tell the legal reason why the complaint is being made. Moreover
the connection between these two matters should be made apparent. Mere
abstract propositions of law such as "fraud is never presumed" when contained
in the points of the brief are insufficient for they do not show the applicability
of the legal proposition to the facts of the case. 57 The seriousness with which
the court views these matters is illustrated by the dismissals of the appeals.
In Payne v. Payne, 8 an equity appeal was dismissed for appellant's failure
to include an index at the end of his abstract of the record as required by rule
13, although the abstract contained only 27 pages. Bank of Kennett v.
Tatumw is in accord though the abstract was longer, and the case further
holds that the court will not consider a supplemental abstract filed after
objection is raised.

52. 101 S. W. (2d) 22 (Mo. 1936).
53. 339 Mo. 966, 98 S. W. (2d) 707 (1936).
54. 339 Mo. 310, 96 S. W. (2d) 495 (1936).
55. 339 Mo. 1009, 99 S. W. (2d) 25 (1936).
56. 339 Mo. 1118, 100 S. W. (2d) 300 (1936), noted in (1937) 2 Mo. L.
REv. 206.
57. See Clay v. Owen, 338 Mo. 1061, 93 S. W. (2d) 914 (1936), cited note
48, supra;also cases cited supra notes 55 and 56.
58. 338 Mo. 224, 89 S. W. (2d) 665 (1936).
59. 100 S. W. (2d) 475 (Mo. 1936).
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State v. Mason,6" settles an important point in criminal appeals. It held
that when appellant's counsel abandoned in his brief some of the assignments
of error contained in the motion for new trial, the court would not pass upon
these assignments. The court admits that under the statute it is its duty to
search the record proper for all errors there appearing regardless of whether
or how such questions were raised below or on appeal; it further conceded that
when a bill of exceptions preserves proper assignments of error in the motion
for new trial, the court will look to all such assignments if the cause is not
briefed by appellant. But where appellant filed a brief in the supreme court
expressly or by implication abandoning such assignments of error, the court
will not consider the points. Leaving the point entirely out of the brief is
deemed an abandoment thereof, 61 though this was not extended to cases
where there is merely a faulty brief.
DISPOSITION OF CASES ON APPEAL

6

Where there are separate or cross-appeals in a single case, the whole case
on appeal must be considered as a unit, according to Punch v. Hipolite Co.6
State ex rel. Ashby v. Cairo Bridge & Terminal Co.6 4 lays down the same rule,
though one party appeals and another takes out a writ of error.
The general doctrine that the decision upon a first appeal will be followed
as the law of the case in a second appeal involving the same issue was applied
in Lober v. Kansas City.6" However certain qualifications upon this doctrine
are illustrated in Poe v. Illinois Cent. R. R.6 There, it was held that the
divisional court would not follow the law announced in a prior appeal of the
same case if convinced that the first appeal was incorrectly decided, especially when a contrary doctrine had been announced in the interim by the
court in banc.
In State v. Bliss,17 there had been a prior review of the same judgment
upon the record only. The affirmance upon that appeal was deemed to be res
judicata and preclude a second review, although the present appeal included

60. 339 Mo. 874, 98 S. W. (2d) 574 (1936).
61. See also Clay v. Owen, 338 Mo. 1061, 93 S. W. (2d) 914 (1936), cited note
48, supra.
62. As to the revival of actions in the Supreme Court, see section on Wills
and Administration infra notes 58 to 60.
63. 100 S. W. (2d) 878 (Mo. 1936).
64. 100 S. W. (2d) 441 (Mo. 1936).
65. 339 Mo. 1087, 100 S. W. (2d) 267 (1936).
66. 339 Mo. 1025, 99 S. W. (2d) 82 (1936).
67. 99 S. W. (2d) 71 (Mo. 1936).
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8 adds to the legion of
a bill of exceptions. Benz v. Powell"
decisions holding
that a case must be heard on appeal upon the same theory as in the trial court.
8 9 the court refused to pass upon a certain question
In Moberly v. Leonard,
because it was moot. It is of interest to notice that the court discovered the
non-justiciable character of the matter from an examination of the record
in another case before the court. The effect of a judge concurring "in result"
70 Speaking of a prior deis considered in State ex rel. Dengel v. Hartmann.
cision which contained language inconsistent with that in a still earlier one, it
was declared that the later of the two could not be considered a ruling decision
when only three judges concurred absolutely, two others in the result, with
one judge dissenting and another absent.

In Lambert v. Jones,7' there was judgment below against three tort feasors
but only two appealed. Finding reversible error upon questions of liability
but none upon questions of damages, the judgment was reversed as to all
defendants with directions to hold in abeyance the verdict as to the nonappealing defendant, until the case was disposed of as to the liability of the
appealing defendants and then enter judgment against the non-appealing
defendant and such other defendant or defendants finally found liable. This
procedure was considered necessary in order to have only one final judgment
in the same amount against all alleged joint-feasors who are held liable. The
disposition also resulted in a partial new trial upon the issue of liability without redetermination of damages, which question was correctly decided on
the first trial.
Tanner a. West7 2 presents an interesting question of the disposition of a
case upon appeal, though the court after stating the facts at length decides
the matter in short order. In a damage action defendant demurred to the
evidence at the close of all the testimony. This demurrer was overruled and a
verdict returned for plaintiff. Defendant then moved for new trial upon the
ground, among others, that his demurrer to the evidence should have been
sustained. The trial court granted the new trial however upon the ground of
error in the giving of a certain instruction upon plaintiff's request. Plaintiff
appealed from the order granting the new trial, but the order was affirmed
upon the ground that defendant's demurrer to the evidence should have been

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

338
339
339
339
339

Mo.
Mo.
Mo.
Mo.
Mo.

1032, 93 S. W. (2d)
791, 99 S. W. (2d)
200, 96 S. W. (2d)
677, 98 S. W. (2d)
738, 99 S. W. (2d)

877 (1936).
58 (1936).
329 (1936).
752 (1936).
7 (1936).
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sustained, refusing to pass upon the further question of the correctness of the
instruction given at plaintiff's request.
It thus appears that the case may be retried although plaintiff did not
make out a case sufficient to go to the jury. It further appears that defendant
would have been in a better position had his motion for new trial been denied
and had he then appealed from judgment upon the verdict. Apparently the
supreme court would then have reversed the case without ordering new trial.
There is no reason why plaintiff should then have been given another chance
to make out a case for the jury.7 3 An efficient procedural device which has
some application to the instant cause is that found in some jurisdictions74 of
submitting the case to the jury with power to set the same aside and order
judgment for the opposite party if the law and facts after due consideration
warrant such disposition. Technically the disposition of the instant cause
seem defensible for the reason that as defendant has asked for a new trial,
he can scarcely complain that one is ordered, and the further fact that he did
not, and probably could not, appeal after the granting of the new trial. But
is this the "very right" of the cause?
When the evidence in a criminal case was insufficient to sustain the conviction by the court below and there was no showing that the state could
make a better case on retrial, it was held, in State v. DeMoss,7 1 that a new
trial should not be ordered but the defendant discharged, especially when
defendant's motion for new trial disclosed newly discovered evidence of an
important nature. In State v. White,76 the supreme court noticed that the
verdict assessed punishment at five years imprisonment, while a memorandum
of the sentence indicated that four years had been imposed. It was declared
that the record on appeal should show the actual entry of the judgment and
the case was remanded for sentence in accordance with the verdict, if that had
not already been done, and, finding no other error, the court expressly ordered
that there be no new trial.
When the trial court erroneously imposed two years more imprisonment
7 7
than the jury had assessed, the supreme court, in State v. Franks,
refused to
73. See supra text at notes 37-40 and following.
74.

CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (1923)

§ 629; MAss. G. L. (Ter. ed. 1932) c. 231,

§§ 120-122; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9495; PA. STAT. (West, 1936) tit. 12, §
681. See also Cruikshank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 75 Minn. 266, 77 N.
W. 958 (1899). Cf. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U. S. 364 (1913).
75. 338 Mo. 719, 92 S.W. (2d) 112 (1936).
76. 339 Mo. 1019, 99 S. W. (2d) 72 (1936).
77. 339 Mo. 86, 95 S. W. (2d) 1190 (1936). See also State v. Melton, 92
S. W. (2d) 107 (Mo. 1936).
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remand the case but itself entered the lawful judgment in accordance with the
jury's findings.
State v. Gregory7" contains an interesting and helpful discussion of when
the supreme court will grant a new trial in a criminal case upon the ground
that the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence. While no definition
of such matters could be tangible or mechanical, it is laid down that the
evidence in order to support the verdict must be substantial, or such as the
jury could reasonably find the issues as it did. Moreover the measure of proof
required in criminal cases and the apparent credibility of witnesses must be
considered in this connection. The court declined to interfere upon the facts
of the Gregory case, and indicated that it would seldom do so.

IV
BANKING AND NEGOTIABLE INTRUMENTSS
LAWRENCE

I.

BANKS

R.

BROWN*

AND BANKING

"'The presumption is that a deposit is a general one and the burden of proving otherwise is on the person claiming priority as a special depositor. A special deposit in its truest sense is one where the
bank merely assumes custody and charge of the property without
authority to use it, and the depositor is entitled to receive back the
identical thing deposited. The title to the thing deposited remains
with the depositor and, as a general rule, if the special deposit be
money the bank has no right to mingle it with its other funds.
However, the rule has been greatly relaxed so that, where the money
deposited is to be used for a specifically designated purpose, it may
still be regarded as a special one, even though the funds were deposited under an agreement allowing them to become mingled with
other funds in the bank and they are so mingled that the identical
money deposited can no longer be identified. However, that purpose
must be evidenced by a mutual understanding or agreement on the

78. 339 Mo. 133, 96 S. W. (2d) 47 (1936).
*Attorney, Kansas City. B.S. Northwest Missouri State Teachers College, 1932;
LL.B. University of Missouri, 1936.
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part of the depositor and the bank and the intention or purpose,
merely on the part of the depositor, that it should become a special
deposit is not sufficient to make it so.' ""
This rule as laid down in an earlier case was quoted, approved and
adopted by the Supreme Court of Missouri in the recent case of Landwehr v.
Moberly, State FinanceCom'r.2 The fact that the deposit is made by a trustee
or executor of funds intrusted to his care does not make the deposit "special"
merely because the funds are to be used only for the purpose of carrying out
the purpose of a trust. The court in the Landwehr case also held that since
the closing of the bank resulted from withdrawals over a period of a year and
since there was no suggestion of mismanagement, there could be no preference
against the bank liquidation on the ground that bank officials knew the bank
was insolvent at the time of accepting the deposits.
Where trust funds are transferred to a bank and its officers had knowledge
that they were trust funds, they will be impressed with a trust and do not
become part of the general assets of the bank. In so ruling the court, in the
case of Happy v. Cole County Bank, 3 followed the well established doctrine
that equity will follow trust property when the purchaser has notice the
4
property is held in trust regardless of consideration.
In Security National Bank Savings & Trust Co. v. Moberly, 5 one Barton
conveyed to the defendant Chauteau Trust Company, as trustee, certain
property to secure payment of $500,000 in notes in the sum of $500 each. In
order to meet semi-annual interest payments and annual principal pay-offs,
the mortgage obligated the mortgagor to make certain regular monthly deposits with the trustee. The funds in suit represented the regular monthly
deposits. The suit was in equity on behalf of the noteholders to establish a
preferred claim against the assets of the Chauteau Trust Company, since
insolvent, to the extent of the deposits. The plantiff intended that the funds
were accepted as special deposits and were impressed with a trust. The court,
after pointing out that "deposits made by fiduciaries are usually considered
simply as general deposits;" that "a special deposit of money.. .consists of
the delivery thereof.. .pursuant to an agreement... to hold same for a pre1. City of Fulton v. Harrison, 69 S. W. (2d) 312, 315 (Mo. App. 1934);
City of Fulton v. Home Trust Co., 336 Mo. 239, 78 S. W. (2d) 445 (1934).
2. 338 Mo. 1106, 93 S. W. (2d) 935 (1936).
3. 338 Mo. 1025, 93 S. W. (2d) 870 (1936).
4. PERRY, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) 379, 380.
5. 101 S. W. (2d) 33 (Mo. 1936).
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scribed purpose... and to return the same money or its equivalent;" that "the
presumption obtains that the deposits were general;" stated that the right of
a bank to commingle and use deposits is determinative of whether the deposit is special and not the fact that it is commingled.
The court expressly overruled the following statement made in the case
of City of Fulton v. Harrison:'
"However, the rule has been greatly relaxed so that, where the
money deposited is to be used for a specifically designated purpose,
it may still be regarded as a special one, even though the funds were
deposited under an agreement allowing them to become mingled with
otherfunds in the bank and they are so mingled that the identical
money deposited can no longer be identified." (italics the author's).
Such a ruling seems proper for it is impossible to reconcile the old rule
with the established law in Missouri that "it is the right or not of the bank to
commingle and use the funds as its own" that determines the character of the
deposit as special or general. 7 With these principles as a background the
court ruled that the deposits in this case were not special but general and not
subject to a preference. In so doing the court held that the fact that no interest is to be paid is not determinative of the nature of a deposit, and although
a bank enters a transaction as a "trustee" account, it does not change the
nature of the deposit from a general one.
A transaction whereby one bank took over all of the assets of another
bank and assumed certain liabilities was held to be a sale of the second bank's
assets except those equal to its capital stock and other liabilities not assumed
in Moberly v. Leonard.8
In Town of Canton v. Bank of Lewis County,9 it was held that the sureties
on a depository bond which provided that the depository should act as such
for one year and until a successor qualified were liable until a successor is
appointed even though a year has gone by.

6. City of Fulton v. Harrison, 69 S. W. (2d) 312 (Mo. App. 1934); City of
Fulton v. Home Trust Co., 336 Mo. 239, 78 S. W. (2d) 445 (1934).
7. Craig v. Bank of Granby, 210 Mo. App. 334, 238 S. W. 507 (1922); In Te
Sturdivant Bank, 89 S. W. (2d) 89 (Mo. App. 1936); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935)
§ 12, comment h.
8. 339 Mo. 791, 99 S. W. (2d) 58 (1936).
9. 338 Mo. 817, 92 S. W. (2d) 595 (1936).
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When a bank gives a depositor of a check credit and allows the depositor
to check against this credit the bank becomes the owner of the check and not
an agent for collection."o
II.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

An endorsement worded "For value received Reuben Josephson hereby
assigns and transfers the within note and coupons with all his interest in and
rights under the Mortgage or Deed of Trust securing the same to ....
Signed
Reuben Josephson," was interpreted (in accordance with the well settled
Missouri rule) in the case of Home Trust Co. v. Josephson," as an unqualified
endorsement.
The court also reiterated the rule that in the absence of suspicious circumstance the presumption is that erasures on a negotiable instrument were
made at or prior to the time of signing. A failure to attempt to rebut the
presumption amounts to an admission of its correctness. In the case of Lampe
v. Franklin American Trust Co.,12 the circumstances were so suspicious as to
rebut the presumption.
Because "the law does not require the doing of a vain and useless act,"
the court, in the Josephson case, held that although "ordinarily presentment
for payment and notice of dishonor of a negotiable instrument are necessary
in order to bind the indorser" it is not necessary "where the indorser is the
person to whom the instrument is presented for payment," and where as in
that case the failure to give notice did not prejudice defendant.
".... where... the plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict and there is
no controversy as to the amount, and the contract sued on calls for interest at
a stated rate for a certain time, so that the ascertainment of the amount of
interest is only a matter of mathematical computation, it is not error for the
court to make the calculation and direct a verdict for the total amount due,
including the interest."'" In so holding, many Missouri cases to the contrary
4
(in regard to interest) were expressly overruled.

10. Liberty National Bank of Kansas City v. Vanderslice-Lynds Co., 338 Mo.
932, 95 S. W. (2d) 324 (1936).
11. 339 Mo.170, 95 S. W. (2d) 1148 (1936).
12. 339 Mo.361, 96 S.W. (2d) 710 (1936).
13. Home Trust Co. v. Josephson, 339 Mo. 170, 95 S. W. (2d) 1148 (1936).
14. Cates, Adm'r. v. Nickell, 42 Mo. 169 (1868); Burghart v. Brown, 60 Mo.
24 (1875); Johnson v. Grayson, 230 Mo. 380, 130 S. W. 673 (1910); Boutross v.
Miller, 223 S. W. 889 (Mo. 1920).
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Any alteration is a material one which may in any event alter rights
duties or obligations of a person sought to be charged, according to the holding in Lampe v. Franklin American Trust Co.Y'

V
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SOLBERT M. WASSERSTROM*

I. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Encroachment of the Legislature on the Judiciary. The statute,' involved
in State ex inf. Crain,ex rel. Peebles v. Moore,2 provides for circuit clerks being
ex officio recorders in counties of less than 20,000 inhabitants and provides
that in counties over 20,000 the offices may be combined on a vote of the
voters of the county. It was objected that the legislature cannot hamper the
work of the circuit clerk since that is an infringement on the judiciary. It was
held that while the courts may not be bound by any and all statutes of the
legislature affecting the office of circuit clerk, 3 the provisions here are not
unconstitutional.
In State ex rel. Pitcairn v. Public Service Commission4 and in State ex
rel. Gehrs v. Public Service Commission,5 it was held that the statute,6 purporting to allow an appeal to the supreme court of decisions of the circuit court
reviewing action by the Public Service Commission, is unconstitutional insofar as it attempts to invade the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals and to
enlarge the jurisdiction of the supreme court; the respective jurisdictions are

15. 339 Mo. 361, 96 S. W. (2d) 710 (1936).
*Secretary to Judge Kimbrough Stone, United States Circuit Court of Appeals.
A.B. 1932, LL.B. 1933, University of Missouri.
1. Act of 1933, Mo. STAT. ANN., §§ 11526, 11528, 11529, 11534, 11535,
11538, 11541, pp. 6696-6699.
2. 99 5. W. (2d) 17 (Mo. 1936).
3. Relative to the nature of the office of clerk of the court, see 11 C. J. 848,
§ 1. It appears that although endowed with certain judicial attributes the office
is essentially a ministerial, not a judicial one; however, some jurisdictions consider
the clerk an essential constituent part of the court. For a rather extended discussion of the nature of the circuit clerk's office in Missouri, see State ex -el. Hensen
v. Sheppard, 192 Mo. 497, 91 S. W. 477, 482 (1905).
4. 92 S. W. (2d) 881 (Mo. 1936).
5. 90 S. W. (2d) 394 (Mo. 1936), followed in State ex rel. to Use of Alton
R. R. v. Public Service Commission, 100 S. W. (2d) 474 (Mo. 1936).
6. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 5237.
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defined by the constitution 7 and the legislature may not either enlarge or

subtract therefrom.
Encroachments of the Judiciary on the Legislature. In Peterson v. Kansas
City Life Ins. Co., 8 defendant had foreclosed a deed of trust after plaintiff had
defaulted. Plaintiff sues for damages for wrongful foreclosure, his contention
being that defendant should have granted a moratorium in such bad times.
The court held that the right to grant a moratorium because of critical conditions is a legislative and not a judicial power. Defendant's refusal to grant
a moratorium cannot be any basis for an action for damages.
In State ex inf. McKittrick v. Gate City Optical Co., 9 the question was
whether defendants were practicing optometry within the meaning of the
optometry code."0 The court held that the statute is plain on its face, and it
is not the province of the court to write exceptions or qualifications which the
Legislature did not see fit to insert.

Encroachment of the Judiciary on the Executive. In State ex rel. State
Highway Commission v. Sevier," the question was the jurisdiction of the trial
judge to issue a temporary injunction prohibiting the Highway Commission
to sign a contract with a construction company for the building of a highway
bridge. It was held that under article 4, Section 44a, of the Missouri constitution, the commission has absolute discretion as to construction of bridges.
It has sole jurisdiction to determine the question of whether promised cooperation by the city of Atchison, Kansas and the State of Kansas would be
forthcoming; and the courts cannot interfere with the ordinary functions of
the executive department of the state government.
II.

LEGISLATION

Titles to A4cts. It was held in State ex inf. Crain,ex rel. Peebles v. Moore,12
that catchwords prefixed by the compiler are not part of the title in a constitutional sense, and hence cannot give the statute13 more than one subject.
All the matter covered was held to have a natural connection with the general
subject of the bill and properly could be embodied in one act.

7. Art. 6, § 12, and amendment of 1884 to art. 6, § 5.
8. 98 S. W. (2d) 770 (Mo. 1936).
9. 97 S. W. (2d) 89 (Mo. 1936).
10. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) §§ 13497 et seq.
11. 97 S. W. (2d) 427 (Mo. 1936).
12. 99 S. W. (2d) 17 (Mo. 1936).
13. Act of 1933, Mo. STAT. ANN., §§ 11526, 11528, 11529, 11534, 11535,
11538, 11541, pp. 6696-6699.
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In the same case, it was contended that the statute above was so contradictory and conflicting as to be unconstitutional since the subject matter
cannot be clearly expressed in the tide. It was held that the provisions are
not new or novel,14 the meaning of the statute is plain, and the objection is
not vaild.
In State ex rel. Mueller Baking Co. v. Calvird,15 the court held that the
statute"8 was part of a substitute act 1 7 to replace a former act,18 and the title
of the original act became the tide of the new act. Section 8707 comes within
the purview of the original act and objection is without merit.

Special Legislation. In State ex rel. Ashby to Use of CapitalSchool Fund
of Mississippi County v. Cairo Bridge & TerminalCo., 9 the statute20 imposing
a penalty on defendants for failure to render a property statement for tax
purposes was held unconstitutional as special legislation in violation of
article 4, Section 53, sub-division 32. The statute imposed a penalty on only
four types of utility companies whereas the statute21 providing for the rendition of the property statements in question applied to a larger number of
public utilities.
In State ex inf. Crain,ex rel. Peebles v. Moore,22 it was held that classification on a population basis was valid, where offices of recorder and circuit
clerk were combined in counties of less than 20,000.
In State ex rel. Mueller Baking Co. v. Calvird,21 it was held that the permissible classification doctrine is applicable to the first 31 sub-divisions of
Section 53, article 4, of the Missouri constitution as well as to the 32nd subdivision; the court disapproves the statement to the contrary made in State
ex rel. StandardFireIns. Co. v. Gantt.24 Thus the classification effected by a
special venue statute, 2 not arbitrary or unreasonable, is valid.

14. See Mo. REV. STAT. (1825) p. 655, and G. S. Mo. 1865, c. 26, § 23,
p. 161.
15. 338 Mo. 601, 92 S. W. (2d) 184 (1936).
16. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 8707.
17. Act against pools, trusts, conspiracies and discriminations.
18. Mo. REV. STAT. (1909) art. 1, c. 98.
19. 100 S. W. (2d) 441 (Mo. 1936).
20. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 10070.
21. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 10066.
22. 99 5. W. (2d) 17 (Mo. 1936).
23. 338 Mo. 601, 92 S. W. (2d) 184 (1936).
24. 274 Mo. 490, 203 S. W. 964 (1918).
25. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 8707, which is part of the act against pools, trusts,
conspiracies, and discriminations.
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Presumptive Validity. In State ex rel. Jacobsmeyer v. Thatcher,"6 the
familiar rule was repeated that every presumption is in favor of the validity
of legislative acts.
Effect of Constitutional Amendment on Statutes. In State ex rel. Dengel
v. Hartmann,2 7 it was held that if a previous law'8 conflicts with the constitutional amendment of 1924, which sets up limitations on the secrecy of
ballot, said previous law is nullified as if specifically repealed. 9
III.

DELEGATION or LEGISLATIVE POWER

Local Option Law. In State ex inf. Crain,ex rel. Peebles v, Moore," the
statute" providing for local option in counties over 20,000 as to the combining
of the offices of circuit clerk and recorder was upheld. 32 The criteria of the
validity of such laws are: (a) the statute must take effect ex propio vigore
without requiring assent of local authorities or electorate to make it such;
(b) the legislation must generally be on a matter of local concern so far that
varied and varying local conditions may be consulted in its application; (c) a
statute cannot delegate unfettered discretion, but must be complete enough to
declare the will of the law makers within practicable limits. The court also
adverts to the rule33 that a statute cannot allow a county to create and discontinue an office at pleasure; but the court decides that rule has no application in this case.
Highway Toll Bridges under Private Corporations. The statute 4 provides
that not less than three nor more than seven qualified electors might become
a body corporate with the right to perpetual succession and should be deemed
a public agency for the purpose of building a highway toll-bridge. Bonds were
to be issued against the income of the bridge, and after retirement of said
bonds the bridge would become free to the public. The constitutionality of the
statute was attacked in State ex rel. Jones v. Brown," one ground of attack

26. 338 Mo. 622, 92 S. W. (2d) 640 (1936). The same case was before the
court in 337 Mo. 1225, 88 S. W. (2d) 187 (1935).
27. 96 S. W. (2d) 329 (Mo. 1936).
28. Mo. REV. STAT. (1919) § 5403.
29. 12 C. J. 725, § 97.
30. 99 S. W. (2d) 17 (Mo. 1936).
31. Act of 1933, Mo. STAT. ANN., §§ 11525, 11528, 11529, 11534, 11535,
11538, 11541, pp. 6696-6699.
32. See State ex inf. Crow v. Evans, 166 Mo. 347, 66 S. W. 355 (1902).
33. State ex rel. Rosenthal v. Smiley, 304 Mo. 549, 263 S. W. 825 (1924).
34. Mo. STAT. ANN., §§ 7914d et seq. and §§ 7907a note, 7907b note, 7907c
et seq.
35. 338 Mo. 448, 92 S. W. (2d) 718 (1936).
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being that there was an unlawful delegation of power. This divided into
two branches: (1) this was an unlawful delegation to citizens of the power to
create public agencies of the state, the court so held; (2) further, the legislature proposes to leave to the unbridled discretion of this alleged public
agency the number of bridges to be acquired, the character and location, or
whether any will be acquired at all. It was held to constitute an unconstitutional delegation.
Sub-division of Townships by County Court. In State ex rel. Frank v.
Tegethoff,36 a statute 7 permitting sub-division of townships by the county
court was attacked as an unreasonable delegation of legislative power. It was
held that the statute in question in harmony with the constitution38 defines
one of the powers of the county courts growing out of their supervisory control
over the administrative affairs of the county.
IV.

DuE PROCESS

Administrative Proceedings. In State ex rel. Anderson Motor Service Co. v.
Public Service Commission, 9 the statute40 providing for court review of proceedings before the Public Service Commission was attacked as denying due
process in that it deprived appellant of a hearing. The statute provides for a
writ of certiorari from the circuit court to the commission; but the party who
prevailed before the commission is not made a party to the proceeding before
the circuit court and there is no provision for notice to or service upon him.
The court held that the proceedings in the circuit court being a mere continuance of the proceedings before the commission, it was incumbent on
appellant to take note of the progress of the case; appellant had the right to
appear before the circuit court, to be heard there, and to appeal from the
judgment of the circuit court.
In State v. Phillips Pipe Line Co.," it was contended that the assessment
and judgment of the Tax Commission 42 contravenes the due process require-

36. 338 Mo. 328, 89 S. W. (2d) 666 (1936).
37. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 12041.
38. Art. 6, § 36.
39. 97 S. W. (2d) 116 (Mo. 1936).
40. Public Service Commission Act, Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 5234.
41. 97 S. W. (2d) 109 (Mo. 1936); 57 Sup. Ct. 668 (1937), on motion of
the Attorney-General of the State of Missouri, this case was continued to the October Term, 1937, of the Supreme Court of the United States.
42. Under Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 4596, 4641.
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ment. The court disposes of the point on the authority of St. Louis-San
4
Francisco Ry. v. Middlekamp.A
In Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Midland Realty Co., 4 4 defendant
contended his contract rates for steam could not be abrogated by the higher
schedule of rates approved by the Public Service Commission. One ground
of complaint was that the defendant was not a party to the proceeding before
the commission wherein the schedule rates were approved and the commission did not have an opportunity to and did not find that the contract was
unreasonable. The court held that the commission's action was only a tentative and prima facie determination of facts controlling defendant's rights and
did not determine the rights themselves. Both parties availed of the usual
and statutory mode of procedure, adequate to safeguard defendant's contractual rights, and the requirements of due process were met.
Assessment of Railroadfor Crossing Improvement. In State ex rel. Wabash
Ry. v. Public Service Commission,41 the railroad company complained that
assessment against it of 40%46 of the cost of the separation of a grade 47 was a
denial of due process. The separation resulted in a slight increase in safety
which was of benefit to the company in that it was protected to that extent
from damage suits. However, the crossing was already reasonably safe, and
the major benefit of the separation was convenience to the highway public
and the beautification of St. Louis' Forest Park and the surrounding residential district. It was held that aside from the safety factor, the convenience
and necessity of the traveling public must be considered; apportionment
should include a consideration of the extent to which the presence of the railroad at the place enhanced the cost of a necessary improvement. The court
says further that the apportionment of the cost to the railroad was reasonable
since there was a full hearing by the commission on the question, and relator
was allowed to introduce evidence to support its contentions; e. g., it was
allowed to prove in detail the use of the crossing by the railroad in comparison
43. 256 U. S. 226 (1921). In that case it was argued that the statute mada
no requirement of a hearing by the commission; but the United States Supreme
Court held that the question of a proper hearing could be raised when a court suit
was brought by the state to collect the tax on the assessment, and there was therefore no denial of due process.
44. 338 Mo. 1141, 93 S. W. (2d) 954 (1926), aff'd, 300 U. S. 109 (1937);
petition for rehearing denied, 57 Sup. Ct. 504 (1937).
45. 100 S. W. (2d) 522 (Mo. 1936).
46. The other 60% was assessed to the city.
47. This elimination of the grade crossing was a part of a complete plan of
separation which was before the Commission and the Supreme Court in State ex tel.
Wabash Ry. v. Public Service Comm., 306 Mo. 149, 267 S. W. 102 (1924).
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to use by vehicular traffic. It will be noticed that it is held that convenience
to the traveling public justifies assessment of part of the cost to the railroad.
In this case, the factor of beautification of the park and residential district
was considered only on the question of whether the plan actually adopted was
permissible in preference to the railroad's plan for a cheaper but less beautifying construction. It has been held that an assessment against a railroad is not
48
justified if the sole object of the separation is beautification.

Refinancing of Trust Certificatesby R. F. C. In Seigle v. First Nat. Co., 49
certificate holders of a trust fund consisting of mortgage securities brought
equity suits for liquidation of the trust fund, and judgment to that effect was
granted. Subsequently, the decree was modified on an intervening petition
to permit a loan to be accepted from the R. F. C. and to permit the transfer
of the securities to the R. F. C. as a pledge with the power in the R. F. C. to
try to liquidate the securities; provison was made for distribution of the
proceeds of the loan to the certificate holders and for distrbution of the proceeds of the liquidation to the certificate holders after repayment of the loan.
It was held there is no denial of due process to appellant certificate holders.

Ouster of Utility at Expiration of Franchise. It was held in State on Inf.
of McKittrick ex rel. City of Californiav. Missouri Utilities Co.0 that the use
of city streets by a utility company is not a vested right but a privilege which
ceases at the expiration of the franchise period. Hence it is held that the company has no property of which it is or can be deprived by an ouster from the
streets.bl
V.

OBLIGATION

OF CONTRACTS

Ousterof Utility at Expirationof Franchise. In State on Inf.of McKittrick
ex rel. City of California v. Missouri Utilities Co.,52 it was held that as originally made, the contract (franchise) was to expire in 1929, the contract
ceased to exist on that date, and a non-existing contract cannot be impaired
by an order of ouster on a subsequent date. 53
The utility company further contended that a certificate of convenience
and necessity issued by the Public Service Commission in 1924 modified the
original contract and made it a perpetual one. The court points out in reply
48.
149, 267
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

State ex rel. and to Use of Wabash Ry. v. Public Service Comm., 306 Mo.
S. W. 102, 108 (1924), and cases cited.
338 Mo. 417, 90 S. W. (2d) 776 (1936).
96 S. W. (2d) 607 (Mo. 1936).
See also Detroit United Ry. v. Detroit, 229 U. S. 39 (1913).
96 S. W. (2d) 607 (Mo. 1936).
See also Detroit United Ry. v. Detroit, 229 U. S. 39 (1913).
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that the Public Service Commission Act 4 makes the consent of the muni-

cipality a condition precedent to the granting of the certificate; hence the
granting of the certificate did not extend the life of the original contract.
Schedule Rate, Approved by Commission, Abrogating Contract Rate. It
was held in Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Midland Realty Co." that the
Public Service Commission may fix by order reasonable rates exceeding the
maximum prescribed by individual contracts, and such an order does not in
the constitutional sense impair the obligation of such contracts; this being so
because the police power cannot be contracted away."
Administrative Hearingon Rate Schedule. In Kansas City Power& Light
Co. v. MidlandRealty Co., 7 it was held that hearings before the Public Service
Commission detailed supra do not impair a consumer's individual contract
rate.

Refinancing of Trust Certificatesby R. F. C. In Seigle v. First Nat. Co.,",
it was argued that the decree detailed above impaired the obligation of the
certificate holders' contract. The court held that the decree does not disturb
the contract but seeks to enforce it in a manner which, to the court, appeared
to be the most effective means.
VI. EQUAL PROTECTION

Refinancing of Trust Certificatesby R. F. C. In Seigle v. First Nat. Co., 9
it was argued that the decree detailed above denied appellant certificate
holders the equal protection of the law. The court points out that appellants
do not indicate in what respect the decree denies to them equal protection,
and no grounds for such objection occurs to the court.
Statutory Penalties. In State ex rel. Ashby to use of Capital School Funds

of Mississippi County v. Cairo Bridge & Terminal Co.,6" it was held that the
statute detailed above"' was unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection.
VII. TAXATION
Franchise Tax on Corporation Doing Solely Inter-state Business. In
State v. Phillips Pipe Line Co.,6 2 it was held that the corporation franchise
54.
55.
petition
56.
57.
petition
58.
59.
60.

Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 5193.
338 Mo. 1141, 93 S. W. (2d) 954 (1936), aff'd, 300 U. S. 109 (1937);
for rehearing denied, 57 Sup. Ct. 504 (1937).
Mo. CONST., art. 12, § 5.
338 Mo. 1141, 93 S. W. (2d) 954 (1936), aff'd, 300 U. S. 109 (1937);
for rehearing denied, 57 Sup. Ct. 504 (1937).
338 Mo. 417, 90 S.W. (2d) 776 (1936).
Ibid.
100 S. W. (2d) 441 (Mo. 1936).
61. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 10070.
62. 97 S. W. (2d) 109 (Mo. 1936), 57 Sup. Ct. 668 (1937).
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tax~s applies only to corporations doing intra-state business. The court
then delivers this dictum: a statute taxing foreign corporations doing a
purely inter-state business would not necessarily be unconstitutional; a state
may not lay a tax on the privilege or right to do business where the corporation is engaged in purely inter-state business, but here the tax is on the
4
right to do business as a corporation.'
Tax Exemption to Toll Bridge in fWhich State Has a Contingent Reversion.
In State ex rel. Jones v. Brown," it was held that the constitution"6 prohibits
the tax exemption attempted to be given the bridge companies organized under
the statute supra.67 The court says that even if it be true that the beneficial
ownership by a state in property held by a trustee is tax exempt,"s here the
state has no interest until retirement of the revenue bonds; and until that time
there can be no exemption. The state cannot declare property to be state
property when it is not; nor can it declare that property, for the purpose of
taxation, shall be deemed state property when in fact it is not.
Sales Tax on Purchasesby Highway Department. In State ex rel. Missouri
Portland Cement Co. v. Smith,69 it was stated that the 17 sales tax7 was an
excise, not a property tax, and might therefore be charged to the State Department on its purchases without violating the constitutional provision 7l exempting from taxation the property of state, counties and other municipal corporations. But the court goes on to hold that the legislative intent was not to
include under the tax the purchases by state agencies.
VIII.

COURTS OPEN AND JUSTICE WITHOUT DELAY

In State ex rel. Kennedy v. Remmers,72 it was held that a rule of the St.
Louis Board of Police Commissioners,73 requiring permission from the chief
63. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 4596 and 4641.
64. See 12 C. J. 109, § 153; St. Louis & East St. Louis Electric Ry. v. Hagerman, 256 U. S.314, 318 (1921); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Middlekamp, 256
U. S.226, 231 (1921); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S.350
(1914); Atlantic and Pacific Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S.160 (1903); Minot
v. Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore R. R., 85 U. S.206 (1873).
65. 338 Mo. 448, 92 S.W. (2d) 718 (1936).
66. Mo. CONsT., art. 10, §§ 6, 7.
67. Mo. STATS. ANN., §§ 7914d et seq. and 7907a note, 7907b note, 7907c
et seq.

68. It will be noticed that the court reserves judgment on whether the rule
contended for is the law.
69. 338 Mo. 409, 90 S.W. (2d) 405 (1936).
70. Laws of Missouri 1935, p. 411.
71. Mo. CONST., art. 10, § 6.
72. 101 S.W. (2d) 70 (Mo. 1936).
73. Rule 10, § 178 of the Police Manual, promulgated under Mo. REv. STAT.
(1929) § 7547.
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of police with approval of the Board before a policeman might retain counsel
and sue in court, was unreasonable and void; further, this violates Section 10,
article 2, of the Missouri constitution. In State ex rel. Anderson Motor Service Co. v. Public Service Commission7 4 it was held that there was no violation of Section 10, article 2, of the Missouri constitution by Section 5234 .7
IX.

MISCELLANEOUS

Who May Challenge Constitutionality of Statute. In State ex inf. Crain,
ex rel. Peebles v. Moore,70 appellant claims office in a county of less than 20,000
inhabitants. The provision of the statute appellant seeks to attack and which
he must overcome deals with counties of more than 20,000 inhabitants. The
court says it is doubtful whether appellant can raise the question, but since
appellant contends the defect makes the whole act void, the court considers
the assigned error. 77
In Citizens Mut. Fire & Lightning Ins. Soc. v. Schoen, 78 defendants
sought to avoid an assessment of a mutual fire insurance company on the
ground that the loss to be paid by the assessment was that of a school district,
and Section 47, article 4, of the Missouri constitution prohibits such a body
from becoming a member of any corporation, association, or company. The
court held that the constitutional provision is intended to protect the credit,
moneys and assets of the school district. Since the defense is not based on any
right of defendants in the credit, moneys, or assets of the school district, and
since they therefore are not within the classification of those entitled to the
protection of the provision, no constitutional question is properly presented.
Mannerof PresentingConstitutionalQuestion. In State ex rel. Jacobsmeyer
v. Thatcher,79 it was held that it is gravely questionable whether a statute
should be held unconstitutional in order to award a discretionary writ of
mandamus."0 Clearly it should not be done where the right to the remedy,
existing from the question of validity, is doubtful.

74. 97 S. W. (2d) 116 (Mo. 1936).
75. Public Service Commission Act, Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 5234.
76. 99 S. W. (2d) 17 (Mo. 1936).
77. See 12 C. J. 760, § 177.
78. 93 S. W. (2d) 669 (Mo. 1936), followed in State v. Moore, 99 S. W. (2d)
17, 20 (Mo. 1936).
79. 338 Mo. 622, 92 S. W. (2d) 640 (1936); 337 Mo. 1225, 88 S. W. (2d) 187
(1935).
80. See State ex rel. Crandall v. McIntosh, 205 Mo. 589, 103 S. W. 1078
(1907).
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,ddmissions of Unconstitutionality. In State ex rel. Jacobsmeyer v. Thatcher,8 it was held that a demurrer does not admit conclusions of law as to
unconstitutionality of a statute, and if it did admit this, the court would not
be bound by the admission.
2
Timeliness of Objection. In State ex rel. Dengel v. Hartmann,"
it was held
that an objection to constitutionality of statutes, not in the pleadings and
3
raised for the first time in the briefs, cannot be considered.

"Taking" of PrivatePropertyfor a Private Use. 4 In Seigle v. First Nat.
Co.,8 it was held an equity court taking over administration of a trust fund
may be technically a "taking", but this is not unconstitutional since the taking was to the use of plaintiffs and at their request.
Grant of Valuable Right to Private Corporationby Legislature. In State ex
inf. McKittrick v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,86 it was contended that
the statute" granting the right to place telephone poles and wires on the state
highways was void as a grant of a thing of value to a corporation. 88 The court
held that the section prohibits only a gratuitous grant, and here the contemplated benefit to the public from the extension of service takes the grant
in question out of the class of grants prohibited.
Elections. In State ex rel. Dengel v. Hartmann,89it was held that Section
3, article 8, of the Missouri constitution applies in all its provisions to primary
elections as well as to general elections, and the limitations on secrecy of
ballot contained in this section are applicable to primary elections. This is
contrary to the prevailing general rule that the term "election" does not include primary elections. 0 The decision in this case extends the ruling of State
ex rel. Hollman v. McElhinney,91 which held that because of a certain other

81. 338 Mo. 622, 92 S. W. (2d) 640 (1936); 337 Mo. 1225, 88 S. W. (2d) 187
(1935).
82. 96 S. W. (2d) 329 (Mo. 1936).
83. For exceptions and qualifications to this general rule, see 12 C. J. 786, §
217; Lohmeyer v. St. Louis Cordage Co., 214 Mo. 685, 689, 113 S. W. 1108, 1110
(1908).
84. Mo. CONST., art 2, § 20.
85. 338 Mo. 417, 90 S. W. (2d) 776 (1936).
86. 338 Mo. 617, 92 S. W. (2d) 612 (1936).
87. Mo. REv. STAT. (1889) § 2721; Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 4921.
88. Mo. CoNsT., art. 4, § 46.
89. 96 S. W. (2d) 329 (Mo. 1936).
90. 20 C. J. 57, § 4; 20 C. J. 114, § 111; State ex rel. Dorsey v Sprague, 326 Mo.
654, 33 S. W. (2d) 102 (1930); State ex rel. Feinstein v. Hartman, 231 S. W. 982
(Mo. 1921); Haas v. Neosho, 139 Mo. App. 293, 123 S. W. 473 (1909).
91. 315 Mo. 731, 286 S. W. 951 (1926).
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provision of the section the opening clause "all elections" of Section 3, article
8, referring to the granting of secrecy of ballot, must be construed to include
primary elections; the instant case holds that likewise "election" as subsesequently used in reference to limitations on secrecyof ballot includes primary
elections.
VI
CRIMINAL LAW
FRANKLIN

E.

REAGAN*

I
PLEADINGS

Missouri criminal pleading has become so standardized that few cases
reach the appellate courts wherein serious and doubtful questions of pleading
are involved. A forgery indictment charging the cashier of a bank with making false entries of deposits in a depositor's pass book was held sufficient notwithstanding there was no allegation that no deposits were made. This indictment is a work of art and shows on its face it was meticulously prepared.'
In the preparation of an information relative to the description of a
gambling game, extreme care must be exercised. An information which failed
to specify the manner in which the table is adapted, devised and designed for
gambling was held to be bad.2 In the case of State v. Mitnick3 it is pointed out
that an information in order to charge a person with engaging in the business
of selling securities, in violation of Section 7744 of the Revised Statutes of
Missouri 1929, must allege more than one sale of securities. But it is not
necessary that an indictment specify the day of the month on which the
4
offense was committed.
II
TRIAL COURT PROCEDURE

(a)

Information or Indictment

The reading of an information to the jury is not reversible error.$ While
an information may be amended at any time before the jury is sworn, an
*Assistant Attorney General of Missouri, Jefferson City. A.B. and LL.B., University of Missouri, 1926.
1. State v. Arnett, 338 Mo. 907, 92 S. W. (2d) 897 (1936).
2. State v. Herndon, 96 S. W. (2d) 376 (Mo. 1936).
3. 96 S. W. (2d) 43 (Mo. 1936).
4. State v. Cohen, 100 S. W. (2d) 544 (Mo. 1936).
5. State v. Truce, 338 Mo. 744, 92 S. W. (2d) 135 (1936).
6. State v. McPhearson, 92 S. W. (2d) 129 (Mo. 1936).
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indictment cannot be amended. However, a defective indictment may be
replaced by an information. 7 Changing the name of the owner of the property burglarized and stolen is a departure and a change of the subject matter.8
(b)

Change of Venue

The filing of five affidavits alleging prejudice in compliance with the
statute9 is mandatory on the court to grant a change of venue."0 This is in
line with previous decisions of the court."
(c) Evidence
The admissibility of a dying declaration does not depend upon the length
of interval between the declaration and death but solely upon the state of
declarant's mind and belief that he is in dying condition. A statement made
immediately after the shooting, and repeated shortly thereafter and made
later in the same day in the hospital after he had been advised by a physician
that there was a chance for recovery, and statements made on the third day
after the injury and again two days prior to his death which occurred three
weeks after the injury held admissible as a dying declaration.'
This is the
3
rule supported by State v. Custer.
The testimony and opinion of a ballistic expert as to bullets having been
4
fired from the same gun was given judicial sanction in State v. McKeever.'
In State v. Williamson, 5 the court held a statement against interest, a confession, inadmissible because prior to making the confession to a deputy
sheriff and others the defendant had talked to the sheriff and the sheriff told
him that he would recommend to the court and prosecuting attorney that the
defendant be returned to the Illinois penitentiary to complete a former
sentence. The court viewed the statement of the sheriff as a promise by one
not authorized, which invalidated a subsequent confession. The other twin,
coercion, which makes a confession likewise involuntary and inadmissible
was recently held to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 6

7. State v. Cutter, 318 Mo. 687, 1 S. W. (2d) 96 (1927).
8. State v. Wright, 95 S. W. (2d) 1159 (Mo. 1936).
9. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 3630.
10. State v. Smith, 98 S. W. (2d) 572 (Mo. 1936).
11. State v. Parker, 24 S. W. (2d) 1023 (Mo. 1930); State v. Stough, 318 Mo.
1198, 2 S. W. (2d) 767 (1928); State v. Golden, 40 S. W. (2d) 1044 (Mo. 1936).
12. State v. Flinn, 96 S. W. (2d) 506 (Mo. 1936).
13. 336 Mo. 514, 80 S. W. (2d) 176 (1935).
14. 101 S. W. (2d) 22 (Mo. 1936).
15. 99 S. W. (2d) 76 (Mo. 1936).
16. Rounds v. State, 106 S. W. (2d) 212 (Tenn. 1937).
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Three cases appear to have been reversed because of the admission or
exclusion of evidence. The admission of evidence of an altercation between
the defendant and a third person in a homicide case, out of the presence of
the deceased, required a new trial.1 7 The exclusion of evidence tending to
show bias and prejudice of a witness toward a defendant,is and the exclusion
of evidence by an accomplice that he had been promised immunity for testifying, 19 required reversal in the new trial.
(d)

Cross Examination

The state may in good faith cross examine defendant's witnesses for the
purpose of ascertaining whether they know or are acquainted with notorious
criminals. 2" The state may also cross examine the defendant's character
witnesses with reference to remarks or matters affecting defendant's reputation, including references to other offenses.n The rule as to cross examina22
tion of character witnesses is also approved in State v. Mitchell.
(e)

Instructions

This is perhaps one of the most treacherous fields of the criminal law.
When to give and when not to give an instruction invariably leads the court
into the twilight zone. The court is required"i to instruct the jury upon all
questions of law arising in the case which are necessary for their information
in giving their verdict; which instruction shall include whenever necessary the
subjects of good character and reasonable doubt.
The correct answer to this perplexing problem always turns upon the
word "necessary", a word which literally has no well defined boundary.
Generally it may be said that instructions necessary to establish the state's
case must be given. 4 Set apart from this general rule is the remaining field
embracing collateral matters wherein the court is not required to give an instruction on collateral matters until requested to do so."
17. State v. Maddox, 98 S. W. (2d) 535 (Mo. 1936).
18. State v. Day, 95 S. W. (2d) 1183 (Mo. 1936).
19. State v. Rose, 96 S. W. (2d) 498 (Mo. 1936).
20. State v. Bagby, 338 Mo. 951, 93 S. W. (2d) 241 (1936).
21. State v. Pope, 338 Mo. 919, 92 S. W. (2d) 904 (1936).
22. 96 S. W. (2d) 341 (Mo. 1936). That the holding of these cases is bottomed upon sound judicial reasoning is clearly demonstrated by a casual examination of a few of the many cases on this question. State v. Pine, 18 S. W. (2d) 48
(Mo. 1929); State v. Hutchison, 186 S. W. 1000 (Mo. 1916); State v. Harris, 22 S.
W. (2d) 1050 (Mo. 1929).
23. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 3681.
24. State v. Broaddus, 315 Mo. 1279, 289 S. W. 792 (1926); State v. McBroom,
238 Mo. 495, 499, 141 S.W. 1120 (1911).
25. State v. Lackey, 230 Mo. 707, 132 S. W. 602 (1910).
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In line with these general principles the court continued to adhere to the
rule that instructions which are a part of the law of the case include the giving
of an instruction on larceny where in a robbery prosecution the evidence tends
to show that the taking of the money was not by force or violence. 2 Collateral matters, which are not a part of the law of the case and upon which the
court is not bound to instruct unless requested so to do, include alibi,27
credibility of witnesses,28 the information as evidence of guilt,2 9 and motive."
It is now well settled in this state that matters of defense are treated as
collateral matters and the defendant must request such an instruction. This
32
doctrine has heretofore been applied to alibi,"' to credibility of witnesses,
to an accomplice's testimony, 3 and to voluntary statements or confessions of
the defendants. 34 However, where the prosecution is based upon a conspiracy
an alibi instruction, even though requested, should not be given. 35 In a burglary and larceny prosecution, an instruction which omitted the element of
intent to steal as applied to a defendant who was present at the commission
of the offense, was erroneous." The intent to kill A cannot be attached to the
actual killing of B. 3 1 The refusal to give an instruction on self defense, stating that it was not necessary for the accused to nicely gauge the quantity of
force necessary to repel the assault,3 8 as well as the refusal to give an instruction to the effect that the proof of other offenses was admitted for the sole
purpose of establishing the guilt or innocence of the defendant under the
charge for which he was being tried, 9 were reversible error.
(f) Argument
The term "Prosecuting Attorney" as used in the statute of procedure includes any attorney assisting in the prosecution. 41 In presenting the state's
26. State v. Craft, 338 Mo. 831, 92 S. W. (2d) 626 (1936); State v. Pope, 338
Mo. 919, 92 S. W. (2d) 904 (1936).
27. State v. Bagby, 338 Mo. 951, 93 S. W. (2d) 241 (1936); State v. Trice,
338 Mo. 744, 92 S. W. (2d) 135 (1936).
28. State v. McPhearson, 92 S. W. (2d) 129 (Mo. 1936).
29. State v. White, 99 S. W. (2d) 72 (Mo. 1936).
30. State v. Wolff, 101 S. W. (2d) 973 (Mo. 1937).
31. State v. Brown, 270 S. W. 275 (Mo. 1925); State v. Wilson, 12 S. W. (2d)
445 (Mo. 1928).
32. State v. Park, 16 S. W. (2d) 30 (Mo. 1928); State v. Headley, 18 S. W.
(2d) 37 (Mo. 1929).
33. State v. London, 295 S. W. 547 (Mo. 1927).
34. State v. Baker, 278 S. W. 987 (Mo. 1925).
35. State v. Craft, 338 Mo. 831, 92 S. W. (2d) 626 (1936).
36. State v. Moore, 95 S. W. (2d) 1167 (Mo. 1936).
37. State v. Batson, 96 S. W. (2d) 384 (Mo. 1936).
38. State v. Traylor, 98 S. W. (2d) 628 (Mo. 1936).
39. State v. Walters, 98 S. W. (2d) 527 (Mo. 1936).
40. State v. Arnett, 338 Mo. 907, 92 S. W. (2d) 897 (1936).
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argument the prosecuting attorney may resort to unwarranted references and
unsound arguments. Neither are ground for reprimand nor error when based
upon facts in the record.4' However, the expression of personal opinion by
the prosecuting attorney as to the guilt of the defendant falls within a different
category and invariably brings a reversal.42 The same results await the misquoting of testimony by the prosecuting attorney. 43 All of the argument of
the prosecuting attorney must be preserved in the bill of exceptions, 44 and
unless it is so preserved it is not error.46
(g)

Jury

A sheriff may be a material witness in the case and yet qualified to select
the jury. This is true even though the sheriff has advised the defendant to
plead guilty. 4" The conduct of the jury, particularly when deliberating upon
the case, is guarded with the utmost scrutiny. Communications with the
jury except through the regularly constituted court officers are prohibited
and the rule is strictly enforced with few exceptions. One of the exceptions
is found in State v. Maples,47 where a certain juror was treated during the court
recess by a physician. The only communication passing between the physician
and the sick juror related to his complaint and illness. The mere physical
separation of the jury for sleeping purposes in case of necessity or for better
accommodation does not require a new trial. 48 This case reviews and approves
State v. Shawley, 49 where the jury during their deliberation were kept in two
separate hotel rooms on the second floor and there was no connection between
the two rooms. This case also approved the separation of a jury where eleven
jurors occupied rooms upstairs, yet an officer and one juror occupied a room
downstairs, subsequent to the conclusion of the case but prior to its submission." These cases specifically overrule the ever questionable holding in
State v. .dsbury.5'

41. State v. Rosegrant, 338 Mo. 1153, 93 S. W. (2d) 961 (1936).
42. State v. Pope, 338 Mo. 919, 92 S. W. (2d) 904 (1936).
43. State v. Crouch, 98 S. W. (2d) 550 (Mo. 1936).
44. State v. Mitchell, 96 S. W. (2d) 341 (Mo. 1936).
45. State v. Thompson, 92 S. W. (2d) 892 (Mo. 1936); State v. Mitchell, 96
S. W. (2d) 341 (Mo. 1936).
46. State v. McPhearson, 92 S. W. (2d) 129 (Mo. 1936).
47. 96 S. W. (2d) 26 (Mo. 1936).
48. State v. Pope, 338 Mo. 919, 92 S. W. (2nd) 904 (1936).
49. 334 Mo. 352, 67 S. W. (2nd) 74 (1933).
50. State v. Arnett, 338 Mo. 907, 92 S. W. (2nd) 897 (1936).
51. 327 Mo. 180, 36 S. W. (2d) 919 (1931).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss4/1

56

et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT-1936
But these liberties of the jury, based upon necessity, are not to be
extended to include pleasure. Where the sheriff took a jury while deliberating
on a case to a crowded railway station five blocks from the courthouse to see
a new train, it was held to be error even though there was no showing of improper influence being exercised on any of the jurors. 2
The jury is to be allowed a reasonable or liberal time in which to consider
and decide the case. The failure to discharge the jury after twenty-three
hours of deliberation was not an abuse of discretion. 53
(h) Motionfor New Trial
While many cases deal with the sufficiency of the motion for new trial,
it is sufficient here to merely point out the long adhered to rule reiterated in
State v. Smith,14 that a motion for new trial must be specific and sufficient and
call to the trial court's attention each and every item of error complained
of in the trial. This rule has been a great deterrent in preventing the sandbagging of trial courts by eliminating on appeal the consideration of those
errors complained of which the trial court was denied the opportunity to pass
upon. 5
III
APPELLATE PROCEDURE

It is the duty of the appellant to cause a full transcript of the record to
be made out, certified and transmitted to the appellate court. Where the
certificate to the proceeding contains no certification or reference to any proceedings in the interim between the filing of the information and the filing of
the motion for new trial there is nothing before the court for consideration
and the appeal will be dismissed. 5
While the record generally on appeal consists of two parts, one, the record
proper, and two, the bill of exceptions, the bill of exceptions may be incorporated into the record proper and become a part of it. 57 It is necessary that
the record proper show the filing of the bill of exceptions in the circuit court
52. State v. Dodson, 338 Mo. 846, 92 S. W. (2d) 614 (1936).
53. State v. Herring, 92 S. W. (2d) 132 (Mo. 1936).
54. 98 S. W. (2d) 657 (Mo. 1936).
55. Only the amended motion for new trial can be considered, State v. Renfro,
279 S. W. 702 (Mo. 1926). General assignments in the motion for new trial preserve nothing for review. State v. Barbata, 336 Mo. 362, 80 S. W. (2d) 865 (1935).
The effect of a general assignment constitutes a waiver of a motion filed after allocution and judgment is void, State v. Selleck, 46 S. W. (2d) 570 (Mo. 1932).
56. State v. Hanks, 98 S. W. (2d) 541 (Mo. 1936).
57. State v. Herring, 92 S. W. (2d) 132 (Mo. 1936).
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and where the record proper does not show the filing of the bill of exceptions
the case is for review solely on the record proper. 6 The bill of exceptions must
be certified to in compliance with the statute; otherwise the appeal will be
disposed of on the record proper.59
Where the judgment is incorrect in the amount of punishment, the supreme court will enter a new judgment, inserting therein the correct amount
of punishment. This question was raised in a number of robbery cases wherein
the robbery was perpetrated by means of a deadly weapon and the court
under statutory authority added two years imprisonment in the pentitentiary
to the imprisonment fixed by the jury. The court held the trial court was
without authority to add two years imprisonment and entered a new judgment for the correct sentence." Where the evidence is insufficient to sustain
the conviction and it appears that the state might in making a better case on
retrial, the case will be reversed and the defendant discharged. 1
A case of particular interest, the most far reaching and progressive, is
State v. Mason,62 wherein the court decided for the first time in this state that
the appellant may abandon certain assignments of error in his motion for
new trial; and in filing a brief on appeal actually does abandon all points in
the motion for new trial not briefed. This lifts from the shoulders of the
court an undue burden which heretofore required a careful examination of all
points in the motion for new trial even though not briefed.
Many cases reach the supreme court and are disposed of on the record
proper. This may be due to the absence of the bill of exceptions, 63 or the filing
of a motion for new trial too late,6 4 and this is equally true of writs of error."
IV
SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Mitchell66 is of particular

interest because it approves
The case of State v.
in a rape case the introduction of testimony showing the physicial condition

58. State v. Miller, 95 S. W. (2d) 1189 (Mo. 1936).
59. State v. Gautney, 93 S. W. (2d) 668 (Mo. 1936).
60. State v. Melton, 92 S. W. (2d) 107 (Mo. 1936); State v. Franks, 95 S. W.
(2d) 1190 (Mo. 1936).
61. State v. DeMoss, 92 S. W. (2d) 112 (Mo. 1936).
62. 98 S. W. (2d) 574 (Mo. 1936).
63. State v. Melton, 92 S. W. (2d) 107 (Mo. 1936); State v. Hightower, 95 S.
W. (2d) 1198 (Mo. 1936).
64. State v. Lyscio, 95 S. W. (2d) 1161 (Mo. 1936).
65. State v. Hardy, 98 S. W. (2d) 593 (Mo. 1936); State v. Timmons, 98 S.
W. (2d) 550 (Mo. 1936).
66. 96 S. W. (2d) 341 (Mo. 1936).
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of the prosecutrix for a six months period prior to the assault, and also the
development of a gonorrheal infection within ten days thereafter. This appears to be the first case in this state in which this matter has been specifically
passed upon and approved.
Another case of particular interest is State v.Frazier,67 wherein the defendant was charged with second degree murder and convicted of manslaughter.
In this case the deceased was afflicted with hemophilia, sometimes referred to
as the disease of Kings, and the individual commonly known as a bleeder.
The defendant had struck the deceased on the jaw with his fists which broke
the skin on the inside of the mouth from which deceased died from excessive
bleeding ten days later. There was no evidence showing the defendant at
the time of the assault knew of deceased's physical condition. The court held
that it was immaterial whether the defendant knew about the condition or
not since the defendant was responsible for the natural consequences of his
act. This was true even though the blow struck may not have been of sufficient
force to injure a normal healthy person. The case is of further interest because it sets at rest in this state the right of a person who has no knowledge
of the crime to make an affidavit upon which a preliminary hearing may be
held.
Where the defense to a crime is that it was accidental the court should
not instruct on self defense. 8

VII
EVIDENCE
WILLIAM H. BECKER, JR.*
I.

JUDICIAL NOTICE

In Barnes v. St. Louis-San FranciscoRy.,i the court took judicial notice
of the pleaded statutes of a foreign state and the judicial decisions construing
the statute, pursuant to Section 806 of Missouri Revised Statutes 1929. The
court took judicial notice that real estate values decreased between 1927 and
1931 to such an extent that evidence of value in 1927 constitutes no substan-

67. 98 S. W. (2d) 707 (Mo. 1936).
68. State v. Whitchurch, 96 S. W. (2d) 31 (Mo. 1936).
*Attorney, Columbia. LL.B. University of Missouri, 1932.
1. 338 Mo. 497, 92 S. W. (2d) 164 (1936).
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tial evidence of value in 1931.2 Further notice of the depression was taken in
Saxbury v. Coons.3
In Smith v. Harbison-W/alker Refractories Company, 4 the court refused
to take judicial notice that there is disease of silicosis which is peculiar to or
the natural result of continuous breathing or exposure to silica dust. The
court refused to take judicial notice that one Hays and one Stephenson were
well known gangsters in Bellovich v. Griese.5
II.

PRESUMPTIONS,

INFERENCES

AND

BURDEN

OF

PROOF

In Lampe v. Franklin American Trust Company, 6 it was held that the
burden of proving consideration for a note showing suspicious alterations on
its face and requiring explanation in order to be admitted in evidence rests
upon the holder suing upon the note. The court distinguished cases where
the execution of the note is not denied but lack of consideration is asserted by
the defendant. In those instances the rule in Missouri is that the burden of
proof rests upon the party asserting lack of consideration. The case further
held that the "presumption of integrity" making admissible a note regular
on its face did not attach to a note showing suspicious alterations on its face;
that such a note is not admissible until the alterations have been satisfactorily explained; that to make a case for the jury, the plaintiff will not be
aided by any presumptions but must sustain the burden of proof as well as
the burden of the evidence to make out every element necessary to impose
liability upon the defendant. It is noted that this rule requires the plaintiff
to bear the risk of nonpersuasion on the issue of consideration which in this
state ordinarily would be borne by the defendant. It was further held in this
case that the burden of proof or risk of nonpersuasion requires the party
bearing it to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the facts asserted
are true rather than that his version of the issues are "more probable".
It was again held in this case that presumptions ordinarily are not for
the consideration of the jury but concern only the courts in administering the
rules relating to the burden of the evidence and the burden of ultimate proof.
However, the inference permitted in favor of a plaintiff in a res ipsa loquitur
case does not disappear but remains in the case to the end and takes the case

2. Peterson v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co., 339 Mo. 700, 98 S. W. (2d)
770 (1936).
3. 98 S. W. (2d) 662 (Mo. 1936).
4. 100 S. W. (2d) 909 (Mo. 1936).
5. 100 S. W. (2d) 261 (Mo. 1936).
6. 339 Mo. 361, 96 S. W. (2d) 710 (1936).
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to the jury notwithstanding the evidence, however probative, given in rebuttal on behalf of the defendant. 7 On the other hand it was held that the
"presumption" or inference that a truck bearing the name of the defendant
was owned and being operated by a servant of the defendant in the scope of
his employment may be overcome by unequivocal evidence to the contrary.8
III.

ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRA JUDICIAL DECLARATIONS

In Shelton v. Wolf Cheese Company,9 the plaintiff sued a corporation for
damages for personal injuries charging that he was struck by an automobile
driven by an employee of the defendant corporation in the scope of his employment. Proof of the master-servant relationship at the time of the casualty
depended solely upon a telephone conversation between plaintiff's attorney
and an alleged agent of the defendant. Three and one half months following
the casualty, plaintiff's attorney secured the telephone number of the defendant corporation from the directory and called that number. The party
answering the call stated that he was "manager" and in response to inquiry
of plaintiff's attorney made certain statements which plaintiff contended
constituted admissions that the operator of the automobile was acting within
the scope of his employment when the casualty occurred. In holding that
there was no proof of the master-servant relationship, the supreme court
held: (1) that post rem narrative declarations of an employee are hearsay and
inadmissible against the employer; (2) that statements made by a person
answering a telephone call to a place of business are admissible even though no
personal identification of the speaker is made, if the conversation occurs in
the course of negotiations relating to and in the transaction of the ordinary
business of the party called; (3) that however, where the admissibility against
the employer of the post rem declaration of the employee depends upon the
nature of the agent's authority and his position with the employer, such
authority may not be established by the alleged agent's declarations but
must be proved by other evidence, consequently the statement of the party
answering the telephone that he was the "manager" of the defendant does not
prove his authority to bind the defendant corporation by post rem narrative
statements. The holdings mentioned above are weakened somewhat by the
court's construction of the conversation as not constituting a clear admission

7. Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac Company, 339 Mo. 726, 98 S. W. (2d) 969
(1936).
8. Ross v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 339 Mo. 982, 98 S. W. (2d) 717 (1936).
9. 338 Mo. 1129, 93 S. W. (2d) 947 (1936).
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of the fact sought to be proved. The decision recognizes the rule announced
in State ex rel. Strokfeld v. Cox,'0 which distinguishes between the admissibility of telephone conversations, on the one hand where the declarant is
called by his number and answers admitting to be the person called, and on
the other hand where the declarant calls from an unknown number stating
who he is and making the declaration. In the first situation the identity of
the declarant is held to be sufficiently established to make the declaration
admissible and in the second situation the identity of the declarant is held to
be insufficiently established to make the declaration admissible.
In State ex rel. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Shain," the plaintiff sought damages
for personal injuries resulting from slipping on some grease upon the floor
of defendant's store. Written statements of the manager and porter, employes
of the defendant, made three months after the casualty were held admissible
against the defendant to prove notice of the greasy condition prior to the injury of plaintiff against the objection that the evidence was hearsay. On the
other hand, portions of the statement tending to show delay in removing the
condition were held inadmissible as hearsay. The case therefore holds that
post rem extrajudicial declarations of an employee are admissible against the
employer to show notice of the defective condition of the premises of the
employer but are inadmissible to prove what was or was not done about the
defective condition. The opinion is supported by some authority cited therein
but fails to give any satisfactory reason for the distinction.
A declaration against interest is admissible despite the death of the declarant and is not rendered incompetent because the declarant is not avail2
able to refute the evidence.
In State v. Crouch," a declaration by the defendant charged with murder,
that three or four minutes after the shooting, defendant walked a distance
of 140 yards and stated to witnesses, "Boys, you know I had to do it in self
defense to save myself" was held to be inadmissible as res gestae because the
declaration lacked spontaneity and was simply a considered and self serving
statement.
On the issue of drunkenness of a railroad employee, the testimony of a
yard master that he had occasion to discipline the employee for drinking
10.
11.
12.
13.

325 Mo. 901, 30 S. W. (2d) 462 (1930).
101 S. W. (2d) 14 (Mo. 1936).
Wills v. Berberich's Delivery Co., 339 Mo. 856, 98 S. W. (2d) 569 (1936).
339 Mo. 847, 98 S. W. (2d) 550 (1936).
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while on duty was held inadmissible. The yard master did not profess personal knowledge of drunkenness on the part of the employee. The court held
that proof of disciplinary finding by a private agency was not proof of the
4
facts found.'
IV.

WITNESSES

1. Competency
In Burnam v. Chicago Great Western R. R.,11 an eight and one half year
old child was found competent to testify concerning a casualty in a suit
brought by his parents for loss of his services, despite the fact that a court
found him incompetent to testify about the same transaction in his suit for
personal injuries two years previously. The court held that the adjudication
of incompetency to testify in his suit did not foreclose the right to have a new
determination of his competency to testify about the same transaction two
years later.
In Lampe v. FranklinAmerican Trust Company,"6 the court held that the
incompetency of a claimant testifying against the estate of a deceased party
was waived by the personal representative when he offered in evidence the
transcript of the cross-examination of the claimant concerning the transaction in issue which testimony had been elicited by the personal representative in another suit between the estate and a third party. The waiver was
held to make the claimant competent to testify concerning the whole transaction and not merely to the matters referred to in the transcript of the crossexamination. In so holding, the court expressly followed the New York court
in preference to a contrary ruling of the Illinois court and followed the
majority rule with reference to the extent of the waiver. 17 The ruling as to
the extent of the waiver followed a prior ruling of the court in Trautmann v.
Trautmann. 8
The grantees in two separate deeds of two separate properties delivered
on the same evening were held competent to testify, each in favor of the other
on the issue of delivery after the death of the grantor. At the same time it
was held that neither was competent to testify in her own behalf because of

14.
(1936).
15.
16.
17.
18.

Hancock v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 339 Mo. 1237, 100 S. W. (2d) 570
100 S. W. (2d) 858 (Mo. 1936).
339 Mo. 361, 96 S. W. (2d) 710 (1936).
See note (1929) 64 A. L. R. 1168.
300 Mo. 314, 254 S. W. 286 (1923).
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the death of the grantor. 9 In the two cases it was held that the delivery of
each deed was "a separate, completed transaction between the grantee there20
in" and the grantor.

2.

Cross Examination

In Burnam v. Chicago Great Western R. R., 2 1 the court announced and
applied the rule that the right to cross examine a witness is dependent upon
hostility of the witness or adversity of the interest of the witness. Under the
statute permitting cross examination of adverse parties,22 the plaintiff was
permitted to cross examine a defendant. At the same time it was held that a
suggestive insinuating cross examination of a witness called by the cross
examiner and exhibiting no hostility or adverse interest was reversible error.
In State v. Rose, 2 it was held to be reversible error to unduly restrict cross
examination of a state's witness even though there was no explicit offer of
proof of the matters sought to be elicited.
3.

Conclusions

Statements of witnesses in answer to questions concerning the witnessing of certain facts, that the witness had a certain "impression"; that he
"thought", "understood". "supposed" or "figured" certain facts were true
24
or untrue are mere conclusions and have no probative value.
4. Opinion Evidence
25

In Stevens v. Meadows, the court reiterated the rule that a lay witness
giving an opinion of insanity must state the facts upon which his opinion is
based; that the opinion of a lay witness as to the insanity of an individual has
no probative force when not based upon facts inconsistent with sanity. On
the other hand, in Buchholz v. Cunningham, 26 it was held that a lay witness
might give an opinion that a person is sane without stating the facts upon
which he bases his opinion.

19. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 723.
20.
99 S. W.
21.
22.
23.
24.
(1936).
25.
26.

Lanphere v. Affeld, 99 S. W. (2d) 36 (Mo. 1936); Schoenwetter v. Affeld,
(2d) 41 (Mo. 1936).
100 S. W. (2d) 858 (Mo. 1936).
Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 1725.
339 Mo. 317, 96 S. W. (2d) 498 (1936).
Masonic Home of Missouri v. Windsor, 338 Mo. 877, 92 S. W. (2d) 713
100 S. W. (2d) 281 (Mo. 1936).
100 S. W. (2d) 446 (Mo. 1936).
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V.

CRIMINAL LAw

In State v. Amende,27 a prosecution for statutory rape, it was held that
admission of evidence of subsequent intercourse with the prosecutrix was held
to be error. The court disapproved and refused to follow two prior decisions.2
In State v. Lebo, 9 a prosecution for forcible rape, evidence of the commission
of prior acts of forcible rape of prosecutrix are held inadmissible. A distinction was drawn between prosecutions for forcible and statutory rape on the
ground that commission of prior acts for forcible rape did not tend to prove
"antecedent probability" of commission of the later offense.
Promises to a prisoner by officers to use their influence with the prosecuting attorney to procure an advantage for the prisoner were held to render a
confession procured by such promises involuntary and inadmissible in State
0
v. Williamson."
In State v. Flinn,1 several dying declarations were held admissible in a
homicide case. There the court held that the express statement of the declarant alone is sufficient to show that the declarations were made under the
sense of impending death and without hope of recovery; that length of the
interval between the declaration of death of the declarant does not control
admissibility of the declaration.

VIII
PUBLIC UTILITIES
FRANK E. ATwoOD*

Opinions dealing only with questions common to other branches of law
are not listed herein.
Quo WARRANTO

In quo warranto proceeding entitled State ex inf. McKittrick, Atty. Gen.
v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,' the court en banc held that statute permitting
telephone company to construct telephone lines along, across, or under public
27. 338 Mo. 717, 92 S. W. (2d) 106 (1936).
28. State v. Miller, 263 Mo. 326, 172 S. W. 385 (1915); State v. Hamilton,
263 Mo. 294, 172 S. W. 593 (1915).
29. 339 Mo. 960, 98 S. W. (2d) 695 (1936).
30. 339 Mo. 1038, 99 S. W. (2d) 76 (1936).
31. 96 S. W. (2d) 506 (Mo. 1936).
*Attorney, Jefferson City. A.B. 1902, A.M. 1912, LL.D. 1930, William Jewell
College. Former member of the Supreme Court of Missouri.
1. 338 Mo. 617, 92 S.W. (2d) 612 (1936).
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highways is not violative of constitutional prohibition against grant of thing
of value to corporation, in view of benefit derived therefrom by general public.
In quo warranto proceeding entitled State ex inf. McKittrick, Atty. Gen.
ex rel. City of Campbell v. drkansas-MissouriPower Co., 2 the court en bane
held that consent of municipality is condition precedent to right to use streets
and alleys of municipality in operating private electric plant and its distribution system, that without such consent no right exists in private electrical
distribution system to operate plant after termination of franchise unless
municipality does some act that would estop it from asserting that such right
does not exist, that supreme court may properly exercise judicial discretion
in granting or refusing judgment of ouster, and that public good is the element
chiefly to be considered as the guide to the court in exercise of such discretion.
Another ouster proceeding is State ex inf. Mc Kittrick, Atty. Gen., ex rel.
City of California v. Missouri Utilities Co.,3 division one there held that quo
warranto will lie by city to oust electrical company from use of city's streets
after expiration of municipal franchise, and grant of certificate of public convenience and necessity to electrical company does not give company right to
operate in municipality after expiration of municipal franchise; and city may
require such company to cease use for lines and poles of city's streets which
were part of state highway system, notwithstanding highway department had
exclusive jurisdiction over highway insofar as public travel was concerned.
Also, questions as to nature and application of doctrine of estoppel are discussed and ruled.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE

In State ex rel. to Use of Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public
Service Commission,4 division two held that movement of natural gas from
other states through foreign corporations interstate pipe line remained interstate movement until gas entered distribution system of local distributing
utility, notwithstanding construction of lateral pipe lines and measuring
stations at termini thereof outside limits of municipality; and, hence, service
thus rendered was not subject to Public Service Commission's orders, and
commission's order requiring foreign corporation operating interstate pipe
line to furnish natural gas to city at reasonable rates was void as interfering
with interstate commerce, though corporation had constructed pipe line to
point outside city limits in order to deliver gas to industrial plant therein.
2. 339 Mo. 15, 93 S. W. (2d) 887 (1936).
3. 339 Mo. 385, 96 S. W. (2d) 607 (1936).
4. 93 S. W. (2d) 675 (Mo. 1936).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss4/1

66

et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT-1936
State ex rel. and to Use of Baldwin v. Public Service Commission5 was an
appeal from a judgment of the circuit court approving an order of the Public
Service Commission. In reversing this judgment division one held that where
railroad gave 45 cents per ton allowance to shippers on interstate shipments
of coal to certain city to meet competition, Public Service Commission's
order to either raise interstate rate 45 cents or lower interstate rate to that
extent is invalid as imposing direct burden upon interstate commerce and
must fall though Congress had not attempted to regulate situation.
RATES

In Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Midland Realty Co.,' division one
held that rates fixed by Public Service Commission for telephone, light, power
and heat automatically supersede all rates coming into conflict therewith, and
order of commission that schedule of rates for steam filed by public utility
were unreasonably high and unjust and therefore unlawful, was not final and
conclusive in subsequent action by public utility to recover from consumer
difference between contract rates for steam heat and scheduled rates, where
commission subsequently found that scheduled rates were inadequate, uniust
and unreasonably low.
DEPRECIATION RESERVES
7
State ex rel. Empire District Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission
was an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court affirming an order of the
Public Service Commission. In reversing this judgment division one held that
statute authorizing commission to require utility depreciation reserve and
subjecting reserve to regulation authorized only prospective order, and, where
no such order had been made, the commission was without power to order
return of funds transferred from depreciation reserve of electric company,
since accumulation of reserve without order was voluntary and reserve was
subject to control of utility, absent showing that company did not properly
maintain property and render efficient service.

APPORTIONMENT

OF EXPENSE

In State ex rel. Wabash Ry. v. Public Service Commission,8 division two
held that where park roads were improved at public expense and used by the
public as roadways, they were public highways and the commission could

5.
6.
7.
8.

339
338
339
100

Mo. 814, 99 S. W. (2d) 90 (1936).
Mo. 1141, 93 S. W. (2d) 954 (1936).
Mo. 1188, 100 S. W. (2d) 509 (1936).
S. W. (2d) 522 (Mo. 1936).
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assess part of the cost of removing railroad grade crossings against the railroad, especially when made necessary by separation of grades outside the
park, and where relocation of city's water mains was made necessary by
separation of grades of railroad and city streets, cost thereof was properly
allowed as part of total cost assessed against city and railroad.
OTHER

DECISIONS

INDIRECTLY AFFECTING

PUBLIC UTILITIES

Typical of cases indirectly affecting public utilities is Grossman v. Public
Water Supply Dist. No.! of Clay County,9 where the court en banc held that constitutional limitation on indebtedness which municipality may incur contemplates debt which must be paid directly or indirectly by resort to taxation,
and not indebtedness payable only out of income derived from property pur0
chased. In State ex rel. to Use of Alton R. R. v.Public Service Commission,"
division one held supreme court without jurisdiction of appeal it not appearing
that constitutional question was not involved. To like effect is State ex rel.
Missouri Electric Power Co. v. Allen." In State ex rel. Anderson Motor Service
Co., Inc. v. Public Serrtice Commission, 2 the court en banc construed statutory
provision of "right to appear" in review proceedings. In State ex rel. St. Paul
& Kansas City Short Line R. R. v. Public Service Commission,"3 division one
held that in proceeding to review order of Public Service Commission dismissing railroad's application for permission to maintain bridge constructed
improperly and without commission's permission, railroad had burden to
show order was unreasonable and unlawful, and that under the evidence the
commission's order was not unreasonable.

IX
TAXATION

J. W.

McAFEE*

There is contained herein a review of all decisions of the supreme court
handed down during 1936 as they are disclosed under the heading "Taxa-

9. 339 Mo. 344, 96 S. W. (2d) 701 (1936).
10. 100 S. W. (2d) 474 (Mo. 1936).
I1. 100 S. W. (2d) 868 (Mo. 1936).
12. 339 Mo. 469, 97 S. W. (2d) 116 (1936).
13. 339 Mo. 641, 98 S.W. (2d) 699 (1936).
*Attorney, St. Louis. LL.B. University of Missouri, 1926. Former Judge Circuit Court, St. Louis.
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tion" by the digests found in the volumes of the South Western Reporter
for the period covered.
Two cases2 digested under "Taxation" are only incidentally connected
with the subject and are not reviewed in detail. In the main, the decisions
reviewed are consistent with established principles.
I
INHERITANCE TAX

In re Costello's Estate' is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court
sustaining an inheritance tax against the distributive shares of the Estate
of James Costello, who died December 27, 1933, bequeathing residue of his
estate equally to N. and K. In September, 1934, and before any distribution
of James' estate had been made, R. died, leaving appellants as sole legatees.
Appellants except to the assessment of the tax against the shares of James
Costello's Estate on the ground that R. never came into possession or enjoyment of any of the property. Judge Gantt, in giving an opinion affirming
the judgment, said that no question of double taxation is involved.
The tax in question is provided for by Section 570, Missouri Revised
Statutes 1929, which reads in part:
"Such tax shall be imposed when any person . . . actually

comes into the possession and enjoyment of the property ... "
The court construes the term "any person" to mean a person lawfully entitled to take the distributive shares and holds that the tax became payable
when the executrices of the estate of R. came into possession of R.'s distributive share. Although the court approves the result reached in In re Kinsello's
Estate,4 the reasoning in that opinion is criticised and departed from.
II
CORPORATE FRANCHIsE TAX
State v. Phillips Pipe Line Co.5 is an action brought by the Attorney
General to collect corporate franchise taxes for the year 1934. Defendant's
1. State ex tel. Hotchkiss v. Lemay Ferry Sewer District, 338 Mo. 653, 92 S.
W. (2d) 704 (1936) is not included in the digest under "Taxation."
2. State v. Gomer, 101 S.W. (2d) 57 (Mo. 1936), contains an interesting
review of the history of the current method of assessing property and of compensating assessors; Dennig v. Swift & Co., 98 S.W. (2d) 659 (Mo. 1936), construes
a contract containing the words "general taxes payable for the year 1931" to refer
to taxes arising from assessments made June 1, 1930. It is held that the term
"fiscal year" is synonymous with "calendar year."
3. 338 Mo. 672, 92 S.W. (2d) 723 (1936).
4. 293 Mo. 545, 239 S.W. 818 (1922).
5. 339 Mo. 459, 97 S.W. (2d) 109 (1936), aff'd, per curiam opinion, 58 Sup.
Ct. 53 (1937).
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demurrer was sustained and the petition dismissed below. Plaintiff appealed.
Defendant was a Delaware Corporation, engaged in piping oil into and
through Missouri. It maintained a terminal in Missouri where it had large
tanks in which some of the oil which it transports is blended and ultimately
delivered to dealers. Judgment was reversed with direction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff. Judge Collet, in the opinion, construes Sections 4596
and 4641, Missouri Revised Statutes 1929, as follows:
"Although the statute contemplates the payment of this tax
only by corporations engaged in business within this state, respondent cannot escape its payment if it is actually engaged in intrastate
business."
The court finds that final delivery is made in tanks upon arrival at the
terminal; that the blending operations performed at the terminal are not
necessary to transportation but are an accommodation to the shipper, enabling him to secure business; that the bills of lading, which were used for
gasoline withdrawn from the delivery tanks, were issued by respondent in
the name of the shipper and that the fiction indulged in of designating the
carrier in these bills of lading as though another carrier, performed the
transportation from the terminal was destroyed by the testimony. The
court, therefore, concluded that the operations engaged in at the terminal
in Missouri were not necessary incidents to interstate transportation and
amounted to intrastate business.
The court, by way of dictum, refers to the contention of the plaintiff
that the statutes involved apply, even though the foreign corporation is
doing interstate business, and says that, in view of its construction of the
statutes, the point is not important, but it indicates that the court feels
that the legislature may have power to so provide.
III
PENALTIES-PUBLIC UTILITIES

In State ex rel. Askby v. Cairo Bridge &. Terminal Company,6 the
prosecuting attorney brought proceedings in his official capacity to collect
from defendant a penalty of one hundred dollars per day for failure of
7
defendant to file a statement of its property with the State Tax Commission.
There was a judgment for the plaintiff. Defendant appealed. Westhues,
6.

100 S. W. (2d) 441 (Mo. 1936).

7.

Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 10066.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss4/1

70

et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court
WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT-1936
Commissioner, in an opinion adopted by the court, reversed the judgment.
Section 10070, Missouri Revised Statutes 1929, provides that some (although not all) of the utility companies shall, if they do not file a statement
of their property with the state auditor on or before January 1st of each
year, be assessed a penalty of one hundred dollars per day in each County
where it shall have used its franchise. Subsequent to the enactment of the
above sections, the legislature created a State Tax Commission and required
that all statements relating to assessment be made to that commission.8
The court holds that the Tax Commission Act covers the whole subject of
the earlier statute; that, since Section 10070 is a penalty act, it cannot be
read into the Tax Commission Law; and that the effect of enactment of the
latter was to repeal the penalty section.
The court proceeds to say further that Section 10066 placed all utility
owners in one class, but that Section 10070 attempted to impose a penalty
on only four of the number and that it thus denied to the members of the
general class equal protection of the laws and was, therefore, unconstitutional;
that Section 10070 is in the nature of a special law and that, since a general
law could be made applicable, it also violates Section 53, subdivision 32 of
article 4 of the Missouri constitution.

Iv
EXEMPTION

A. Sales Tax
In State ex rel. Missouri PortlandCement Co. v. Smith, State Auditor,9
mandamus was brought to compel respondent to audit an invoice for sand
purchased from relator by the State Highway Commission, which respondent
had refused to do because 1% had not been added, by relator, as sales tax.
In the opinion by Judge Leedy, it was held that the exemption from taxes
granted the state by Section 6, article 10, of the constitution of Missouri
is limited to real and personal property and does not apply. It is pointed
out in the opinion that this is an excise tax, and that, under the general rule
applying to exemption from taxation of subsidiary agencies of government,
there would be no exemption; nevertheless, after examining the act in question, " the court concluded that the legislature did not intend that the state

8.

Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 9853.

9. 338 Mo. 409, 90 S. W. (2d) 405 (1936).
10. Laws of Missouri 1935, p. 411.
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should merely take money from one pocket to put it in another, and that
the sale here in question was exempt. Corroboration for the result reached
is found by the court in the fact that the legislature which passed the Sales
Tax Act, made no appropriation for the payment of such tax by the Highway
Commission.
B. Bridge Trustees
In State ex rel. Jones v. Brown, Secretary of State," mandamus was
brought to compel respondent to file in his office certain articles of agreement tendered by relators and to issue a certified copy thereof. The articles
of agreement involved conform to acts of the legislature 1 2 providing for the
incorporation of toll-bridge trustees, as a public agency, for the purpose of
building or acquiring toll bridges and appurtenances, granting to such
trustees power to pay the cost thereof by issuing bonds secured by a lien on
the property so acquired, such bonds to be retired from income. The act
provides that property acquired by such trustees is to be held for the benefit
of the state and that when the bonds are paid in full the property or
properties shall become free public facilities. The act further provides' that
the property acquired and bonds issued by such trustees have for purposes
of taxation the status of property and bonds of the state. Judge Frank,
in an opinion concurred in by all of the court, held that the act was unconstitutional in that it delegated to private citizens power to create agencies
of the state.
In considering whether the attempt to exempt property from taxation
violates Section 7, article 10 of the Missouri constitution, it is said:
"... if and when, the net income derived from the operation
of the bridges discharges the bonds with interest, the state might
acquire a beneficial interest in them, but until that time comes, if
ever, it has no interest."
The court points out that the legislature may not validly provide for the
exemption of property from taxation by merely declaring that such property
shall, for the purpose of taxation, be deemed state property when, as a
matter of fact, it is not the property of the state. The peremptory writ of
mandamus was denied. It will be observed that, since the court holds that

11. 338 Mo. 448, 92 S. W. (2d) 718 (1936).
12. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 7914d et seq.; Laws of Missouri 1933, pp. 115117.
13.

Mo. REv.

STAT.

(1929) § 7914-H.
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the provisions for the incorporation of such trustees is unconstitutional, it
is unnecessary for the court to decide the question of tax exemption; and
that what is said on the latter subject is obiter dictum. That accounts, no
doubt, for the failure of the court to explain in more detail some of the
points suggested.
The statement that the state can have no interest in the bridge property
until the bonds are fully paid, gives no heed to the possibility that the state
may, under the act, have an interest contingent upon the payment of the
bonds. If a substantial portion of the bonds are retired so that there is a
valuable equity, would not the beneficial interest of such equity, under the
statutes in question, vest in the state? The statement may be explainable
upon the theory that the real interest of the state is in the free public
user of the bridge facilities, and that such user would not be available until
all bonds are paid.
As said above, however, the dictum is concerned chiefly with approval
of the established rule that what amounts to property of the state under
the constitution, is a matter for judicial, not legislative, determination.
V
ASSESSMENT OF SPECIAL TAXES-SEWER DISTRICTS

In State ex rel. Hotclkiss v. Lemay Ferry Sewer District,'4 a proceeding
by mandamus was brought to compel the levying of additional taxes to pay
outstanding warrants of the districts' 5 which were issued to pay preliminary
expenses. Section 11037 of the Act authorized the levying of a uniform tax
of not more than ten cents per hundred square feet for preliminary
expenses. Section 11062 provides, that if the circuit court finds that the
estimated cost of the proposed improvement exceeds the benefits to be
derived from its construction, the district shall be dissolved as soon as all
costs incurred are paid, and that "... if the uniform tax.., be found insufficient to pay all costs . . ." the board of the district shall make such additionaJ levy as may be necessary to discharge such deficiency. Immediately
after its organization, the district in question made the maximum levy for
expenses. Preliminary expenses incurred, however, exceeded the amount
of the levy.

14. 338 Mo.653, 92 S.W. (2d) 704 (1936).
15. The sewer district in question was organized under chapter 65, Mo. REV.
STAT. (1929).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1937

73

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 4 [1937], Art. 1
2 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Before any construction on the proposed sewer was begun, the above Act
was repealed' 6 with the provision, however, that the Act repealed should
''continue in force for the purpose of paying all outstanding and lawfully
incurred costs . . . .", and that the district should stand as if the circuit
court had ordered dissolution under Section 11062.
Judge Frank, with Judges Gantt, Collet, Leedy and Tipton concurring,
held that Section 11037 fixed an absolute limit for preliminary expense levies;
that the provisions in Section 11062 for additional levies where the district
is to be dissolved by order of the court means additional levies within the
maximum fixed by Section 11037. It is, therefore, held that any preliminary
costs incurred in excess of such maximum are not "lawfully incurred."
Macon County Levee District v. Goodson" is expressly overruled, and State
ex rel. Becker v. Wellston Sewer District"" is distinguished on the ground
that the point here under consideration is not decided in that case. The
alternative writ of mandamus is quashed. Judge Ellison, with Judge Hayes
concurring, filed a dissenting opinion in which it is contended that the maximum for uniform levies on an area basis fixed by Section 11037 contemplates a project which will be carried to completion. In such case, any expenses exceeding the amount of the levy may be paid out of the ultimate
benefit assessments. However, where dissolution is ordered under Section
11062, there will be no benefit assessments, and if expenses are to be paid, it
must be by additional uniform levies. Thus, it is reasoned that Section
11037 provides the maximum, unless there is an order of dissolution, in
which event no maximum limit is prescribed. It is the opinion of the dissenting judges that the peremptory writ should issue.
There is nothing in the facts to indicate whether or not the warrants
in question were issued to pay costs which arose before the total expenses
exceeded the amount of the original levy. Such facts, it would seem under
the reasoning of the majority opinion, might have some bearing on whether
expenses governed by such warrants were "lawfully incurred" as that term
is used in the repealing act. It can be said in favor of the dissenting opinion
that it does present a reasonable hypothesis under which the public agency
can, upon dissolution, pay obligations incurred in good faith.

16. Laws of Missouri 1931, p. 355.
17. 224 Mo. App. 131, 22 S. W. (2d) 651 (1929).
18. 332 Mo. 547, 58 S. W. (2d) 988 (1933).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss4/1

74

et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court
WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT-1936
X

TORTS
GLENN MCCLEARY*

The table showing the topical analysis of the decisions indicates that
tort cases continue to supply much of the subject matter for the court. The
tremendous growth of tort law, particularly in the field of negligence since
the middle of the last century, has resulted from a continuous demand from
injured persons for protection to interests which in the past had not been protected and for further protection to interests already protected to a certain
extent. The basic idea of liability for wrongful conduct is that, upon a balancing of the social interests involved in each situation, the law determines that
the actor should or should not be held responsible. Our more detailed principles of tort law are grounded upon this basic idea of liability.
Most of the tort cases fall in the field of negligence and apply previously
well settled doctrines to factual situations which vary slightly from situations
previously dealt with. For this reason only the more significant variations or
advances in the application of negligence principles will be mentioned.
Because of jurisdictional limitations, many, if not most of the interesting
advances in liability during the year did not appear in the decision of the
supreme court, but they are found in the decisions by our courts of appeals
and, necessarily, are to be excluded from this study.'

A.

I. NEGLIGENCE
Duties of Persons in Certain Relations
1. Possessors of Land

The protection given by negligence principles was applied in the case
of Paubelv. Hitz, 2 where a postman was injured while delivering mail because
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B. Ohio Wesleyan University,
1917; J.D. University of Michigan, 1924; S.J.D. Harvard, 1936.
1. For example, the extension of liability of a manufacturer to a consumer
for personal injuries resulting from unwholesome food and beverages on the theory of
implied warranty in the case of Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
90 S. W. (2d) 445 (Mo. App. 1936); the extension of liability of a manufacturer of
articles, other than food and beverages to the consumer, who has suffered injuries
of some defect in the manufactured product, by the application of straight negligence principles in Jacobs v. Frank Adams Electric Co., 97 S. W. (2d) 849 (Mo.
App. 1936); the extension of liability for misrepresentations by turning back the
speedometer on a used car by permitting a purchaser to rely upon such misrepresentations in Jones v. West Side Buick Co., 93 S. W. (2d) 1083 (Mo. App. 1936).
2. 339 Mo. 274, 96 S. W. (2d) 369 (1936).
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of an unsafe condition in the sole approach to the defendant's place of business. While the judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on the grounds of
contributory negligence, the interesting extension of protection through
negligence principles is found in the fact that the court first found the status
of the postman to be that of a business invitee or business guest. Under
Missouri law, had the court determined his status to be that of a licensee,
there would have been no duty on the part of the possessor to warn or make
safe those conditions which are known to be dangerous to licensees, even if
there was no reason to expect an alert licensee to discover the dangers, and
contributory negligence would not have been in the case. The case is interesting in that the court reexamined the basic principles which go to determine
the liability of a possessor of land for injuries to others which have been
received while on the land. The court recognized that the old common law
conception of an owner's or occupier's sovereignity and immunity for acts
done within the limits of his land has been encroached upon by the modern
principles of negligence. The possessor at old common law was considered to
be sovereign over his land and could use it in any way he pleased, just so long
as he did not interfere with the land or the enjoyment of the land of his
neighbor. The modern principles of negligence, which govern one's conduct
in most situations where injury has resulted, have had an exceptionally difficult time in being applied to the relations of the possessor to those coming
on the land. Property law had had several centuries of growth before the
principles of negligence emerged in the middle of the last century.
To determine the relationship between the possessor and the person injured while on the premises, the court quite properly looked first to see to
whose advantage it was that the plaintiff was on the premises at all. A licensee
is one who comes on the premises for his own purpose and with the consent of
the possessor. Since he is the only one receiving a benefit from his presence,
he must take the premises in Missouri in the condition in which he finds them;
he has no reason to expect that the possessor will make any preparation for
his use of the premises. But, even here, the tendency in the law is to impose
an affirmative obligation to make the premises safe or to warn of hidden
dangers if the possessor knows of the condition, realizes that it involves an
unreasonable risk, and has reason to believe that the licensee will not discover the condition or realize the risk. The basis for this encroachment on the
traditional position of the possessor to use his land as he pleases is that the
possessor gave his consent to the licensee to visit the premises, and he must,
therefore, assume a certain responsibility to prevent injuries. He voluntarily
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss4/1
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gave his consent, and out of the desire to preserve life the imposition of such
a duty does not seem unreasonable.
The court found, however, that the "plaintiff's presence was not solely
for plaintiffrs benefit, but for the mutual benefit of defendant (to and from
whom plaintiff delivered and received mail) and plaintiff." Therefore, "the
status of plaintiff on defendant's premises was that of a business invitee,
visitor, or guest." Since the business guest knows that the possessor is to
receive a benefit from his visit, he is entitled to expect that reasonable care
will be exercised to discover existing dangers and those dangers made safe,
or, at least, that a warning will be given to enable the visitor to determine
whether to enter the premises or not.
A significant advance is seen in the terminology used in the opinion by
discarding the old term "invitee" or "invited licensee" for a neater term
"business invitee, visitor, or guest." The important fact is the purpose of the
visit and not whether there was in fact an invitation. The latter fact is inferred
from the existence of the former. The use of the word "invitee" is confusing
and misleading when used alone. But to speak of a "business invitee, " "business
visitor", or "business guest", the emphasis is placed on the purpose of the
visitor which, after all, is the important fact in determining the amount of
protection to be given.
The holding of the court on the duty problem is in accord with cases in
other jurisdictions involving postmen and other governmental employees,
such as revenue agents and inspectors, with the exception of firemen and
policemen. The Missouri courts have not had to determine the status of firemen and policemen, but any reason for distinguishing between governmental
employees such as revenue agents and inspectors as against firemen and policemen seems entirely lacking. Both groups are privileged to enter the premises
irrespective of any permission or benefit which may result to the possessor.
It is a law given privilege. There may be good reasons for not holding the
possessor responsible to those whose privilege is law given rather than by his
own consent. Furthermore, he may not know when to anticipate their presence in performance of duty, which imposes a hardship on him. The postman,
however, is even in a stronger position since governmental employees of that
class have no absolute right to enter the premises of another. The possessor
may even prevent him from entering, something he cannot do to other governmental employees in performance of their public duties. Until his consent is
withdrawn he can anticipate the postman's more or less regular entry.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1937
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A business guest, in the case of McKeighan v. Kline's, Inc.,3 sustained
injuries in a fall, while passing through the store vestibule of the defendant.
Other customers had tracked oil on the floor of the vestibule from the public
alley adjoining. There was no evidence to show how long the condition had
existed before the plaintiff entered. To establish negligence, it was held
necessary for the plaintiff to establish both the actual existence of the condition
for such a time as to charge the defendant with actual or constructive notice
thereof, so that by the exercise of ordinary care the condition could have
been remedied or warning given. The mere likelihood that other persons
might create this danger upon the premises was material only to charge the
defendant with a duty to exercise ordinary care to make an inspection for
the purpose of discovering the danger.
In Bagby v. Kansas City,4 a boy ten and one half years of age was injured
when rock became loosened and rolled down a cliff in a municipal park. The
cliff was at least twenty feet high, too steep to climb, and very difficult to
scale along side to side. The city had constructed a fence to keep the public
from crossing to the part at this point. The cliff was permitted to remain in
its natural state as an object of beauty and it was evident that that portion
of the park was not to be used as a playground. The court held that, although
a municipality was required by the law of Missouri to exercise ordinary care
in maintaining public parks in a reasonably safe condition, this does not
mean that the city must eliminate every danger. "It would... be impracticable and a heavy burden upon a municipality to keep portions of a park, not
intended for a playground, in a safe condition." Neither was the city under a
duty to place warning signs advising the public of the danger from climbing
up or along the rock cliff since the cliff itself was more impressive as a warning
than any sign which may have been placed there to children of the plaintiff's
age.
To place some restrictions upon the manner in which a possessor uses his
premises in favor of those to whom he has given his consent to come on the
land, and, therefore, has surrendered voluntarily some liberty in using this area
while they are upon it to avoid injuring them seems fair; but to impose restrictions upon possessors, merely because they have not gone to the trouble or
expense to keep persons from trespassing, imposes an obligation on the
possessor by the wrongful acts of the intruders. However, the social interest

3. 339 Mo. 523, 98 S. W. (2d) 555 (1936).
4. 338 Mo. 771, 92 S. W. (2d) 142 (1936).
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in the preservation of the lives of members of the public demands that some
protection be at least given a certain group of trespassers as to activities conducted on the premises. Where members of the public intrude over a limited
area to the knowledge of the possessor, the possessor is subject to liability for
bodily harm there caused by his failure to carry on the activity, involving a
risk of death or serious bodily injury, if he does not conduct that activity

with reasonable care for their safety. This duty does not arise from the owner's
consent, but from the probability of serious injury, and public policy requires
that it be prevented even though it does invade the traditional privileges of
possessors.

Where children have been playing around railroad cars in a

switchyard so continuously and for such a length of time that the employees
of the railroad should have known of this intrusion, the railroad was held to
owe a duty to keep a reasonable lookout for the children.

In Yakubinis v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R.,1 the following instruction was upheld:
"The Court instructs the jury that (although they may find
from the evidence that persons were in the habit of walking on the
railroad track from time to time where plaintiff was injured, and that
the defendant knew it, yet, unless they further find that its track at
this place was habitually so used and that defendant knew it), or by
the exercise of ordinary care might have known it, then the defendant's servants in charge of the train owed no duty to keep a lookout
at that place for persons on the track and it was not liable in that case
for injuries received by the plaintiff unless its servants in charge of
the engine and train which injured him saw or knew that he was in
a dangerous position, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have
known his dangerous position on the track in time to have stopped
the train and avoided injuring him and failed to do so."
2.

Transferors

The case of Billings v. North Kansas City Bridge & R. R.7 raises the
question as to the liability of a transferor for bodily harm caused by a dangerous condition after the vendee has taken possession. Here the defendant
bridge company, in the construction of the bridge, had placed girders in a
5. Burnam v. Chicago Great Western R. R., 100 S. W. (2d) 858 (Mo. 1936).
6. 339 Mo. 1124, 100 S. W. (2d) 461 (1936).
7. 338 Mo. 1122, 93 S. W. (2d) 944 (1936).
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certain manner whieh the plaintiff maintained constituted a nuisance. The
girders were surrounded by a curbing six or eight inches in height which made
it impossible for an automobile to hit a girder unless it mounted the curbing.
After the transfer of the bridge to the vendee, a part of the curbingwas removed
and the girders painted in black and white stripes. The plaintiff was injured
when a truck in which she was riding collided with one of the girders. It is a
general principle that a vendor of a thing is not subject to liability for bodily
harm caused by a condition which comes into existence after the vendee has
taken possession. If the structure which caused the injury involved a risk
of injury to persons because of its plan or construction, then a nuisance may
be found to exist during the time it was under the control of the vendor, and
liability is not cut off by a transfer of the thing. In this case, however, there
was no evidence to support a finding that the girder was so constructed that
it constituted a nuisance under the conditions which existed during the period
the bridge was operated by the vendor. The danger was created by a new and
different use to which the girder was put after the defendant's control over it
had ceased.
3.

Lessors

The responsibility of a lessor for insufficient lighting of a stairway, which
was under the control of the lessor for the common use of tenants and those
on the premises as business guests of the tenants, was before the court in
Lambert v. Jones.8 The evidence was that the tenants should furnish lights
when their business guests used the stairway, and that they had installed and
maintained their own lights in the stairway. The lessor had never provided
or maintained any lights there. By assuming this obligation, a duty was
created on the part of the tenant to his business guests to exercise care to keep
the lights in good working order, so that the stairway would be lighted sufficiently to make it reasonably safe for them to use on the occasions when he
invited them to do so. The lessor, however, owes no duty at common law to
light a stairway, either for the benefit of the tenants or of persons visiting
them for business, social or other purposes. Two reasons have been given by
the courts: first, that this would impose too onerous a burden on lessors; and
second, that tenants take the premises as they find them and they cannot
complain if they are maintained in the condition in which they were when the
tenancy began, and persons coming on the premises in the right of the tenants

8. 339 Mo. 677, 98 S. W. (2d) 752 (1936).
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can have no greater rights. Where the landlord agrees to furnish light to the
stairways and hallways, where he assumes gratuitously to keep these places
lighted and fails to do so without warning to those who have a right to reply
on the continuance of the service, or where the construction of the way is
such as to require artificial light even in very ordinary times to be reasonably
safe, or where a statute imposes a duty on him to supply light, the lessor has
been held liable.' In this case none of these special situations was presented.
4. Supplier of a Chattel
One who supplies to another a chattel, to be used for the supplier's business purpose, is liable to those for whose use the chattel is supplied, if the
supplier fails to exercise reasonable care to make the chattel safe for the use
for which it is supplied. In determining whether the chattel is supplied for the
supplier's business purpose, the fact that it is being used for the purpose of
completing a contract or business dealing is important. Thus, in Stoutimore

v. A. T. & S. F. Ry., 10 and Markley v. Kansas City Southern Ry.," the carrier
was held liable to loaders for negligence in furnishing a defective freight car,
without making adequate inspection to discover a defective condition existing
in the car. The loaders came in contact with this dangerous condition while
loading the car. These defects were in the thing furnished to the plaintiffs for
the purpose of having them use it, as they did, for the benefit of the defendant.
The defendant, therefore, owed a duty to see that the car was properly inspected before being brought into use, and he is liable for those dangers which
reasonable inspection would have discovered. In the former case, this duty
extended to the shipper's employees as a risk of injury may be foreseen as to
them.
5. Host-Guest
An interesting application of straight negligence principles was involved
in the case of .drp v. Rogers,'2 where a guest brought an action against a truck
driver for negligence in stopping in a dangerous neighborhood to repair his
engine. The neighborhood had the reputation of being a "gangsters layout,"
which was known to the driver. While stopped there, a stranger ordered the
driver to move on. When the driver was about to enter the truck to drive on,

9.
10.
11.
12.

(1923) 25 A. L. R. 1273, 1312.
338 Mo. 463, 92 S. W. (2d) 658 (1936).
338 Mo. 436, 90 S. W. (2d) 409 (1936).
99 S. W. (2d) 103 (Mo. 1936).
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the stranger fired a pistol at the truck, injuring the plaintiff who was a guest
therein. Here is a situation where the modern principles of negligence may
be applied in pure form, as contrasted to the approach in the property cases
where other principles of liability or non-liability had developed to govern
one's conduct with relation to others. Thus, negligent conduct may consist
of an act which a reasonable man should realize as involving an unreasonable
risk of injury to another, or a failure to do an act which is necessary for the
protection or assistance of another and which the actor is under a duty to do.
In the instant case the court held that the defendant as a reasonable man,
could not be said to have foreseen a risk of injury to the plaintiff in stopping
his truck in the district under the arc light. The fact that the driver considered
the neighborhood dangerous was thought not to be of consequence. It
appeared that the driver moved on as soon as he had reasonable cause to
anticipate violence on the part of the stranger and, therefore, used the care
of an ordinary reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances. That
is, as soon as an unreasonable risk of injury could be foreseen, the defendant
acted as a reasonable man would act so that there was no breach of the duty
and, therefore, no negligence. This case will receive further consideration
under the discussion of legal or proximate cause.
B.

Breach of Duty Established Through Violation of Statute
or Ordinance

The duty and breach of duty, which constitute negligence, may be shown
through violation of legislative enactment which was intended to protect the
plaintiff against an injury of the sort which he received. The fact that the
statute imposed a penalty for doing the prohibited act, or for failing to do a
required act, is immaterial in determining whether the defendant is subject to
liability for an invasion of the plaintiff's interest. The most common type of
case in which negligence may be shown in this manner, involves violation of
statutes requiring certain safety appliances"i and devices for protecting workmen from harmful dust, smoke, or poisonous gases which their work demands
that they encounter. 4 In Felber v. Union Electric Light and Power Co.,' 5
violation of an ordinance requiring left-hand turn signals was relied upon by
plaintiff to establish liability for injuries sustained when the truck, making

13. Gieseking v. Litchfield & M. Ry., 338 Mo. 1, 94 S. W. (2d) 375 (1937).
14. Busen v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 339 Mo. 1098, 100 S. W. (2d) 277 (1937).
15. 100 S. W. (2d) 494 (Mo. 1937).
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the left turn, was struck by an oncoming automobile and forced into the
plaintiff, who was using the walk for pedestrians on the cross street. The
ordinance requiring the arm signal by the driver, to show his intention to
make a left turn, was intended to warn persons approaching from the rear
and, therefore, to prevent injuries of that type. The purpose of the ordinance
was not to prevent injuries of the sort that actually happened, and the violation could not be relied on to establish negligence per se.
C.

Res Ipsa Loquitur

Where a thing which has produced an injury is shown to have been under
the control and management of the defendant, and the occurrence is such
that in the ordinary course of events does not happen if due care has been
exercised, the fact of injury under these circumstances is sufficient to support
a recovery in the absence of any explanation by the defendant tending to show
that he was free from negligence. This doctrine was held applicable in Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac Co., 16 in an action for injuries received by a pedestrian
on the sidewalk who was hit by half a brick which fell from the upper story
of a building owned by and in the exclusive possession and control of defendants. The evidence showed that the owner of the building was keeping open
house to enable its patrons and employees and their friends to view a parade.
It was contended by the defendant that it was not in control of the instrumentality causing the injury since its evidence disclosed that a trespasser
caused the brick to fall. The court held that control "does not mean actual
physical control, but refers rather to the right of control at the time the
negligence was committed." This right of complete and exclusive control was
present.
On the other hand, the mere skidding of a motorcar is not in and of itself
negligence for it is an occurrence which in the ordinary course of events
may happen even if due care has been exercised. In Annin v. Jackson,17 it was
held with reference to skidding that it is as consistent with due care as it is
with negligence of the driver, "and it may and as a matter of experience does
occur without fault."
D. Imputed Negligence
The question of imputed negligence was presented in Kourik v. English,8
where an insurance company had engaged an adjusting company to investi16. 339 Mo. 726, 98 S. W. (2d) 969 (1936).
17. 100 S. W. (2d) 872 (Mo. 1936).
18. 100 S. W. (2d) 901 (Mo. 1936).
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gate a claim arising from a stolen automobile, without direction as to particulars, and on the basis of a per diem compensation. The adjusting company
performed services for eighty-seven different insurance companies. The
adjusting company was held an independent contractor and not a servant or
agent of the insurance company, as regards the latter's liability to one injured
in an automobile driven by the adjusting company's president while making
an investigation. While the insurance company had the right to tell the
adjusting company what to do and not to do, it did not, under their arrangements, have the right to tell them how to do what they desired to have
accomplished.
The weight of the presumption, which is raised from the plaintiff's evidence showing the name of the defendant on the truck causing the injuries
complained of, that the truck was being operated by the defendant through
its agents was raised in Ross v. St. Louis Dairy Co." The defendant offered
evidence that the driver of the truck was the agent of an independent contractor and that the defendant held no property interest in the truck, but for
advertising purposes the defendant's name was on the truck, together with
the name of the independent contractor. At the close of the evidence the trial
court gave a peremptory instruction directing a verdict for the defendant.
The appellant contended that the presumption made a prima facie case that
could not be taken from the jury regardless of the strength of the defendant's
evidence. The court cleared up some of the uncertainty that had arisen in
previous decisions and denied that such prima facie case, where it rests alone
on this presumption, cannot be destroyed by positive and unequivocal testimony introduced by the defendant. "....when defendants introduced positive
and unequivocal evidence to the contrary, the presumption disappeared and
in so far as plaintiff's case rests upon said presumption it fails." On the
other hand, if the defendants had introduced no evidence, the court by dictum
stated that the presumption might have carried the plaintiff's case to the
jury.20
In Mullally v. Langenberg Bros. Grain Co.,"i the question presented was
whether the negligence of an employee would be imputed to his employer to
permit a recovery by the employee's wife who was injured through the
19. 339 Mo. 982, 98 S. W. (2d) 717 (1936).
20. This case is commented on in (1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 213. On the question
of presumptions as evidence, see (1936) 1 Mo. L. REv. 359. Discussing charges on
presumptions, see (1937) 2 Mo. L. REV. 87.
21. 339 Mo. 582, 98 S. W. (2d) 645 (1936).
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employee-husband. While the court denied a recovery on the ground that the
employee-husband was acting outside the scope of his authority at the time
of the alleged injury, it did recognize the right of recovery against the employer even though, under the law of Missouri, the wife could not maintain
a civil action against her husband for a personal tort. The case marks a
significant advance, and the reader is referred elsewhere in the Review for a
2
more extended discussion of this problem than is permitted here. 1
E. Causation
Assuming the duty and the breach of duty to have been made out and
the defendant to have been negligent, there was still the question of causation
or responsibility in law to be determined in a few decisions. In Annin v.
Jackson,23 the instructions hypothesized that the skidding of an automobile
in which plaintiff was a guest was the sole factual cause, without other
hypothesized facts bearing thereon that the skidding of the car was the legal
or proximate cause of the injury. The court points out that not only must
there be a causal connection in fact (actual cause) between the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff's injury, but it must be the "efficient, immediate
and proximate cause" (cause in law). Actual cause denotes any occurrence
which is a necessary antecedent or sine qua non of an event. If the injury
would not have happened "but for" the defendant's negligence, there is causal
relation in fact and the defendant's conduct may be said to be an actual
cause of the injury. However there is no liability unless it also is the legal
cause of the injury.
Concurrent causation was involved in Felber v. Union Electric Light and
PowerCo., 24 and in Levins v. Vigne.2 5 In the former case the plaintiff's injuries
were received when the defendant was alleged to have made a left turn at a
street intersection in such a negligent manner that its truck was struck by an
oncoming car which forced the truck into the plaintiff, who was a pedestrian
using a pedestrian walk on a cross street. The court pointed out that, to hold
the defendant liable, it was not necessary that its negligence was the sole legal
cause of the injury; that if the concurrent negligence of two persons causes
injury to a third, both are liable. In the latter case there was evidence to the

22.
23.
24.
25.

See
100
100
339

(1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 232.
S. W. (2d) 872 (Mo. 1936).
S. W. (2d) 494 (Mo. 1936).
Mo. 660, 98 S. W. (2d) 737 (1936).
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effect that plaintiff's decedent was struck by one automobile and left lying
on the highway when he was picked up, carried and dragged by defendant's
automobile. The appellant assigned as error the refusal of the trial court to
give an instruction which seemed to convey the direction that the jury could
not find for the plaintiff unless they could separate the injuries sustained
when struck by the supposed first automobile, and further find that such
injuries sustained from being struck by defendant's automobile were the sole
cause of death. The instruction would have excluded liability on the part of
the defendant for negligence which caused an injury or injuries contributing
to, or combining or concurring with, the other prior injuries to cause death.
The court quoted text book authority with approval: "If the concurrent or
successive negligence of two persons, combined together, results in an injury
to a third person, he may recover damages of either or both, and neither can
interpose the defense that the prior or concurrent negligence of the other contributed to the injury."26
The matter of intervening cause, which cuts off the responsibility in law
of the defendant's negligence, was presented in Irp v. Rogers,17 where the
plaintiff was shot by an assailant when the driver of a truck, in which the
plaintiff was riding as a guest, stopped to repair a defect in the engine in a
district known to be a hangout for gangsters. Here the alleged intervening
cause was the criminal act of a stranger. While the case was decided on other
grounds, the court gave a considerable discussion to this problem and seemed
to conclude that the intentional crime or tort of a third person is a superseding
cause, although the defendant's negligence created a situation which afforded
an opportunity to the third person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the
defendant at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized the
likelihood that such a situation might be created thereby and that the third
person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.
One who supplies through a third person a thing to be used for the supplier's business purposes is liable if reasonable care has not been exercised to
make the thing safe for the use for which it is supplied, although the dangerous
character or condition of the thing is discoverable by an inspection which the
third person is under a duty to the person injured to make. Thus, in Markley

26. See discussion of concurrent negligence under the recent case comments
to be found elsewhere in this issue.
27. 99 S. W. (2d) 103 (Mo. 1936).
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v. Kansas City So. Ry., 28 and Stoutimore v. Z. T. & S. F. Ry., 21 the defendant
carriers were not relieved of their responsibility in permitting cars to go out
of their hands in a dangerous condition to be loaded by the shipper or his
employees, even though a third person in each situation was under a duty to
the person injured to make an inspection. The negligence of the third person,
who also owed a duty to inspect, is not an intervening cause to relieve the
supplier of liability; instead, it may be a concurring cause.
F.

Defenses in Negligence Cases

In Herringv. Franklin,0 in an action against a railroad for injuries sustained when the truck in which plaintiff was riding was struck by a train at a
street crossing, the plaintiff contended that, having once looked for the train
and not seeing it, he was entitled to assume that the defendant would operate
it in a careful manner both as to speed and proper warnings and in compliance
with the local speed ordinance, and that he could not be guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law when relying on that assumption. But the court
pointed out that, before one may take advantage of that assumption, he must
exercise due care for his own protection. The plaintiff stated that he looked
west no more after the truck started some twenty-five or thirty feet north of
the north track. There was nothing to prevent him doing so except, as he
expressed it, the fear of a train from the other direction. There was nothing
to have prevented him from seeing the train had he looked, and the evidence
further showed that the truck could have been stopped almost instantly.
An instruction to return a verdict for motorist, who was sued for injuries
sustained in a collision, if the jury should find that plaintiff failed to avoid
the collision, although he could have done so by the exercise of the highest
degree of care for his own safety, was held in Bloch v. Kinder31 not erroneous
as assuming that the plaintiff, by the exercise of the highest degree of care,
could have avoided the collision. The court stated, however, that the instruction could and should have been written so as to obviate this criticism.
Whether a guest is necessarily negligent in relying upon the driver of an
automobile, where the driver has exclusive control and management of the
automobile, was again presented in Annin v. Jackson.12 [Following earlier

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

338
338
339
338
100

Mo. 436, 90 S. W. (2d) 409 (1936).
Mo. 463, 92 S. W. (2d) 658 (1936).
Mo. 571, 98 S. W. (2d) 619 (1936).
Mo. 1099, 93 S. W. (2d) 932 (1936).
S. W. (2d) 872 (Mo. 1936).
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precedents in Missouri, the court said: "Though a guest is bound to exercise
his faculties and not trust himself entirely to the driver, yet 'it is a matter of
common knowledge that under ordinary circumstances such occupants do
largely rely upon the driver, who has the exclusive control and management
of the vehicle, exercising the required degree of care, and for that reason
courts are not justified in adopting a hard and fast rule that they are guilty
of negligence in doing so.' "
In Gwaltney v. Kansas City Southern Ry.,11 the court repeated the
Missouri rule that a person is not excused from the consequences of contributory negligence in voluntarily exposing himself to a known peril for the
purpose of saving property. Most courts have taken the other position, and
hold that the voluntary effort of a plaintiff to avert threatened harm, caused
by the defendant's negligent conduct, to property is not a superseding cause
of injury from such efforts, nor is it contributory negligence. This is true
not only where the harm is sustained by the one whose property is put in
peril by the defendant's negligence, but also where a third person sustains
injury in attempting to protect the property of another from the threatened
4
harm. The Restatement of Torts supports the latter position.
G.

HumanitarianDoctrine

In the case of Bumgardner v. St. Louis Public Service Co.,35 the court
dealt with the effect which antecedent negligence has under the humanitarian
doctrine. Since this interesting case is discussed fully at another place in this
issue of the Review, it is desired only to call attention to the case at this point' 6
Other decisions involving the humanitarian doctrine presented nothing of
significance beyond earlier applications.
H.

Burden of Proof

It is apparent that lawyers and trial courts are still having difficulty in
framing instructions on the burden of proof which will stand up under the
scrutiny of the supreme court. In Nelson v. Evans, 17 the objectionable portion
of an instruction dealing with the burden of proof in negligence cases is as
33. 339 Mo. 249, 96 S. W. (2d) 357 (1936).
34. Section 472. The Missouri decisions are discussed in (1920) 18 U. OF Mo.
BULL. L. SER. 33.
35. 102 S.W. (2d) 594 (Mo. 1936).
36. See discussion of this case under the recent case comments to be found
elsewhere in this issue.
37. 338 Mo. 991, 93 S. W. (2d) 691 (1936).
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follows: "If, therefore, you find the evidence touching the charge of negligence
against the defendant is evenly balanced, or the truth as to the charge of
negligence as against the defendant remains undetermined in your minds,
after fairly considering the evidence, then your verdict must be for the defendant." In Bellovich v. Griese,38 and Timper v. Missouri Pac. Ry.,3 9 the instruction read the same except, for the words italicized above, the phrase
"remains in doubt in your minds" was substituted. In all of these cases the
instruction was condemned on the ground that a greater burden was cast
upon the plaintiff than the law imposes. This objection was overcome in
Doherty v. St. Louis Butter Co. 40 as follows: "If, therefore, you find the evidence touching the charge of negligence against the defendant does not
preponderate in favor of the plaintiff, or is evenly balanced, then and in that
case plaintiff is not entitled to recover against the defendant and you will find
your verdict for the defendant."
The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on the burden of proof and
the effect of rebutting evidence by the defendant on the presumption or inference raised by the doctrine was presented in Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac
Co.41 The court reiterated its previous rule on these matters in pointing out
"that the burden of proof never shifts and that the presumption raised by the
doctrine res ipsa loquitur, relating as it does to the burden of proof, remains in
the case to the end and will take the case to the jury, notwithstanding the
evidence, however probative, given in rebuttal on behalf of the defendant.... And when all the evidence is in, it is then for the jury to say whether
the preponderance thereof is for the plaintiff."
II.

LIBEL

In Fisher v. Myers,42 in an action based on libel, the question was presented whether the occasion of the publication was privileged. The parties
were members of the same fraternal order. The defendants had distributed
pamphlets at the annual state meeting of the order, accusing plaintiff of
immoral conduct. It was shown by the plaintiff that the local chapters only
were vested with jurisdiction, under the regulations of the order, to hear and
determine charges of immorality or misconduct of any kind affecting a mem38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

100 S. W. (2d) 261 (Mo. 1936).
98 S. W. (2d) 548 (Mo. 1936).
339 Mo. 996, 98 S. W. (2d) 742 (1936).
339 Mo. 726, 98 S. W. (2d) 969 (1936).
339 Mo. 1196, 100 S. W. (2d) 551 (1936).
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ber's moral fitness or her membership in the order. Had charges such as these
been instituted in the local chapter of which the plaintiff was a member, the
court recognizes that the occasion would be a privileged one when done in
good faith. Here, there would be a common interest in the subject matter to
a certain extent between the author of the communication and the recipients.
But mere common membership in a fraternal order or other similar organization does not afford a sufficient common interest in the subject-matter which
makes a communication, otherwise libelous, qualifiedly privileged. The court
quite properly felt that the damage to the reputation of the individual in such
circumstances would be much greater than any benefit to society from extending the doctrine of qualified privilege.
Qualified privilege was raised in the case of Heitzeberg v. Von Hoffman
Press,43 where a letter was alleged to have been written to a third person
referring to the fact that the plaintiff had been an editor of a certain publication, and charging the plaintiff with loose financial policy and laxness as
manager. The court held the petition was not demurrable as showing that the
statements in the letter were qualifiedly privileged, especially in view of the
allegation that the letter was not written in response to any inquiry. These
allegations were also sufficient on demurrer to show injury to the plaintiff in
his business or profession at the time of the alleged false statements, notwithstanding the further allegation that the plaintiff's employment with a certain
publishing corporation was severed about one year before the date of the
letter, and that he had obtained no permanent employment since that date
III.

FRAUD

In the case of Orlann v. Laederich,44 the court treated at considerable
length the rules which determine whether a plaintiff is entitled to rely upon
misrepresentations of opinion made by the antagonistic party to a transaction.
Here the vendor of an interest in land misrepresented its value. The plaintiff
stressed the tendency of the courts in fraud cases "to condemn the falsehood
of the fraud-feasor rather than the credulity of his victim." However, where
the subject matter is one upon which the two parties have an approximately
equal capacity to form an opinion, neither is justified in relying upon the
opinion of the other, for it is not reasonable for people to rely upon the
opinion of others in such situations. The ordinary man in determining the

43. 100 S. W. (2d) 307 (Mo. 1936).
44. 338 Mo. 783, 92 S. W. (2d) 190 (1936).
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advisability of entering into transactions, such as the sale and purchase of an
interest in land in the instant case, ordinarily relies upon his own opinion.
This is so even though the purchaser in this sort of transaction knows that
the other is somewhat more familiar with the value of such things. The court
said: "Parties, sui juris, in full possession of their faculties and unrestrained
in their action, when about to enter a business transaction, should not look
to the law or the courts as a child does to its parent or a ward to its guardian.
The exercise of common sense, self-reliance, and ordinary diligence and prudence is to be expected in such transactions between adults, and indolence,
listlessness, indifference, and unwarranted credulity should not be encouraged." The court, however, recognizes other situations in which reliance
would be justified such as where the maker holds himself out as having special
knowledge of the matter which the recipient does not have, or where the
maker stands in a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence to
the recipient, or where the recipient was hampered or interferred with in
making his own investigation by the maker.
The remedy in tort for damages for fraud is only one of the means for
protecting those who have suffered this form of harm. Most of the cases
decided in the period under review, in which legal redress has been sought
because of fraud, fall outside the tort field. For example, there are the cases
in which a creditor seeks to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, 41 or in which
the plaintiff seeks rescission of contract and to get his money back, 46 or in a
47
contest to set aside a will.
XI
TRUSTS
W. L. NELSON,

A.

JR.*

1. ExPREss TRuSTS
Court Ordering Action not Provided for by Trust Agreement

In Seigle v. First National Co.,' a bank held certain securities, owned
by the defendant company, in trust to secure participation certificates issued
by the latter. The trust agreement provided that in the event of default
45. Hendrix v. Goldman, 92 S. W. (2d) 733 (Mo. 1936); Farmers & Merchants
Bank of Festus v. Funk, 338 Mo. 508, 92 S. W. (2d) 587 (1936).
46. Patzman v. Howey, 100 S. W. (2d) 851 (Mo. 1936).
47. Shelton v. McHaney, 338 Mo. 749, 92 S. W. (2d) 173 (1936).
*Attorney, Columbia. A.B. 1933, LL.B. 1936, University of Missouri.
1. 338 Mo. 417, 90 S. W. (2d) 776 (1936).
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in the payment of interest or principal on the certificates, the bank should
sell enough of the securities to enable it to make these payments, or should
sell all the securities and divide the proceeds among the certificate holders.
After an announcement that the company was unable to meet its obligations on the certificates the court, as a result of the filing of several suits
by certificate holders, appointed a co-trustee and directed that the assets
be liquidated. Two small distributions were made by the trustees. Later
the company filed an intervening petition stating that the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation had agreed to lend it money for the purpose of distributing a dividend of approximately 46 per cent to the certificate holders,
provided that the bank would pledge to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation all the company's assets which it was holding in trust. The circuit court
found the proposal to be fair and directed the trustees to enter into the
agreement. This decree was appealed from, one of the grounds for the appeal
being that since the trust agreement provided only for a liquidation of the
securities and the distribution of the proceeds in the event of default the
court had exceeded its power in directing that the securities be pledged
to secure a loan. The supreme court upheld the action of the lower court
and quoted with approval the following language of the Court of Chancery
of New Jersey in the case of New Jersey National Bank & Trust Company
v. Lincoln Mortgage and Title Guaranty Co.: 2 "but it is also true that a court
of equity, in its capacity as universal trustee, may in cases of emergency,
for the preservation of the trust estate and the protection of the cestuis,
authorize and direct the trustees to do acts which under the terms of the
trust and under ordinary circumstances they would have no power to do."
The court indicated that a liquidation at a time when the assets were not
readily salable was an "emergency" not contemplated by the parties to the
trust agreement, and was such a circumstance as to authorize the court
3
to proceed as it did in attempting to preserve the corpus of the estate.
The lower court had also directed that the maturity dates of the certificates be extended. In holding that the court had no power to make this

2. 105 N. J. Eq. 557, 148 At]. 713 (1930).
3. In discussing an earlier Missouri decision the court said: "The question of
whether a court in the liquidation of a trust estate in an emergency possessed the
power to vary the terms of a trust arrangement made prior to, and not in contemplation of, the emergency and when the trust estate was not subject to the control
of the court, was not involved."
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order the supreme court said that although a court did have the power "to
suspend the enforcement of the contract pending the administration of the
trust estate by the court," it did not have a right to make a new contract,
which would be the result of this order, over the objection of either party.
B. Powers of Trustee
Although the courts will, as stated in Seigle v. FirstNational Co.,4 direct
the trustee to proceed in a manner not provided for by the trust agreement
if such procedure is necessary to preserve the trust res and protect the
beneficiary, they will ordinarily hold the trustee to the terms of the agreement even though a different course of procedure would be to the benefit of
the cestui.
In Carter v. Boone County Trust Co.,5 the trustee had directed that
certain property which he owned should be leased by his executors and the
income used to pay annuities. He further directed that the property be kept
insured so that it could be rebuilt in the event of fire. After the death of
the testator the building burned and another was erected. The money for
this construction was derived from insurance and from rent paid in advance
by a bank which had leased the new building from the administrator with
the will annexed. In an action to construe the will and to cancel the lease
one of the testator's grandchildren contended that the administrator had
no right to invest the rent money and the proceeds from the insurance in
the new building. The court held that the executor was limited by the
powers given in the will and it was therefore the duty of the administrator
with the will annexed to replace the building and lease it, even though he
could have obtained a larger income for the estate by lending the money
received from the insurance.
Irvine v. Ross, 6 although digested as involving a trust
primarily involved the construction of a will. The only reference
was a statement by the court that the executor took the property
as directed by the testator, to carry out the purposes stated in the

question,
to trusts
in trust,
will.

4. 338 Mo. 417, 90 S. W. (2d) 776 (1936).
5. 338 Mo. 629, 92 S. W. (2d) 647 (1936).
6. 339 Mo. 692, 98 S. W. (2d) 763 (1936).
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C. Following Trust Properry
Happy v. Cole County Bank7 was an action to have certain funds
impressed with a trust. One of the defendants, the trustee of an estate in
which the plaintiff was beneficiary, had the trust funds on deposit in a bank
of which the defendant was president. When the Commissioner of Finance
ordered that certain notes be cancelled as assets of the bank, and that the
assets be restored, the defendant trustee transferred the trust funds to the
bank. The beneficiary then brought suit to have this money impressed
with a trust. The lower court entered a decree in his favor, and that judgment was affirmed on appeal, the supreme court holding that one who takes
property without having paid a valuable consideration takes it charged with
any trusts to which it may be subject, and that equity will follow the property and fasten the original trust upon it for the benefit of the person holding
the equitable interest, whether or not the donee has notice of the trust.
Benz v. Powell" also involved an alleged misappropriation of trust
funds. The petition alleged that one Powell, trustee, had wrongfully and wilfully intermingled a trust fund, of which the plaintiffs were beneficiaries, with
his private estate, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to a preferred claim
against the assets of the estate of the trustee, then deceased. The court held
that in order for the plaintiffs to recover in this action to follow trust funds
they had to prove that the trustee had misappropriated the trust funds and
that the part so misappropriated had reached, in some form, the estate of the
trustee. The court decided in favor of the defendants, as did the lower court,
holding that there was no evidence to show that the trust fund had come into
the hands of the trustee or his executor.
D.

Jurisdiction

In Winning v. Brown,9 the husband of the sole heir of the grantor in
a trust deed brought suit to have the deed declared void. The trustee filed
an answer and cross-bill asking for an accounting, the appointment of a
receiver, and a construction of the deed. The defendants appealed from a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff's wife, and asserted that the plaintiff had

7. 338 Mo. 1025, 93 S. W. (2d) 870 (1936).
8. 338 Mo. 1032, 93 S. W. (2d) 877 (1936).
9. 100 S. W. (2d) 303 (Mo. 1936).
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no capacity to maintain the action. The court did not make a finding as to
this contention, but held that the cross-bill and answer of the trustee conferred jurisdiction on the court of the subject matter of the litigation.
II.

IMPLIED TRUSTS

A.

Resulting Trusts

Three of the cases decided by the Missouri Supreme Court in 1936 were
suits to establish resulting trusts. In each of these the court went into the
degree of proof necessary to maintain such actions, pointing out that the
evidence must be clear and positive, and that the court must be convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that a trust was intended.
Lieberstein v. Frey' was a suit brought by the heirs of Louis Lieberstein
against his wife's heirs, and their grantee, to establish a resulting trust in
certain real estate in favor of the plaintiffs. The evidence was undisputed
that the deeds were made to the wife under the direction of the husband, but
there was conflicting testimony as to whether the property was to be held for
the benefit of the husband, or whether the wife obtained fee simple title.
'The trial court found for the defendants. On appeal the supreme court
affirmed this judgment, holding that when property is taken in the name of
the wife, under the directions of and with full knowledge of the husband,
there is a rebuttable presumption that no trust was intended, even though
the purchase money belonged to the husband, and that to overcome this
presumption, "the evidence must be 'clear, strong, unequivocal, and so
definite and positive as to leave no room for doubt in the mind of the chancellor' that a trust was intended.""
In Parkerv. Blakeley,"2 the plaintiff brought suit to cancel a deed which
he had executed to his sister. His contention was that an implied trust had
arisen in his favor because the deed, though absolute on its face, was in
reality a conveyance to his sister in trust, the oral agreement being that
she should hold the land until it could be disposed of. The lower court found
for the plaintiff. This decision was reversed by the supreme court, that court

10. 92 S. W. (2d) 114 (Mo. 1936).
11. 92 S. W. (2d) 114, 118 (Mo. 1936).
12. 338 Mo. 1189, 93 S. W. (2d) 981 (1936).
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denying that the evidence proved that it was the intention of the parties, at
the time the deed was executed, to separate the legal and beneficial estates
and convey only the former to the sister. The court first pointed out that
if there was an actual trust agreement it was unenforcible as an express trust
because not in writing.' In discussing the type of evidence needed to establish a trust by operation of law the court made the same requirements that
it set forth in Lieberstein v. Frey,'4 and said that "the evidence must be so
clear, cogent, positive, and convincing 'as to exclude every reasonable doubt
from the chancellor's mind'."'51 It added that such a trust must arise from the
facts of the transaction itself, and not by virtue of subsequent occurrences.
In Little v. Mettee,'6 the plaintiff contended that a resulting trust was
created in his favor in certain real estate devised by his grandmother. As
originally written the codicil to the will would have given the plaintiff an
interest in the property, but when the will was presented for probate it had
been altered in such a manner as to exclude him. The property was conveyed to the defendants, according to the provisions of the altered codicil,
and they went into possession. Plaintiff then brought this suit on the theory
that the will was altered after its execution, that the defendants knew of such
alteration, and that when they took the land they held an interest in it in
trust for the plaintiff. In affirming the judgment for the defendants the court
quoted from numerous Missouri decisions to show that in order to establish
a resulting trust an extraordinary degree of proof is required, and that a
mere preponderance of the evidence is not sufficient. The court also set out
17
the various situations which might give rise to such implied trusts.

13. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 3104.
14. 92 S. W. (2d) 114 (Mo. 1936).
15. 338 Mo. 1189, 93 S. W. (2d) 981 (1936).
16. 338 Mo. 1223, 93 S. W. (2d) 1000 (1936).
17. The court said: "The general types of a resulting trust, recognized and
enforced in equity, may be said to be: (1) Where a purchase has been made and
the legal estate is conveyed or transferred to one party but the purchase price is
paid by another party; (2) where a person standing in a fiduciary relation uses
fiduciary funds or assets to purchase property in his own or a third person's name;
(3) where property is transferred without any consideration coming from the donee
or grantee under such circumstances that he is considered as holding the property
for the benefit of the donor or grantor; (4) where property is acquired by a person
under circumstances which show that it is conveyed to him on the faith of his intention to hold it for or convey it to another, or to hold it for or convey it to the
grantor or the grantor and another; and (5) the trust which arises in favor of the
donor, or those claiming under him, where the trust is not fully declared, or fails, in
whole or in part...."
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B.

Constructive Trusts

In Parker v. Blakeley,"' the court, after deciding that a resulting trust
had not arisen, went on to discuss constructive trusts. It denied that the
plaintiff had made out a case for the latter since he had failed to show that
the conveyance was induced by fraudulent means. The court pointed out
that the mere refusal of a trustee to execute an express trust does not make
out a case for a constructive trust.
A decision which also may be classed under the heading of constructive
trusts, though no active fraud was present, is Cantley v. Beard.19 That suit
was an action to determine the interests of the plaintiffs, the State Commissioner of Finance and his deputy, and the defendants, one of these being
the County of Morgan, in certain notes and collections. County funds had
been turned over to the bank, although it had not been designated as a
county depository as was required by law. It appeared that the funds were
then used by the individual defendants, the officers of the bank, to purchase
certain notes held by the bank. The notes were then assigned to the defendants to secure them on a depository bond executed by them to the county.
The bank later closed and the plaintiffs, who took it over, contended that
the defendants held the notes and the collections on the notes in trust for
the plaintiffs. The contention of the county was that the bank, not having
been selected as a depository according to law, held the funds as trustee ex
maleficio, and that this trust extended also to the notes. The court agreed
that the bank became trustee ex maleficio of the original funds, but denied
that a trust relation was created as to the notes and collections thereon. It
said that since there was no authority for investing the funds of the county in
the notes held by the bank the transaction was void ab initio, and the title
to the notes and collections remained in the bank. The court said that the
county should have proceeded for a preference as to its deposit, because the
bank did hold the original funds deposited by the county as trustee ex
mdeficio.

18. 338 Mo. 1189, 93 S. W. (2d) 981 (1936).
19. 339 Mo. 649, 98 S. W. (2d) 730 (1936).
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XII

WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
THOMAS

E.

ATKINSON*

It is the purpose of this section to review the decisions relating broadly
to the law of succession to property upon death. Hence the subject matter
treated is somewhat more extensive than that included within the topics of
Descent and Distribution, Executors and Administrators and Wills, in the
digests. On the other hand a line must be drawn somewhere. Consequently
cases are not included simply because the parties happen to be personal representatives, testamentary trustees or heirs of deceased persons.
I.

PROBATE AND CONTEST OF WILLS

The judicial tendency to find that a will has been executed with the
required formalities is illustrated in the case of Buchholz v. Cunningham.'
There the attestation clause did not state expressly that the testator signed
the will in witnesses' presence; yet the attesters' statement that testor signed
the will was taken as the equivalent of a declaration of his signing in the
presence of the witnesses. The testimony of the sole surviving witness was
inconclusive and to the effect that some of the formalities might or might not
have been performed. Still the court held that a prima facie case had been
made by proponents.
It was also held in the same case that proponents, having the burden of
proof upon issues of proper execution and mental capacity, have the right to
open and close even when contestants attempted, in a case consolidated for
trial, to set up an earlier will conceded to be executed properly when deceased
was of sound mind. The opinion also affirms the right of proponents after
qualifying witnesses as to their association with deceased, to ask whether they
had noticed any sign of insanity. It is further held that when there is a proper
charge as to the necessary elements for mental capacity, it is not erroneous
to instruct that no particular degree of understanding is necessary on the part
of testator and that he need not understand the ordinary affairs of life.
When a correct charge was given to the effect that testator must have
the ability to understand: (1) the nature and extent of his property, (2) the
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B. University of North Dakota,
1925; LL.B. University of Michigan, 1917; J.S.D. Yale, 1926.
1. 100 S. W. (2d) 446 (Mo. 1936). Other points in this case are noted infra
note 14.
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reasonable claims of all persons who may have been within the reasonable
range of his bounty, and (3) to whom he wished to and was giving his property,' it was held not reversible error, in Townsend v. Boatmen's Nat. Bank,3
to instruct the jury that the testator had a right to exclude his heirs at law
and that they should not consider whether the will's provisions were appropriate or inappropriate. It is doubtless true that the unreasonableness of a
will's provision cannot by itself make a case for the jury upon the issue of
mental capacity. As said by the court however, this matter may be considered by the jury along with other evidence. The non-reversible character
of these particular instructions is made out from (1) the other portions of the
charge set forth above, (2) the fact that the will was not particularly unnatural in its provisions, and (3) that the will was read to the jury and its
provisions frequently called to their attention.
The well-founded judicial attitude to uphold wills against the claim of
mental incapacity is again illustrated in Stevens v. Meadows. 4 There the will
was rejected below upon the ground that the testatrix was suffering from insane delusions. In reversing the case and ordering establishment of the will

the court held that witnesses who testify to unsound mind must give the
details of facts upon which their opinion is based and that the court will scan

these with care. Upon review of the testimony the court found that, while
testatrix was strong-willed and perhaps unjustly objected to her mature
daughter keeping company with men and later leaving home to marry, this

was not sufficient evidence that; she was laboring under insane delusions when
making a will disinheriting the daughter.
While not involving a will but rather an inter vivos transfer of property,
Lastofka v. Lastofka5 is closely related to testamentary problems. In reversing
a decree for plaintiffs, children of deceased grantor, setting aside a deed by
their mother to the defendant son, the court took occasion to remark that the

tests of mental capacity and undue influence were practically the same as
2. This charge was given at the request of contestant and appellant. It was
further held that the instruction was not in conflict with one given at proponent's
request, that if testator knew and understood: (1) that he was executing his will,
(2) the nature and extent of his property, and, (3) the natural objects of his bounty,
he had capacity to execute the will. It is probably true that it is only the ability to
know and understand, which is required for testamentary capacity. A proponent
might complain of a charge requiring actual knowledge and understanding, but surely
a contestant could not.
3. 104 S. W. (2d) 657 (Mo. 1936).
4. 100 S. W. (2d) 281 (Mo. 1936).
5. 339 Mo. 770, 99 S. W. (2d) 46 (1936).
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in the testamentary cases. This suggests a comparison of the respective
beneficial features of deed or will in such cases. On the one hand, the will,
being entirely revocable, offers much greater protection of the interests of the
parent in his lifetime. This feature should be decisive in all doubtful cases
in favor of the will device. On the other hand, all other arguments are in
favor of the deed transaction: (1) the avoidance of probate and administration, (2) the fact that possible litigation is carried on in court cases with trial
de novo on appeal and accordingly with much less chance for "sympathetic"
decisions than in jury trials of similar issues in will contests.
In Shelton v. McHaney,6 it was held that the burden of proof as to fraud
upon the testator in procuring execution of the will was upon the contestant
and was not shifted by virtue of the fact that the one accused of the fraud was
the attorney who drafted the will and was named executor and trustee therein.
The decision is consistent with an earlier case, Ryan v. Rutledge,7 where the
issue of undue influence was involved. The Shelton case establishes the doctrine that there will be no presumption of fraud from the mere fact that the
executor-trustee drafted the will, when he was not a devisee or legatee.
Questions frequently arise as to whether a certain instrument is a will
or a deed. These two types of instruments require respectively different formalities in the matter of execution. In addition, to be effective, the deed
must be delivered. The beneficiaries under a will must have the instrument
probated in order to establish their interests thereunder, while probate is not
required for a deed. The character of the instrument must be determined to
ascertain which set of formalities is required by the former owner and by the
beneficiaries after his death. A will is ambulatory in its nature, while a deed
creates actual present legal relations. Sometimes, upon the offer of an instrument for probate, the question may arise whether the document does not by
its terms attempt to create present legal relations and is hence a deed and
therefore not entitled to probate. More frequently a beneficiary claims that
the instrument is a deed, while the heirs of the former owner contend that it
is testamentary in nature. Three cases of the latter category were decided by
the supreme court in 1936. In Lanphere v. Affeld,8 the owner of land and his
wife gave their daughter a warranty deed reciting consideration of one dollar
and love and affection, regular in all respects except that it contained the

6. 338 Mo. 749, 92 S. W. (2d) 173 (1936).
7. 187 S. W. 877 (Mo. 1916).
8. 99 S. W. (2d) 36 (Mo. 1936).
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provision "grantors retain possession until after their death." Later the owner
made a will leaving all his property to his son and appointed him executor.
The son went into possession of the land, whereupon the daughter brought
an equitable action to obtain possession thereof, to have title therein declared
vested in her, and for the rents and profits of the land. The court held that
the instrument was a deed and that the provisions thereof vested title in
plaintiff at once, subject to a life estate retained by the parent. The decree
for rents and profits was held to be properly against the defendant personally
as there was no evidence that he was authorized to take possession of the land
as executor. A like decision is found in the companion case of Schoenwetter v.
Affeld,9 except that there was testimony of an understanding that the deed
was not to be recorded until after the grantor's death. The opinion holds that
this evidence is immaterial as the provision was not contained in the instrument. Had it been, the court intimates some doubt as to the result. It would
seem that such provision should not make an instrument testamentary in
character, as it is the delivery rather than the recording which makes a deed
effective between the parties.
On the other hand, an instrument which grants land to one and his heirs,
and (1) reserves a life estate in the grantor, (2) states an intention that the
instrument should not take effect until grantor's death, (3) provides in case
grantee died without children the property should go to the grandchildren of
the grantor, was held testamentary in the case of Thorp v. Daniel. Of course
the first provision does not by itself make the instrument testamentary. The
second provision, however, especially when coupled with the third, was
deemed to cause the instrument to be considered entirely ambulatory and to
create no interest at the time of execution and delivery. The court distinguishes the second provision from one in an earlier case wherein the language
was that the instrument was not to take effect in full entirety until grantor's
death. As there was no claim that the instrument had been executed with
the formalities required for a will, or probated as such, the purported beneficiary could receive nothing thereunder.
While testator's widow may not ordinarily contest a will for the reason
that she may take as much against the will as when it is set aside, it was held
in Jensen v. Hinderks" that she should be permitted to amend her petition
in a will contest by alleging the existence of an earlier will making her sole
9. 99 S. W. (2d) 41 (Mo. 1936).
10. 339 Mo. 763, 99 S. W. (2d) 42 (1936).
11. 338 Mo. 459, 92 S. W. (2d) 108 (1936).
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beneficiary and thereby become a proper contestant. Fields v. Luck2 decided
that where there was a suggestion of death of one of defendants in a will contest and an order of revival and yet the representatives of the deceased
defendant were not brought before the court, the judgment setting aside the
will was void for lack of necessary parties.
In Callahan v. Huhlman,3 it was held that where the probate court's
record filed in a will contest in circuit court showed that the will had been
purportedly admitted to probate in vacation without confirmation in term,
there was no judgment of the probate court and the circuit court had no jurisdiction as the contest is derivative and in the nature of an appeal. When an
earlier and a later will are offered to the probate court at the same time and
thereupon the court admits the later will, and at a subsequent time formally
rejects the earlier one, the one year period, within which the action to establish the first will in circuit court must be brought, runs from the formal rejection of the earlier will at the subsequent date. This is the holding in
Buchholz v. Cunningham,14 which opinion also illustrates the court's approval,
by innuendo at least, of the consolidation for purpose of trial of several suits
to establish or reject different wills of a single decedent.
State ex rel. Cowden v. Knight1 presents a novel question of procedure
with reference to probate. There the will of the testatrix left $1.00 to her
brother and her father respectively and the balance of her estate to her husband. The latter predeceased testatrix, so that the gift to him was not saved
to his heirs by the anti-lapse statute16 for the reasons that he was not a "relative" of the testatrix within the provision to prevent lapse, and furthermore
was not survived by descendants. His collateral heirs for some reason difficult
to understand, presented the will for probate but the probate court declined
to take proof of the will. Thereupon these heirs brought mandamus to compel
the probate judge to take proof of the will and either grant a certificate of
probate or rejection. Thereupon the collateral heirs of testatrix brought an
original proceeding in prohibition in the supreme court to prevent the circuit
court from further action in the mandamus suit. The provisional rule was
made absolute for the reason that it would be useless to probate the will as its

12.
13.
14.
note 1.
15.
16.

339 Mo. 1140, 100 S. W. (2d) 471 (1936).
339 Mo. 634, 98 S. W. (2d) 704 (1936).
100 S. W. (2d) 446 (Mo. 1936). Other points in this case are noted supra
338 Mo. 584, 92 S. W. (2d) 610 (1936).
Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 527.
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terms could not be carried out because of the lapse. The decision is not only
technically correct but it has a common sense basis. Had the probate court
issued a certificate of rejection, an interesting question would have arisen
upon appeal. Technically probate should not be denied because the will
cannot be given effect, as only the issues of execution, mental capacity, undue
influence, fraud and revocation are involved on probate; yet practically, when
the will can clearly have no effect, should it be reversible error to reject it?
II.

CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS

Two cases involve the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction over decrees
construing wills. In Fleischakerv. Fleischaker,17 it was held that in a dispute
as to the time of ascertaining the sums to be distributed to various beneficiaries
of the estate, the jurisdictional amount was not the sum shown by the original
inventory nor the balance on hand at the time of trial, but rather the amount
to be gained by plaintiff or to be lost by defendant if relief be granted, or vice
versa if relief be denied. As this was not shown by the record to exceed $7,500,
the court considered it had no jurisdiction of the appeal. Peer v. Ashauer 8
was likewise a case where the supreme court held that there was no jurisdiction to hear an appeal in a will construction suit, though the land to be partitioned was worth $8,000, for the reason that it must be shown that the
amount in dispute was over $7,500. Likewise in the same case there was no
jurisdiction upon the ground of title to land being involved where the petition
alleged that plaintiff and defendant were each seised of one half interest in
the land and defendant demurred, admitting the allegation of tide.
In Keller v. Keller,19 a devise of property to R. and V., his wife, share
and share alike, was held to create a tenancy in common and not be the
entireties, or in joint tenancy. Lunsmann v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. 2
involves a question of construction which is probably of interest only to the
litigants, prefaced by the court's general statements that the object of construction is to reach the intention of the testator as gathered from the whole
will and that technical rules of construction should give way to this intention.
21
The substance of these generalities appears again in Blumer v. Gillespie,
passing on the recurring problem of whether words,-sufficient in themselves

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

338 Mo. 797, 92 S. W. (2d) 169 (1936).
92 S. W. (2d) 154 (Mo. 1936).
338 Mo. 731, 92 S. W. (2d) 157 (1936).
339 Mo. 669, 98 S. W. (2d) 748 (1936).
338 Mo. 1113, 93 S. W. (2d) 939 (1936).
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to create an absolute estate in fee, are affected by subsequent language showing an intention to benefit others. There the testator (a) gave all his property
to his wife, and expressed (b) faith that she would protect and educate his
son, (c) and the wish that the wife would bequeath to the son upon her death
all property inherited from testator, (d) and the idea and wish that the son
should have what might remain of the estate upon the wife's death. It was
held that the language in (c) and (d) had the effect of cutting down the provision for the widow to a life estate by implication with remainder in the son.
It is interesting to notice that while trust cases are cited, the court does not
make use of the trust devise but decides the case upon the basis of legal
estates.
A devise "to the Macon County, Mo., school funds" was held clear
enough to render inadmissible any extrinsic evidence upon the issue of testator's intention in the case of Burrier v. Jones22 This was held to vest the
legal title in the statutory custodian of school funds for the benefit of the
persons entitled to the benefits thereof, disapproving of an earlier Missouri
case 23 where similar language was held to constitute an ineffective charitable
devise because of failure to separate the legal and equitable estates.
Irvine v. Ross 2 4 involves the construction of the word "heirs" in a will.
There the testator by his will created a trust of his property for his daughter
who was his sole heir and was given the income of the property while unmarried. It was then provided that if she married, all real estate should be
conveyed to the daughter for life, with remainder to her issue but if she died
without issue then to testator's heirs. She married and died childless, whereupon her husband brought this suit against testator's collateral heirs, contending that the testator's heirs must be determined at the time of testator's
death, when the daughter was the sole heir, and that the sole purpose of the
provision was to prevent her from defeating her issue if she had any. The
court held however that the whole will showed an intention to benefit those
persons who answered to the description of testator's heirs at the time of the
daughter's death, if she died without issue.
Brock v. Dorman25 is another case involving the meaning of "heirs" as
used in a will. There the testator devised the land in question to his son for
22. 338 Mo. 679, 92 S. W. (2d) 885 (1936) noted in (1936) 1 Mo. L.
368.

REV.

23. Robinson v. Crutcher, 277 Mo. 1, 209 S. W. 104 (1919), criticized in

(1921) 21 U. or Mo. BULL. LAw SEP. 31.

24. 339 Mo. 692, 98 S. W. (2d) 763 (1936).
25. 339 Mo. 611, 98 S. W. (2d) 672 (1936).
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life and after latter's death to the son's heirs. The son and his wife years after
testator's death adopted F then 43 years of age. Then the son died and F
conveyed the land to plaintiff who brought this suit against the testator's
heirs at law who would take upon the son's failure to have heirs. It was held
that, while the Rule in Shelley's Case under which the son would have taken
a fee had been abolished by statute,"6 still F was entitled as the heir of the
son by the adoption. In so holding it was pointed out that the person answering the description of heir at the time of the son's death was entitled to take
the remainder, and that even under the old method of adoption by deed F
would be the heir of the son. 27 Adoption of adults as well as minors is recognized as before, and the Court refused to be influenced by the argument that
the adoption was a subterfuge to defeat the rights of testator's heirs.
In Laird v. Lust,2 8 testator devised his property to nine of his children
share and share alike "and in case any of my children, at my death be dead,
and leaving children, or descendants then such children should take the share
their parents would have taken, if living." By a subsequent clause it was
provided that if any of the children named in the above clause died without
issue the part willed to the child or children so dying should be divided
equally among the other children named in the preceding clause. In a suit
between the devisees to partition, defendants contended that the land was
not partitionable because the estate given to the children was merely a life
estate in the event that they died without issue. It was held, however, in
accordance with the preference for early vesting, as well as the intention of
the testator as spelled out from the entire will, that the latter clause was
merely a provision for a division of the property in case that some of the
named children died without issue before testator's death and that those
who survived testator had a vested estate in fee and the land was therefore
partitionable.
III.

ADMINISTRATION, AND THE RIGHTS

OF HEIRs

9

Cronacher v. Runge was a suit brought for admeasurement of dower in
the lands of plaintiff's deceased wife. It appeared that plaintiff had once
renounced the will but later had contracted to accept it in return for certain
considerations. Defendant's children of the wife, asked for possession of cer26.
27.
300, 305.
28.
29.

Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 562, 3110.
See Limbaugh, The Adoption of Children in Missouri (1937) 2 Mo. L.

REV.

98 S. W. (2d) 768 (Mo. 1936).
98 S. W. (2d) 603 (Mo. 1936).
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tain land which the husband claimed as part of his dower right. It was held
in effect that the contract superseded the renunciation and should be given
effect, as fraud in obtaining it was neither alleged nor proved. It was also
held that defendants were entitled to recover possession in the cross action
which was deemed to be in the nature of ejectment.
Another case involving election to take dower is Colvin v. Hutchison.',
There the widow, a resident of Illinois, renounced the will by a paper filed in
the Illinois court. This was held to constitute also a rejection of the will in
Missouri without steps taken in this state. Furthermore the widow was
deemed to take common law dower in accordance with the Missouri rule that
this was deemed to be intended when not made explicit by the terms of the
renunciation. This holding was in spite of the fact that under the Illinois law
the presumption under such circumstances was against the taking of a mere
common law life interest. The law of the situs of the land prevailed. Accordingly, the widow having since died, her collateral heirs were entitled to no
interest in the Missouri lands.
If one takes a foster-child without legal adoption and dies intestate, the
claim is frequently made that there was an agreement to adopt. The courts
have in some cases enforced such contracts by giving the child the property
which he would have taken had the adoption been carried out as agreed.31
However, the courts insist before taking the property from the regular channels of inheritance that the agreement be definite and furthermore clearly
shown. The supreme court showed commendable strictness in this regard by
affirming judgment for defendant heirs in Furman v. St. Louis Union Trust
Co.-2 and reversing judgment for claimant in Benjamin v. Cronan,33 both decisions being placed upon the failure to offer proofs of the necessary kind and
character in order to warrant enforcement of such agreements.
Much the same degree of proof is required in order to recover against
a decedent's estate upon his alleged contract to devise. Such relief was denied
in Stibal v. Nation3 4 for failure of specific proofs. Otherwise, as the court
points out, the safeguards of the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of Wills
would have no real effect. The possibility of recovery upon such a contract
30.
31.
300, 303,
32.
33.
34.

338 Mo. 576, 92 S. W. (2d) 667 (1936).
See Limbaugh, The Adoption of Children in Missouri.(1937) 2 Mo. L. REV.
310.
338 Mo. 884, 92 S. W. (2d) 726 (1936).
338 Mo. 1177, 93 S.W. (2d) 975 (1936).
98 S. W. (2d) 724 (Mo. 1936).
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is illustrated, however, in Jer Standig v. St. Louis Union Trust Co." There the
petition of decedent's niece alleging decedent's alleged promise to devise land
to plaintiff in return for services performed by plaintiff's husband was held
not to be demurrable on account of laches, though filed four years after
testator's death. The contention of laches was overruled because plaintiff's
husband had made prompt claim to recover judgment for the value of the
services rendered and the present petition was filed within a few days after
denial of the husband's claim on the ground of the plaintiff's cause of action.
The court realistically recognized the two proceedings as "a joint affair." The
court refused to pass on the question of whether plaintiff's claim would be
superior to the successors in interest of decedent's husband who took against
the will, saying that this question depended on the equities of the situation to
be disclosed by the proofs.
In re Estateof Thompson v. Coyle andCo.36 is an interesting and important
decision holding that an action commenced in a state or federal court outside
of Missouri does not interrupt our non-claim period of claims against estates
and it makes no difference that the personal representative voluntarily
appeared in the out of state action. It was held in W7ahl v. Murphy37 that the
filing in probate court of a transcript of a judgment recovered in a suit brought
against one in his lifetime and revived against his administrator does not
result in a lien upon decedent's lands in plaintiff's favor. The general statute' s
providing for a judgment lien upon land refers only to suits against living
persons, and the preference to judgments given under the administration
statute39 is expressly confined to judgments rendered against deceased in his
lifetime and later filed in the probate court. When a preferred claim is asserted
against the estate of a trustee upon the ground that the deceased trustee intermingled trust funds belonging to plaintiff with his personal estate, it was held
in Benz v. Powell 0 that no preference should be granted unless both the intermingling is proved and the trust funds are traced into the hands of the trusttee's executor.
In Landwehr v. Moberly, 41 it was held that the deposit by an executrix
of estate funds in a bank did not become a special deposit so as to be entitled
35.
36.
37.
38.
1935, p.
39.
40.
41.

339 Mo. 539, 98 S. W. (2d) 588 (1936).
339 Mo. 410, 97 S. W. (2d) 93 (1936).
99 S. W. (2d) 32 (Mo. 1936).
Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 1104, 1142, as amended by Laws of Missouri
207.
Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 148-156, 182.
338 Mo. 1032, 93 S. W. (2d) 877 (1936).
338 Mo. 1106, 93 S. W. (2d) 935 (1936).
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to preference upon failure of the bank because of the representations of the
bank's cashier that the bank was safe and that the money could be had at any
time, nor by reason of the fact that the deposit was for the purpose of carrying out the trust. In Happy v. Cole County Bank,42 a testamentary trustee,
who was president of the defendant bank, checked money from the trust
account into his individual account and gave his individual check in payment of his own indebtedness to the bank. It was held that the bank was
liable to the cestui as its officers knew the source of the funds. The fact that
the will might not have been properly executed was held immaterial. Defendant insisted on the statute of limitations as a defense, upon the theory that
the trustee could have sued before. This argument was rejected on the ground
that the trustee was the wrongdoer and did not represent the plaintiff in the
transaction.
Rains v. Moulder41 is an interesting decision regarding the adjustment of
the equities between the grantee of the purchaser at a void administrator's
sale and the heirs at law. The heirs of course are considered to have title to
the land but the grantee of the purchaser may recover for improvements by
virtue of the general statute, 44 and also will be subrogated for so much of the
purchase price as went to pay the decedent's debts.
In Monroe v. Lyons, 4i the widow and four children of intestate executed
an instrument purporting to bargain and sell to one C a one fifth interest in
intestate's lands (subject to the widow's dower and certain other interests)
reciting the intention to make C an heir along with the other children. C had
been brought up by intestate but was never legally adopted. It was held that
the transaction must be regarded as a conveyance of the mentioned interest
and not as a mere contract that C was to be considered an heir.
In Parkerv. Blakeley, 41 plaintiff and defendant were the sole heirs of the
intestate. The former deeded to defendant his interest in the land formerly
owned by decedent, the conveyance reciting nominal consideration and a
release of plaintiff's indebtedness to the intestate. In plaintiff's subsequent
attempt to repudiate the transaction and cancel the deed, it was held for
defendant, as upon these recitals neither constructive nor resulting trusts
could arise in the absence of fraud and mistake. The right of beneficiaries

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

338 Mo. 1025, 93 S. W. (2d) 870 (1936).
338 Mo. 275, 90 S. W. (2d) 81 (1936).
Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 1384, 1385.
339 Mo. 515, 98 S. W. (2d) 544 (1936).
338 Mo. 1189, 93 S. W. (2d) 981 (1936).
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under a will to compromise their interests was recognized in Brinkmeyer v.
Helm, 47 but as no executed agreement, or executory contract for good consideration was found, the provisions of the will were given effect. The will
involved a question of abatement of legacies and the related problem of a
charge of pecuniary legacies upon devised lands. At the time of execution of
the will testator had sufficient money to satisfy all legacies, but this had been
spent before his death. A specific devise of land to his daughter was held to be
preferred to pecuniary legacies. Furthermore no charge was imposed on the
land to pay the latter, especially as the testator had executed a deed of the
land to the daughter, which deed was recited in the will, though it had never
been delivered. If the daughter had obtained the realty through the residuary
clause, which intermingled realty and personalty, the legacies would probably
have been charged upon the land.
In Krebs v. Bezler,48 the testator appointed his widow executrix and gave
her a life estate in his lands and chattels with remainder to the children of the
couple. The widow, who had signed mortgage notes upon the land as surety
in her husband's lifetime, after his death paid the husband's entire personal
assets toward discharge of the mortgages and the balance from her own
funds. It was held that she was entitled as surety to subrogation of the
amount so paid from her individual moneys, though as to the estate funds so
used, she was not entitled to reimbursement. As the same parties were interested in both realty and personalty and in the same proportions, the ultimate
equities between life-tenant and remaindermen would not be affected by payment from the estate funds. Hence the statute, 49 providing that devises shall
take effect subject to encumbrances upon the land, could have no practical
effect. Had the will made disposition of the land and the personalty to
different persons, or to the same persons in different proportions, there would
have been an interesting application of this statute to the situation of lifetenant and remainderman.
When a legatee dies after testator's death but before distribution, there
are two successions and the state is entitled to two inheritance taxes upon the sum bequeathed. This was held in In re Estate of Costello v. King"0 in
spite of the fact that the statute51 declared that the tax was imposed when the
person "actually comes into possession and enjoyment of the property."
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

100 S. W. (2d) 452 (Mo. 1936).
89 S. W. (2d) 935 (Mo. 1936).
Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 523.
338 Mo. 673, 92 S. W. (2d) 723 (1936).
Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 570, as amended by Laws of Missouri 1931, p. 130.
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This provision was deemed satisfied when the personal representative of the
legatee came into possession of the legacy.
In re Estate of Shelton v. McHaney5 2 is a precedent for several points regarding the fees of executors and testamentary trustees as well as food for
thought regarding the legislative and judicial attitudes toward the whole
subject. It was held that the statute" plainly gives the personal representatives commissions of 5% on personal property, though the court points out
that, in the particular case, this sum may be more or less than the services
are worth. It is further held that, while executors may waive these statutory
fees, they are not deemed to do so by acting both as executors and as trustees
under a will limiting the trustees' fees to 109 of the annual income. Such
executors and trustees are entitled to fees in both capacities. Furthermore
executors' fees can be claimed upon property turned over in kind by the personal representatives to themselves in their capacity as trustees. However,
the court refused to allow as expenses of one of the executors, three fourths of
the salary of his law stenographer on the ground that it was not clearly shown
that so much of her time went into work of the estate, nor that she had been
paid directly by the executor for the estate work. The court intimated that

a stenographer or other employee might be lawfully engaged by an administrator or executor for work concerning the estate and that compensation for
such services might be allowed as a credit. A word of caution might be spoken
in this connection. Much, if not most, of the mechanical work of this nature
should be regarded as part of the executorial function, and if others are en-

gaged to perform them the expense should be borne by the representative out
of his commissions1 4 The entire law and practice of allowance of commis-

sions and fees in decedent's estates demands thorough examination. Every
fair-minded lawyer cognizant with the facts would doubtless admit that the
charges are often excessive and that in certain localities and in particular
kinds of cases there are abuses of a grievous nature. 5

52.

338 Mo. 1000, 93 S. W. (2d) 684 (1936).
STAT. (1929) § 221.
54. See Overman v. Lanier, 157 N. C. 544, 73 S. E. 192 (1911).
55. In this general connection it may not be amiss to cite an example of the
allowance of fees and expenses in an estate administered by a public administrator.
File number 41088 of the Probate Court of Jackson County at Kansas City is that
of the Estate of William Daley, deceased. From the papers in this file, it appears
that the decedent was a beggar who died with $2,220.00 on deposit in a local solvent
bank and without other property of value. The public administrator was granted
letters. While there is a vague statement in the latter's application for additional
compensation that certain persons claimed to be heirs or creditors of the intestate,

53. Mo. REv.
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In Hoffmeyer v. Mintert,5 the court disposes of several objections by the
heirs to the final account of an administrator. The exceptions upon final
accounting to the allowance of several claims upon the semi-annual accounting because they were paid prior to allowance were held without merit where
the heirs were present at the semi-annual settlement, consented to the allowance, and the allowance was approved after waiver by the administrator of
service of the demands. It was further held that taxes might properly be paid
without demand upon the administrator and that expenses of administration
might be allowed upon final settlement without prior formal allowance. The
court however opened up the semi-annual settlement to correct what was
apparently admitted to be an error in computation in the administrator's
favor.
IV.

SURVIVAL AND REVIVAL OF ACTIONS

North v. North57 is an interesting case, regarding survival of actions. In
a settlement of property upon divorce, the husband agreed to pay his wife
$500 per month as long as she remained single, and directions for these payments were included in the divorce decree. Several years later the former
husband applied for and obtained an order reducing the payments to $300.

there is no record of who such persons were, nor the nature of their contentions.
At any rate no heirs appeared and no claims were filed except for funeral and administration expenses. The only matters upon which the court was asked to pass
were applications for allowances of administrator's and attorney's fees and the
former's accounts which were unopposed. The only additional reason assigned in
the public administrator's application for additional allowances was that he was
obliged to supervise the funeral arrangements and other post-mortem affairs of the
deceased. The following is a recapitulation of the accounts filed in the estate:
Public administrator-regular commissions .....................

Public administrator-special allowances ..............

..............

$ 111.00

500.00

Services of another in investigating assets, heirs, etc ........................................
75.00
Attorney's fees..................................................................................................
300.00
Funeral expenses .......................................................................................................
800.00
M onument for grave .................................................................................................
150.00
Cemetery grave .....................................................................................................
45.00
Appraisers' fees .......................... ................
27.00
Notary's fees ......................................................................................................
9.00
Publication of notices .............................................................................................
12.06
Surety bond charges ...............................................................................................
25.00
Court costs ............................................................ 72.20
City and county taxes ...........................................................................................
38.65
Balance-escheat to state...................................................................................
55.09
TOTAL---------............
56. 93 S. W. (2d) 894 (Mo. 1936).
57. 339 Mo. 1226, 100 S. W. (2d) 582 (1936).
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From this order, the former wife appealed, and pending appeal the husband
died. It was held that while alimony was not payable from a husband's estate
after his death, still he could bind himself to pay his wife sums after his death.
As his agreement was of the latter sort, payments could be enforced against
the estate and were not subject to reduction by the court.
The unjust failure of our statutory law to provide for the survival of
death actions upon the death of the wrongdoer is illustrated in Hendricks v.
Kauffman18 There the children of deceased obtained judgment against the
individual employer of their father. Defendant appealed and died pending
appeal, but his representative secured a reversal of the case and a new trial
was ordered. Thereupon the representative of the former defendant moved
that the action be dismissed because of the non-survival of such claims upon
the death of defendant. A dismissal was held proper though it was pointed
out that the appellate court might have reversed the case upon condition that
the administrator stipulate not to move to dismiss. The opinion, regrettable
as it seems, is in general accord with holdings elsewhere as to the point of nonsurvival of death actions upon the death of the wrongdoer. 9 Such decisions
call for legislation to remedy the situation generally, without resort to the
stipulation devise.

Vitale v. Duerbeck6" is a valuable opinion upon the effect of the death of
a plaintiff in a personal injury action from the original injuries sued upon.
This clearly depends upon the stage of the court proceeding at which the
death took place. If it occurred before judgment in the trial court, it is declared that there would be no survival, though a subsequent action could then
be brought for wrongful death. If the death happened after judgment, the
action does not abate but is merged in the judgment. However, if the death
took place pending appeal and prior to submission thereof, there must be suggestion of death and substitution of heirs or representatives in order to give
the attorney authority to proceed. After submission to the appellate court,
no revivor is necessary. The Vitale case, being one in which the death
occurred after the filing of defendant's motion for rehearing, was held to fall
in the latter class.

58. 101 S. W. (2d) 84 (Mo. 1936).
59. Clark v. Goodwin, 170 Cal. 527, 150 Pac. 357 (1915), L. R. A. 1916 A
1142, noted in (1915) 4 CAL. L. REv. 52; Wright v. Smith, 136 Kan. 205, 14 P.
(2d) 640 (1932); Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 151 Pac. 366, L. R. A. 1916 A
1140 (1915). Cf. Onso GENERAL CODE (1931) § 10509-166.
60. 338 Mo. 556, 92 S. W. (2d) 691 (1936).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss4/1

112

et al.: Work of the Missouri Supreme Court

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT-1936
XIII
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
JAMES

A. POTTER*

During the year 1936 there were 13 cases decided by the supreme court
involving, directly or indirectly, the workmen's compensation law of Missouri.
The majority of these decisions announced no new interpretations or rules
but merely applied established principles to the facts of each particular case.
Consequently no extended discussion of them is necessary.
THE SUPREME COURT IS A COURT OF LIMITED JURISDICTION

The reason for the limited number of cases decided during the year 1936
involving appeals from decisions of the Workmen's Compensation Commission is the limited jurisdiction of our supreme court.
The Missouri Compensation Act provides that appeals may be taken
from decisions of the commission to the circuit court, and from that court
appeals may be taken as in ordinary civil cases.1 The ordinary course of
appeal from the circuit court is to the various courts of appeal. However, if
the amount in controversy exceeds $7500.00, an appeal may be taken to the
supreme court direct.2 In eight of the cases decided by the court in 1936, the
basis for jurisdiction was the amount in controversy. 3 Five of these cases
were based on claims for compensation for the death of an employee, one was
a compensation claim for permanent total disability, and two were damage
suits seeking more than that amount. Three of the cases decided by the
supreme court during the same period were certified to that court by the
courts of appeals because of supposed conflict in the opinions of the courts of
appeals with prior decisions of those courts or of the supreme court. 4 One
*Attorney, Jefferson City. A.B. 1902, LL.B. 1905, University of Missouri.
1. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) 3342.
2. Mo. CONST. ART. VI, § 3, amend, of 1884, and Mo. REv. STAT. (1929)
§ 1914, enacted pursuant thereto.
3. Kemmerling v. Koch Erecting Co., 338 Mo. 252, 89 S. W. (2d) 674 (1936);
O'Dell v. Lost Trail, Inc., 100 S. W. (2d) 289 (Mo. 1936); Holder v. Elms Hotel
Co., 338 Mo. 857, 92 S. W. (2d) 620 (1936); Maddux v. Kansas City Public Service
Co., 100 S. W. (2d) 535 (Mo. 1936); Drew v. Missouri Pacific R. R., 100 S. W.
(2d) 516 (Mo. 1936); Adams v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 101 S. W. (2d) 75 (Mo.
1936); Wills v. Berberich's Delivery Co., 98 S. W. (2d) 569 (Mo. 1936); Markley
v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 338 Mo. 436, 90 S. W. (2d) 409 (1936).
4. Allen v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 338 Mo. 395, 90 S. W. (2d) 1050
(1935); Downey v. Kansas City Gas Co., 338 Mo. 803, 92 S. W. (2d) 580 (1936);
State ex rel K. C. Bridge Co. v. Mo. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 92 S.
W. (2d) 624 (Mo. 1936). The basis for such appeals is found in Section 6 of the
amendment of 1884 to article VI of the Missouri constitution.
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case involved an original proceeding in mandamus.5 One was based on a writ
of certiorari to the St. Louis Court of Appeals. 6 It is interesting to note that
during the year 1936 there were over 35 decisions rendered by the courts of
appeals involving the Compensation Act. From these statistics, and from
the decisions it should be noted that in the great majority of cases involving
7
the Compensation Law, the courts of appeals are the courts of last resort.
REITERATION

OF ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES

For the most part the decisions were based upon the application of
established principles to the particular facts involved. These principles and
the cases in which they were reiterated, are as follows:
First. Findings of fact of the commission are binding on appellate
courts if they are sustained by sufficient competent evidence. 8 This principle
is sometimes stated to be that the findings of fact of the commission, if supported by substantial, competent evidence, have the force and effect of the
verdict of a jury, and are conclusive on appeal."
The case of Adams v. ContinentalLife Ins. Co.'" cites authorities holding
that though the commission states only a legal conclusion rather than a finding of fact, its award will not be reversed if its conclusion is supported by
sufficient competent evidence.
Second. The weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses
are questions for the commission, the trier of fact, and are not considered on
appeal."

5. State ex rel Weaver v. Mo. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 95 S.
W. (2d) 641 (Mo. 1936).
6. State ex rel Kroger Gro. & Baking Co. v. Hostetter, 98 S. W. (2d) 683
(Mo. 1936).

7. Ibid.
8. Maddux v. K. C. Public Service Co., 100 S. W. (2d) 535 (Mo. 1936);
Adams v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 10l1S. W. (2d) 75 (Mo. 1936); O'Dell v. Lost
Trail, Inc., 100 S. W. (2d) 289 (Mo. 1936).
9. Maddux v. K. C. Public Service Co., 100 S. W. (2d) 535 (Mo. 1936).
It should be noted that in these cases no discussion is directed to the meaning of the
terms "substantial" or "sufficient." However, in this connection it may be said
that the criterion used in these cases is the same as that used when an appellate
court is reviewing a case on a demurrer to the evidence in an ordinary civil suit. It
must be decided in each case whether there was enough evidence introduced to justify submission of the case to the jury. If the answer is in the affirmative, then the
award of the commission must be upheld.
10. 101 S. W. (2d) 75, 82 (Mo. 1936).
11. Maddux v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 100 S. W. (2d) 535 (Mo.
1936); Adams v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 101 S. W. (2d) 75 (Mo. 1936).
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Third. If an injury sustained in the course of employment aggravates an already weakened condition or pre-existing disease, and injury or
death results, liability for compensation arises. "2
Fourth. When does an accident occur in the course of one's employent? In O'Dell v. Lost Trail,Inc., division one follows and applies the test
laid down in the McMain Case" on the question of what is a trip in the course
of one's employment, as follows:
"If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, he
is in the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same
time some purpose of his own.... If, however, the work has had no
part in creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have
gone forward though the business errand had been dropped, and
would have been cancelled upon failure of the private purpose,
though the busines errand undone, the travel is then personal, and
personal the risk."
A companion question is: What is an act in the course of one's employment? The O'Dell case follows the test set out in Hinkle v. Chicago, B. & Q.
R. R.14 as follows: 5
"The fact that the act was done during the time of the servant's employment is not conclusive, nor is the motive of the servant
so. The question is, Was the act done by virtue of the employment
and in furtherance of the master's business? . . . 'Whose business
was being done and whose general purposes were being promoted?'
Maniaci v. Express Company, 226 Mo. 633, 182 S. E. 981."
Fifth. The validity of the Compensation Act was raised in Holder
v. Elms Hotel Co."8 In a suit by the husband against the employer for loss of
services and companionship of his wife, the employee who sustained an injury
in the course of her employment, employer, defendant, set up the Compensation Act as a defense. Plaintiff contended that the Act violates Sections 1,
12. Wills v. Berberich's Delivery Co., 98 S. W. (2d) 569 (Mo. 1936). A
strict application of this principle has given rise to serious objection on the part of
the employers. As a result some employers are subjecting each applicant to a rigid
physical examination prior to hiring, and if the applicant is found to have any
disease or physical imperfection, he is rejected. If this practice becomes general
among employers, it will, in time, cause a great amount of unemployment among
employees who are capable of doing considerable work. Such a situation might
justify a modification of the rule.
13. McMain v. Connor & Sons Const. Co., 337 Mo. 40, 85 S. W. (2d) 43
(1935).
14. 199 S.W. 227 (Mo. 1917).
15. 100 S. W. (2d) 289 (Mo. 1936).
16. 338 Mo. 857, 92 S. W. (2d) 620 (1936).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1937

115

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 4 [1937], Art. 1
2 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
22 and 23 of article VI of the constitution of Missouri in that it deprives
plaintiff of a hearing in a constitutional court. Division two of the court
overruled this contention without discussion, merely stating that such contention had been overruled in DeMay v. Liberty Foundry Co. 17.
Plaintiff further contended that the Act violates the "due process"
clause of the United States Constitution. In overruling that contention the

court said:
... the Constitution does not forbid the... abolition of old
ones (rights) recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible
legislative object.' . . . A husband has no vested right arising out
of a future tort to his wife."''
Sixth. The application of the Act is avoided if the injured employee
is, at the time of the accident or injury, engaged in interstate commerce, in
which case his rights may be governed by federal law. In Drew v. Missouri
Pacific R. R.19 in an action under the Federal Act, the court applied the well
established test, namely: "... was the employee, at the time of the injury,
engaged in interstate transportation, or in work so closely related to it as to
be practically a part of it?..." Applying this test to the facts, the court
found employee was not so engaged, and hence had no cause of action under
the Federal Act.
CONSTRUCTION

OF VARIOUS SECTIONS OF THE ACT

The supreme court has uniformly held that the statute should be liberally
construed so as to give effect to the intention of the legislature.
Section 330120 was the subject of close scrutiny by division two of the
court in Holder v. Elms Hotel Co.21 That case was a common law action for
damages brought by the husband of an employee who had received an injury
in the course of her employment. He sued for loss of services and companionship. The employer set up the Compensation Act as a defense to such action.
Section 3301 provides among other things:
"The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee, shall exclude
all other rights and remedies of such employee, his wife, her husband, parents,
personal representatives, dependents, heirs or next kin, at common law or

17. 327 Mo. 495, 37 S. W. (2d) 640 (1931).
18. Holder v. Elms Hotel Co., 338 Mo. 857, 866, 92 S. W. (2d) 620 (1936).
19. 100 S. W. (2d) 516 (Mo. 1936).
20. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929).
21. 338 Mo. 857, 92 S. W. (2d) 620 (1936).
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otherwise, on account of such accidental injury or death, except such rights
'2
and remedies as are not provided for by this chapter. 2
The court held that the Act was intended to define rights of third parties
as well as those of employer and employee, that the release and exclusion
clauses of the section are in harmony with such intent, and that they were
intended to take away this common law right of the husband.
Section 330523 defines certain terms used through the Act. In Downey v.
Kansas City Gas Co.,2 4 the term "accident" as therein defined" was considered.
Employee's job was installing furnaces, heaters, etc., in the course of which
his hands and arms would become covered with soot. In wiping sweat from
his face he would get soot in his eyes, causing them to smart and burn. This
continued over a period of five or six weeks, resulting in impairment of his
vision. Following the Guillod case, 26 the court held that the employee had
suffered an injury caused by a "series of similar accidental occurrences....
Here we have an unexpected and unforseen event, bearing in mind that the
'event' referred to in the statute may be a result rather than a cause."
28
27
In Maddux v. K. C. Public Service Co, the term "total disability"
came under judicial scrutiny. The court there said:
"Having in mind the ... rule of liberal construction, the question presented may be stated thus: What did the Legislature mean
by the use of the phrase 'inability to return to any employment' as it
appears in subdivision (e) of the statute above referred to? There
being nothing of a technical nature involved therein, it is our duty
to hold that the Legislature intended that the words should be taken
in their 'plain or ordinary and usual sense. Section 655 R. S. Mo.
1929.... When we speak of the 'ability' or 'inability' of a person to
obtain and hold employment, we ordinarily have in mind that the
person referred to is either able or unable to perform the usual duties
of whatever employment may be under consideration, in the manner
22. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929).
23. Ibid.
24. 338 Mo. 803, 92 S. NV. (2d) 580 (1936).
25. (b) The word "accident" as used in this chapter shall, unless a different
meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean an unexpected or
unforeseen event happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault
and producing at the same time objective symptoms of an injury.
26. Guillod v. K. C. Power & Light Co., 224 Mo. App. 382, 18 S. W. (2d) 97
(1929).
27. 100 S. W. (2d) 535 (Mo. 1936).
28. (e) The term "total disability" as used in this chapter shall mean inability
to return to the employment in which the employee was engaged at the time of
the accident.
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that such duties are customarily performed by the average person
engaged in such employment."
In State ex rel. Weaver v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission,2 Section 3310, subsection (b),30 was construed by the court en banc.
This sub-section provides:
"(b) This chapter shall apply to all injuries received in this
state, regardless of where the contract of employment was made,
and also to all injuries received outside of this state under contract
of employment made in this state, unless the contract of employment in any case shall otherwise provide."
The court held that the limiting clause, "unless the contract of employment in any case shall otherwise provide", applies to both situations, namely
(1) where the injury occurs in Missouri even though the contract was made
elsewhere, and (2) where the injury occurs elsewhere under a Missouri contract of employment.
The term "dependent" as used in Section 331931 was construed and
defined in Kemmerling v. Koch Erecting Co.32 The court said that the question of dependency is one of fact, and for the commission to decide. It
pointed out that in some cases, as parent and child, or husband and wife,
dependency is presumed from the relationship. But in other cases it is not;
in such cases the burden is placed on claimant to prove dependency.
Section 3319 also provides for payment by the employer of the reasonable
cost of burial of the deceased employee. In the same case it was held that this
section authorized an award of such burial expense only to the person who
furnished same by authority of the nearest relative of the deceased. It further
appears from that case that such award is proper only when such expense is
borne by such individual out of his own funds, and the award will be made if
the deceased's money is used.
In Allen v. St. L.-San Francisco Ry.,33 the court had under consideration
the question of limitation as provided for in Section 3337.34 It was there held
that the statute does not begin to run against minors so long as they have no
duly appointed guardian or curator.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

95 S. W. (2d) 641 (Mo. 1936).
Mo. REv. STAT. (1929).
Mo. REv. STAT. (1929).
338 Mo. 252, 89 S. W. (2d) 674 (1936).
338 Mo. 395, 90 S. W. (2d) 1050 (1935).
Mo. REv. STAT. (1929).
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JURISDICTION AS AFFECTED BY Locus OF ACCIDENT

The question of jurisdiction of the Missouri Compensation Commission

as affected by the locus of the accident and the contract of employment was
considered in State ex rel. Weaver v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation
36
Commission, 5 and Adams v. ContinentalLife Ins. Co.
The former case was before the court on an application for a writ of
mandamus to compel the commission to assume jurisdiction of a claim. The
deceased was employed by a New York corporation, the contract of employment having been entered into in Illinois. The deceased worked in Missouri
and sustained injuries in this state in the course of his employment. His
widow and children were residents of Missouri.
The Illinois Act 7 provides that it shall apply to all injuries received outside the state where the contract of employment was entered into in Illinois.
The Missouri Act08 provides that it shall apply to all injuries received in
Missouri regardless of where the contract was made. Each Act provides that
its remedy shall be in lieu of all others.
The question was-which law should be applied? It was held that this
question must be determined by weighing each state's governmental interests, following Alaska Packers Ass'n v. IndustrialAccident Commission of
3 9 and turning the scale of decision according to their weight. In
California)
order to impose the foreign statute upon the courts of the state where the
action is brought on the ground of the full faith and credit clause, it is necessary to show, "upon some rational basis, that of the conflicting interests in-

volved, those of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum".
In Adams v. Continental Life Ins. Co.,40 the employee's death occurred
in South Dakota. Claim was filed before the Missouri Commission on the
ground the deceased was working under a contract entered into in Missouri.

This fact was in dispute, and the commission held that it was without jurisdiction. In its decision the supreme court, in upholding the commission,
recognizes the rule that if deceased, at the time of his death, was working
under a contract made in Missouri, which did not otherwise provide, the

35. 95 S. W. (2d) 641 (Mo. 1936).
36. 101 S. W. (2d) 75 (Mo. 1936).
37. ILL. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd) § 142, c. 48; ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933)
1379, § 205, c. 48.
38. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 3310.
39. 55 Sup. Ct. 518, 523 (1935).
40. 101 S. W. (2d) 75 (Mo. 1936).
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Missouri commission would have the jourisdiction even though the accident
,occurred in another state.
EVIDENCE

In Wills v. Berberich's Delivery Company,41 the widow filed a claim for
the death of her husband. While the deceased was repairing the roof of employer's garage, he fell off and injured his left arm and elbow. At the time of
the fall he had a boil on his cheek. The infection spread and he died within
a week. The commission allowed $8000.00 compensation.
On appeal the circuit court reversed the award because of the exclusion
of competent material evidence. The evidence offered by employer and excluded by the commission was a statement of deceased that he had sustained
no injury to his face, and testimony of deceased's physician that deceased had
told him the same thing.
It was contended that since the employee was dead and not there to
refute said evidence, it was inadmissible. In overruling this contention the
court pointed out that such rule does apply when one of the parties to a conJractis dead; in such cases the law seals the lips of the other party. However,
such rule was held to be inapplicable to a compensation case, the court saying, "Evidence of statements made against interest may be shown even where
the party who is alleged to have made them is dead".
The testimony of deceased's physician was held to be admissible on the
theory that he was not a party to any contract with deceased. In a roundabout way the court recognizes that statements of a patient to a physician
during the course of and in aid of treatment are admissible as an exception
42
to the hearsay rule.
Based on the informality of proceedings before the commission (Section
3349) the court points out the distinction between admission of incompetent
evidence and the exclusion of competent evidence. The admission of incompetent evidence is not in itself reason to set aside an award if sufficient
material competent evidence was introduced to support the award. But the
exclusion of competent evidence offered by the losing party is ground for
reversal.

41. 98 S. W. (2d) 569 (Mo. 1936).
42. The court might have given as a further reason for the admissibility of
the physician's testimony sub-section (c) of Sec. 3348, Missouri Revised Statutes
(1929), which provides:
"The testimony of any physician who examined the employee shall be admissible in evidence in any proceedings for compensation under this chapter."
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OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

Downey v. Kansas City Gas Co., 43 was a suit for damages sustained by
reason of an occupational disease. Employer, defendant, set up the Compensation Act as a defense. It appeared that employee's work was installing
furnaces, heaters, etc., that he got soot on his hands and arms, and in wiping
sweat from his face, soot got in his eye. This continued over a period of five
or six weeks, resulting in injury to his eye. A judgment was recovered by
plaintiff.
The court reversed the case and held that plaintiff had suffered an injury
under the Compensation Act. 44 It further adopted the definition of an occupational disease to be "a disease that is not only incident to an occupation, but
the natural, usual, and ordinary result thereof; and... not... one occasioned
4
by accident or misadventure". 1
The court held that plaintiff had failed to show facts sufficient to bring
his case within this definition, but he did show that his injury was in the nature
of an accident.
MISCELLANEOUS

In Markley v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 45 an employee of a rock company sued the railroad for furnishing a defective car, by reason of which he
sustained injuries in the course of his employ. One ground of defense advanced by the defendant was that plaintiff could not maintain the suit because his employer had paid him compensation for the injury. The court
held that this contention was decided against defendant in General Box Co.
7
v. Mo. Utilities Co.4
A writ of mandamus was sought in State ex rel. Kansas City Bridge Co.
v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission,48 to compel the commis-

43. 338 Mo.803, 92 S.W. (2d) 580 (1936).
44. See discussion of this case, supra.
45. Wolff v. Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 336 Mo. 746, 81 S. W. (2d) 323
(1934).
46. 338 Mo. 436, 90 S.W. (2d) 409 (1936).
47. 331 Mo. 845, 55 S.W. (2d) 442 (1932). In that case the employer brought
suit under Sec. 3309, Missouri Revised Statutes (1929), for the death of Clark, an
employee, against defendant by reason of whose negligence it was alleged Clark was
killed. The court said:
"Our courts have held that, while the Workmen's Compensation Act deprives
the injured employee, or his dependents in case of death, of the right to maintain
a suit based on negligence against his employer when such act applies, the compensation allowed being exclusive,

. .

. yet the right of such employee to sue and re-

cover against the negligent third party remains unimpaired by such act....
48. 92 S.W. (2d) 624 (Mo. 1936).
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sion to accept jurisdiction of a claim. Employee drowned in the Mississippi
River while working on a bridge. A claim was filed before the Missouri commission but jurisdiction was denied on the ground that the claim was properly under the Federal Act. The employer applied to the St. Louis Court of
Appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel the Missouri commission to
assume jurisdiction, which writ was denied, but the cause was certified to
the supreme court. In the meantime, a claim was filed under the Federal
Act.
The court denied the writ on the ground that mandamus issues only of
necessity to prevent injustice, and it will not issue if it would be nugatory
or unavailing. The court pointed out that there were too many alternatives.
If the writ were issued, the claimant might (1) refuse to prosecute his claim,
(2) dismiss his claim in both state and federal tribunals, or (3) the federal
tribunal might assume jurisdiction exclusively. Furthermore, if the writ
were denied, the employer might suffer no injury if claimant dismissed his
claim.
In Downey v. Kansas City Gas Company,49 the employer set up the
Compensation Act as a defense to a common law action for damages. The
court held that in such actions the act is an affirmative defense. The defendant must plead and prove facts bringing the case within the act.

49. 338 Mo. 803, 92 S. W. (2d) 580 (1936).
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